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Introduction
As a consequence of the Great Recession (2007-09), the standard New Keynesian model for analyz-
ing optimal policy has changed from assuming frictionless nancial markets to including nancial
rigidities. These changes render the new framework suitable for analyzing the interaction between
macroeconomic policy and nancial events.
In the present dissertation, I analyze optimal monetary, unconventional, and macro-prudential
policy under commitment. I make use of a model with a banking sector that faces balance sheet
constraints.
In order to emphasize the role played by monetary policy in containing nancial instability, in
the rst chapter the sole policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. Then, I allow the central
bank to make use of additional policy instruments. In the second chapter, the central bank can
undertake purchases of private securities. Finally, the third chapter considers the optimal mix
between monetary and prudential policy.
Chapter 1. In order to emphasize the role played by the monetary policy in containing nan-
cial instability, I assume that the sole policy instrument is the nominal interest rate. The main
distortions in this economy are: the monopolistic competition, sticky prices, and the balance sheet
constraint of banks. Sticky prices allow monetary policy to have real e¤ects. This friction interacts
with the nancial distortions and create trade-o¤s for the central bank. If a nancial shock hits,
the gap between the actual and the e¢ cient allocations widens. This uctuation is costly and the
central bank attempts to stabilize the nancial market, but the cost is uctuation in ination.
The main result of this chapter is that nancial events matter. Stabilizing the nancial sector is
welfare improving, but with only one policy instrument the central bank cannot stabilize ination
and nancial variables at the same time. A modied Taylor rule that consider a feedback para-
meter on the deviations of the cost of credit from its steady state level can implement the optimal
policy.
However, in this framework there are more objectives than policy instruments. In the next step,
I allow the central bank to use asset purchases of private securities and I deal with the optimal
mix of conventional and unconventional monetary policy.
Chapter 2. In this chapter, I extend the model in chapter 1 in order to allow central bank to
undertake direct lending to rms. Asset purchases is the unconventional policy instrument. In this
framework, the central bank a¤ect the price of credit (interest rate) and the provision of credit
ii
(lending in the private credit markets). The nominal interest rate inuences the cost of credit.
The credit intermediation by the central bank seeks to inuence the availability of and the price
of credit. Together, the conventional and unconventional policy can serve to stabilize ination and
the nancial markets. The central bank can implement the optimal policy by means of two policy
rules: the conventional Taylor rule which sets the nominal interest rate, and an asset purchases
rule.
Unconventional monetary policy can give a hand to conventional policy in order to stabilize
ination and nancial activity. However, if the central bank cannot access to unconventional
means to stabilize the economy, monetary policy would still need support from other branches of
policy in order to achieve price and nancial stability. Even if the economy can be stabilized with
monetary policy alone, the question is can it be stabilized more e¤ectively with macro-prudential
policies working alongside monetary policy? The model in chapter three is designed to answer this
question.
Chapter 3. In this chapter, I consider the optimal policy mix between monetary and prudential
policy. I make substantial modications to the model used in chapters 1, and 2, in order to make
it useful in assessing macro-prudential policies consistent with the evidence.
In the model, the banks face balance sheet constraints. They lend to households and rms.
Agent are heterogeneous: rstly, they are poor or rich; secondly, the groups di¤er by their degree
of patience; thirdly, as in the empirical evidence, the poorest contribute more to aggregate con-
sumption than to the aggregate disposable income, I capture this by allowing the poor-borrowers
to possess external habits, while the rich-savers possess internal habits in consumption.
The habits externality drives these agents to overconsume and to overborrow. Given that
consumers with external habits overborrow from banks, there are motives to introducing reserve
requirements as a prudential instrument.
The reserve requirement acts to reduce the overconsumption. The increase in the reserve
requirement makes the credit more expensive and the central bank can stabilize the economy
when the shocks hit.
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Chapter 1
Financial Frictions and Optimal Policy.
Abstract.
I analyze optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with a banking sector that faces
balance sheet constraints. Additionally, I consider monetary rules that can implement the optimal
policy.
In the presence of nancial frictions, ination stabilization is not as desirable as it is in their
absence. Rather, nancial stability becomes an objective of policy. When shocks hit, the policy
maker cannot simultaneously stabilize ination and the nancial sector. In the presence of the
nancial accelerator, the monetary policy faces a trade o¤ between stabilizing the cost of credit,
which contribute to keep a healthy nancial sector, and stabilizing ination.
The simple rule that implements the optimal policy shows a strong reaction to changes in the
cost of credit. This rule is inertial and has a small feedback coe¢ cient on ination.
1.1 Introduction.
The Great Recession (2007-09) has renewed interest in analyzing the role of nancial events on
propagation and amplication of exogenous shocks. The disruption observed in the nancial
markets during the crisis shows that the credit markets play a crucial role in macroeconomic
stability.
The conventional New Keynesian model assumes that nancial markets work perfectly. For
example, Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) develop quantitative models with
several nominal and real rigidities, but assume frictionless nancial markets1.
Economic modelling has advanced in the introduction of imperfect nancial markets into the
conventional framework for analyzing monetary policy. For example, a moral hazard problem in
1Some exceptions to this are BGG(1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). However, the two previous studies
focus on the qualitative aspects of the nancial frictions rather than analyzing the quantitative e¤ects of such
distortions.
1
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) impedes the banks issuing an e¢ cient
amount of loans to non-nancial rms. They analyze unconventional policy as conducted by the
Federal Reserve in the past crisis. However, they abstract from optimal policy considerations. I
ll in this gap.
Following the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011), in the current model, prices are sticky, there
is monopolistic competition, and a banking sector facing balance sheet constraints. There is a
moral hazard problem between savers and bankers. In particular, in every period the banks can
divert a share of the funds available for lending. In order to prevent this, households impose an
incentive constraint on the banks. This has the e¤ect of tying the supply of credit to the value of
the capital in the bank. In this context, a shock reducing the value of the banksassets increases
the cost of credit, which leads to a fall in investment and asset prices. By directly a¤ecting banks
equity, swings in asset prices a¤ect the cost of credit and tend to amplify movements in investment.
This creates and endogenous feedback loop between asset prices and real activity. I analyze optimal
monetary policy in such circumstances.
Does there exist a trade-o¤ for optimal monetary policy in the presence of nancial frictions?
The nancial frictions create ine¢ cient activity and they place an additional constraint on
optimal policy. The central bank has to engineer an optimal response that stabilizes the nan-
cial sector, and ination. However, there is only one policy instrument available. Within this
framework, a productivity shock, a cost-push shock, or a nancial shock are inationary and re-
cessionary. When negative shocks hit, the balance sheet constraints of the banks tighten. As a
consequence of this, the banks reduce the supply of credit. This starts a cycle in which the initial
shock amplies the reduction in investment and the increase in the cost of credit, multiplying the
e¤ect on real activity. An optimizing central bank would seek to prevent this situation.
The main result of this chapter is that the introduction of nancial frictions creates a trade-o¤
between ination and nancial stabilization 2. If the central bank pursues ination stabilization, it
comes at the cost of increased nancial disruption and large deviations from the e¢ cient allocation.
Along this line, the central bank cannot simultaneously achieve ination and nancial stability with
only one policy instrument. If the only policy instrument available is the nominal interest rate, the
optimal policy trade-o¤s nancial and ination uctuation. In particular, it reacts to increases in
the cost of credit. If the premium on capital deviates from its long-run average, the central bank
aims to reduce ine¢ cient uctuations in output by making the credit cheaper by contributing to
the appreciation of the assets held by the nancial institutions.
Price stability is suboptimal because policymakers stabilize the nancial markets in order to
reduce ine¢ cient uctuation in output. For example, if ination rises, the typical policy of in-
2In the benchmark New Keynesian model it is necessary to introduce a cost-push shock to generate a non-trivial
policy trade-o¤ (Woodford (2003)). Leith et al. (2015, 2012) show how in the New Keynesian model, the presence
of deep habits in consumption serves to create interesting policy trade-o¤s. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) show that
productivity shocks can create policy trade-o¤s if there is cost channel in which the rmsmarginal costs depend
directly on the nominal interest rate.
2
creasing the nominal interest rate to reduce the ination pressures, elevates the banks cost of
funding. In this case, the banks would require a larger premium on their loans, which will in turn
exacerbate the collapse in investment spending and real activity, increasing the deviation from
the e¢ cient allocation. Hence, the optimal policy consists in allowing a temporary deviation from
price stability in exchange for a partial stabilization of the nancial markets.
How should optimal policy be conducted in this economy? Monetary policy can a¤ect all
the parts of the nancial sector. By changing the cost of credit, the central bank can a¤ect the
incentives for leveraging in the nancial sector. When negative shocks arise and nancial frictions
are present, it is optimal to aggressively reduce interest rates in order to stabilize the nancial
sector. This policy reduces the cost of funding, revalues the nancial assets, and protects the
protability of the banking sector. In contrast, in the absence of nancial frictions, the monetary
stance is not required to be as expansionary ; ination stabilization is optimal in that economy.
How can the central bank implement this optimal policy?
The second result of this chapter is that a central bank can mimic the optimal policy if it reacts
to changes in the nancial conditions, such as the cost of credit for rms. Not reacting to nancial
events is welfare decreasing. The optimal implementation of policy delivers an inertial rule that
has feedback coe¢ cients on both ination deviations and deviations of the premium on capital.
In particular, if the cost of credit for rms increases, which normally happens in a bad times, the
central bank should cut the interest rate to make the cost of funding cheaper. In this case, the
feedback coe¢ cient on ination is smaller, while larger coe¢ cients decrease welfare. It is optimal
to set the coe¢ cient on output uctuations to zero. The inertial rule has advantages over the
non-inertial. The introduction of the inertial component allows the central bank to commit itself
to stabilize the nancial markets in the short-run, while, if necessary, reversing its policy in the
long-run in order to anchor ination expectations and to achieve price-level control. This setting
implements the optimal policy.
To answer the questions posed here, I use a New Keynesian model with a banking sector
that faces balance sheet constraints, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). In this economy, I analyze
the optimal monetary commitment. In order to accurately compare the welfare across di¤erent
policies, I follow the approach developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section I present the literature review. In
the third section I present the model. The fourth section contains the benchmark calibration.
Section ve presents the problem faced by a benevolent social planner who seeks to maximize the
social welfare. This e¢ cient allocation serves to compare the results of optimal policy, which is
contained in section six. The optimal implementation of policy is presented in the seventh section.
The section after that presents robustness checks. And the ninth section concludes.
3
1.2 Related Literature.
The current paper can be related to the literature analyzing policy trade-o¤s in the presence of
real frictions. For example, in models without nancial frictions, the introduction of a cost-push
shock can generate signicant trade-o¤s for the policy maker (Woodford (2003)). Leith et al.
(2012, 2015) show that the introduction of deep habits in the utility function of the representative
consumer can generate a non-trivial optimal policy exercise. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) show that
if rmsmarginal costs depend directly on the nominal interest rate, the optimal policy is to allow
ination uctuations.
However, the particular emphasis of the current paper is on the trade-o¤s faced by the policy
maker in the presence nancial frictions. There is a group of works analyzing the optimal monetary
commitment in the presence of nancial frictions. For example, using the cost-channel mechanism
and a costly state verication, De Fiore and Tristani (2012) show that productivity shocks can
generate a trade-o¤ for monetary policy. In their framework, the optimal policy is to mitigate
output uctuations and to allow deviations of ination from its long run level. The central banks
trades o¤ stability of ination for stability of real activity.
In Carlstrom et al. (2010), borrowers are restricted to borrow at e¢ cient rates because there
is a constraint that ties the amount of loans to their collateral. They show that the central banks
loss function is partly a function of the tightness of the credit constraint, which they interpret as
a risk premium. However, their model abstracts from capital accumulation, which in the current
paper is relevant to introduce the nancial friction.
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) analyze optimal policy in an extended version of the New Key-
nesian model which incorporates household heterogeneity and nancial frictions. Borrowers and
savers discount future consumption at di¤erent rates, creating a positive wedge between borrowing
and lending rates; the loans are costly to produce and this constrains the supply of credit. They
conduct the optimal policy exercise using a linear-quadratic approach. In contrast, I conduct opti-
mal policy in a medium size DSGE model with a banking sector facing balance sheet constraints.
Similarly to the current paper, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) consider the implementation of the
optimal policy using Taylor rules. They also nd that nancial variables should be introduced into
such rule.
Leduc and Natal (2015) also consider the optimal commitment in a model with nancial fric-
tions. The optimal monetary policy should lean against movements in asset prices and risk-premia.
Their result is similar to one of the main conclusions in this paper. The optimal policy can be
approximated by including a speed-limit rule that places a substantial weight on the growth of
nancial variables. In their model, the nancial friction is on the borrowers side. In particular,
they rely on the nancial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In their
framework, the demand for credit is constrained by entrepreneursnet wealth. In contrast, in the
current paper, nancial frictions are on the supply side and the constrained agents are the banks,
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not the borrowers.
After the analysis of optimal policy in the presence of nancial frictions, I deal with the issue
of its optimal implementation. There is large literature researching the ability of simple rules to
lean against the nancial markets. For example, in Andres et al. (2010), borrowing is subject to
collateral constraints and banks are monopolistically competitive. The optimal monetary commit-
ment implies a short-run trade-o¤ between output and ination. A Taylor rule augmented with a
feedback coe¢ cient on the real-state prices implements the optimal policy.
Similarly, Gambacorta and Signoretti (2013) develop a DSGE with both a rms balance sheet
channel and a bank-lending channel. They assess whether Taylor rules augmented with asset
prices and credit can improve upon a standard rule in terms of macroeconomic stabilization. If
the central bank reacts to the nancial variables, welfare is maximized. Ination targeting and a
standard Taylor rule are less e¤ective in stabilizing uctuations.
In a model with search and matching frictions in the credit market, Fujimoto et al. (2014) con-
clude that the optimal rule must maintain a balance between nancial and real economic activity.
By taking nancial variables into account, monetary policy may contribute to nancial stability.
Notarprieto et al. (2015) analyze the implementation of optimal policy in a model with a hous-
ing sector. The social welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule features a reaction to house price
variations. Similarly to the previous studies, I nd that augmenting the conventional monetary
rule to include nancial elements is desirable. In particular, stabilizing the cost of credit increases
welfare in the economy.
Kamber and Thoenissen (2012) show that the amplication of monetary shocks introduced by
the feedback loop between nancial and real events can be overturned by assuming a more canonical
Taylor-type interest rate rule where the policy rate reacts to both ination and the output gap.
Output stabilization matters in this context and they nd a case to reduce the ination stabilization
motive. The model they use for their analysis is similar to nancial accelerator model by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
Finally, a group of authors nd that there is no case to extend the conventional Taylor rules
to include nancial variables. For example, Gilchrist (2002) concludes that, although asset prices,
and the economy as a whole, can exhibit large uctuations in response to nancial shocks, there
is not a strong case for including asset prices in monetary policy rules. The reason, he argues,
is that as asset channels are similar to aggregate demand channels, they tend to increase both
output and ination. Ination targeting, therefore, yields most of the benets of asset prices
targeting. Faia and Monacelli (2007) study optimal Taylor-type rules in an economy with credit
market imperfections. They conclude that for low values of the feedback coe¢ cient in the policy
rule, responding to a measure of assets is welfare improving. However, when monetary policy
responds strongly to ination, the marginal welfare gain of responding to asset prices vanishes. A
strong anti-inationary stance always attains the highest level of welfare.
In contrast to most of the literature presented above, I conduct an optimal policy exercise in a
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medium-size DSGE model in which the nancial frictions a¤ect the supply of credit, rather than
demand. Similarly to most of them, I present the ability of simple rules to implement the optimal
policy, which leans strongly against nancial events. In the next section, I present my benchmark
model for conducting this optimal policy analysis.
1.3 The Model.
The model I use for the analysis is a New Keynesian DSGE, similar to Christiano et al. (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007), but modied by Gertler and Karadi (2011) to include nancial
intermediaries that face balance sheet constraints. Within this framework, an agency problem
between borrowers and lenders limits the supply of credit. The number of loans that can be
intermediated by the banking sector depends on the value of net wealth in this sector. A reduction
in the value of this wealth has the e¤ect of increasing the cost of credit. The increase in the cost
of credit negatively a¤ects investment. As a consequence, the economic activity decreases. The
e¤ects of the shock are amplied with respect to the case in which the nancial friction is absent.
There are ve groups of agents: households, nancial intermediaries, non-nancial producers,
capital producers, and retailers.
1.3.1 Households.
Households choose consumption (Ct), labor (Lt) ; and debt
 
Dht+1

in order to maximize their
utility. Each household has a continuum of members. Within the household there is perfect
consumption insurance. There are two types of agents inside each household. At each period, the
fraction (1  f) represents workers and (f) bankers. A household owns the banks managed by its
members. The deposits of this household are in intermediaries they do not own.
The survival horizon of banks is nite. Introducing this nite horizon has the e¤ect of ensuring
that over time the banks do not reach the point where they can fund all the investment from their
own capital. () is the probability that a bank operates until the next period. This probability is
independent of how long the agent has been a banker. The average survival length of a bank is 
1
1 

.
The relative share of workers and bankers is constant. Each period, the number of bankers
leaving the industry is (1  ) f . The same number of workers become bankers. Households provide
their new bankers with startup funds. When a bank leaves the industry its retained prots are
returned in a lump-sum transfer to its owner.
Preferences.
To capture consumption dynamics, the utility function includes habits in consumption. The utility
function for the representative household is:
6
Et
1X
=t
 t
"
(C   hC 1)1 
1     
L1+'
1 + '
#
(1.1)
where (Lt) is labor. 0 <  < 1, is the subjective discount factor. The parameter h measures the
habit persistence in consumption.  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
 is the weight of labor disutility. ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The budget constraint of the household is:
Ct = WtLt + t +Rt [Dt +B
g
t ] 

Dt+1 +B
g
t+1
  Tt: (1.2)
Deposits (Dt+1) and government bonds
 
Bgt+1

are short-term assets paying the same return in
equilibrium. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), this condition is imposed from the beginning.
Bgt+1 +Dt+1

is the quantity of short-term riskless debt that the household acquires at period (t).
The gross real return on those assets is (Rt). This return is paid from (t  1) to (t).
Prots (t) from nancial and non-nancial rms are net of the amount the household gives
to its starting bankers at period (t). (Tt) are lump sum transfers from the government. The real
wage (Wt) complements the households budget constraint.
Optimality Conditions.
It is assumed that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unitary. The intertemporal max-
imization of (1.1) subject to the set of constraints of the form (1.2) implies the optimality condi-
tions3:
Optimal labor supply:
L't
Uct
= Wt: (1.3)
Euler equation:
1 = Ett;t+1Rt+1; (1.4)
where marginal utility of consumption (Uct) is:
Uct = Et

1
(Ct   hCt 1)   h
1
(Ct+1   hCt)

(1.5)
and
t;t+1 =
Uct+1
Uct
: (1.6)
3Appendix A.1 contains the detailed derivations of these conditions.
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1.3.2 Banks.
Balance Sheet.
The nancial intermediary (j) receives deposits from households (Djt+1). These deposits pay the
short-term real interest (Rt+1) from (t) to (t+ 1). These funds complement the accumulated
wealth of banks (Njt). Banks make use of these two sources of funds to make loans to producers.
Loans pay the rate
 
Rkt+1

between (t) and (t+ 1).
The quantity of assets that the bank holds is (Sjt) : The relative price of the nancial asset is
(Qt). In each period the total value of assets held by the representative bank is (QtSjt). The value
of the banks liabilities plus capital is (Djt+1 +Njt). The balance sheet of the representative bank
is:
QtSjt = Djt+1 +Njt: (1.7)
Evolution of Wealth.
A banks net wealth evolves according to
Njt+1 = R
k
t+1QtSjt  Rt+1Djt+1; (1.8)
which is the di¤erence between the return on its assets
 
Rkt+1QtSjt

and the cost of its liabilities
(Rt+1Djt+1). After solving (1.7) for deposits and inserting the result in (1.8), the evolution of
wealth can be expressed as:
Njt+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtSjt +Rt+1Njt; (1.9)
the term

Rkt+1  Rt+1

is the assets premium over the riskless rate.
The banker will not fund a project with a return less than the cost of deposits. If the discount
factor applied by the bank to assets between period (t) and (t+ i) is

it;t+i

, then the next
condition should apply for the bank to operate:
Et
1+it;t+1+i

Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i
  0 (1.10)
in any period (i  0). In frictionless capital markets this relationship holds with equality. By
contrast, when the nancial frictions are present, this risk adjusted premium may be positive. The
presence of a positive spread in equilibrium will translate into ine¢ ciently low levels of capital and
overall economic activity.
Bank Maximization Problem.
The problem of the bank is to maximize the expected value of its terminal wealth (Vjt)
8
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) (1.11)
where
Njt+1+i =

Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSjt+i +Rt+1+iNjt+i
The probability of survival of banks (t) is subject to a random shock, which evolves as
ln (t) =  ln (t 1) + "t :
where ("t) has mean zero and variance (
2
t).
There is a frictionless process of lending and borrowing between producers and banks. The
possibility of making prots encourages the banker to remain in the industry as long as possible. In
order to issue new loans, the bank borrows from households. Then, the bank uses its accumulated
wealth and the deposits to issue loans to producers. It is assumed that banks face frictions in this
process of borrowing from households. This friction reduces the ability of the bank to issue new
loans.
In particular, every period, the bankers can divert a fraction () of available funds. To avoid
that the bank absconds with the funds, the household imposes an incentive constraint on the bank.
The cost to the banker of diverting funds is that the households can force the bank to shut down
and households can recover the fraction (1  ) of assets. For the lender to be willing to supply
funds to the banker, the following incentive constraint must be satised:
Vjt  QtSjt: (1.12)
The left-hand part (Vjt) is the expected present value of the banks nancial activity if it
remains in the industry. This is what the bank would lose if it is forced to leave the industry. The
term (QtSjt) is what the bank would gain if it absconds with the funds. The bank assesses this
trade-o¤ and acts optimally. The bank would remain in the industry as long as the benets from
doing so covers the benets from absconding with a share of assets.
The household would deposit in the bank only if the benet for the bank of lending and
borrowing is at least as large as the benet for the bank from diverting funds. This contract limits
the ability of the banking sector to raise funds from households. As a consequence, the banks have
limits on the loans they can issue. This will impact the level of capital that rms can accumulate
and the overall economic activity would be ine¢ ciently low.
In the appendix A.1 it is shown that the conjectured solution to the banks maximization
problem can be expressed as
Vjt = vtQtSjt + tNjt (1.13)
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where
vt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

(1.14)
+Ett+1t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
and
t = E (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 (1.15)
+Ett+1t;t+1zt;t+1t+1:
The term (vt) is the marginal expect return to the bank of increasing assets. (t) is the marginal
expected return to the bank of increasing its accumulated wealth.
The term
xt;t+i =
Qt+iSjt+i
QtSjt
(1.16)
is the gross growth of assets between period t and t + i. Over the same period, the net wealth of
the banker has a gross growth of
zt;t+1 =
Njt+i
Njt
: (1.17)
Leverage Ratio.
Substituting the conjectured solution (1.13) in the incentive constraint (1.12)
tQtSjt + tNjt  QtSjt; (1.18)
and solving for assets, the incentive constraints can be expressed as
QtSjt
Njt
 t
  t : (1.19)
Dening the leverage ratio in the banking sector (t) as the maximum ratio of loans to net
wealth
h
QtSjt
Njt
= t
i
, then
t =
t
  t : (1.20)
Combining (1.19) and (1.20), it is possible to express the assets intermediated by the bank as
QtSjt = tNjt; (1.21)
which is the leverage ratio times the banks net wealth. The previous expression means that the
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maximum amount of loans issued by the representative bank is limited by the maximum leverage
ratio tolerated by the household. This leverage ratio is a function of the diverting preference of
the banks and the protability of the banking industry. The maximum amount of loans is also
restricted by the amount of accumulated wealth of the bank.
Substituting the leverage ratio in the evolution of wealth (eq. 1.9)
Njt+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1
	
Njt; (1.22)
and using this in (1.16) and (1.17)
zt;t+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1; (1.23)
and the gross rate of assets can be written as
xt;t+1 =
t+1
t
zt;t+1: (1.24)
Evolution of Aggregate Leverage Ratio.
The components of the leverage ratio are the same for each bank. After aggregating (1.21),
QtSt =

t
  t

Nt: (1.25)
the overall demand for assets in the economy (QtSt) can be written as a function of the leverage
ratio and the accumulated wealth (Nt) in the banking sector
Evolution of Aggregate Net Wealth.
The evolution of aggregate wealth (Nt) is the sum of two components: the net worth of the existing
banks (Net), and the net wealth of the new banks (Nnt)
Nt = Net +Nnt: (1.26)
The fraction of bankers (t 1) at (t  1) survives until (t). Then, using the aggregation of
(1.22),
Net = t 1

Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt
	
Nt 1: (1.27)
As outlined by Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that the newly entering bankers receive
start-up funds from their respective households. It is assumed that these start-up funds are equal
to a small fraction of the value of assets that exiting bankers had intermediated in their nal
operating period. The total value of assets of exiting bankers is (1  t 1)QtSt 1. It is assumed
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that each period the household transfers a fraction
h
w
1 t 1
i
of those assets to its new bank. In
aggregate [Net = wQtSt 1]. The evolution of aggregate wealth is
Nt = t 1

Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt
	
Nt 1 + wQtSt 1: (1.28)
1.3.3 Intermediate Goods Producers.
The goods produced in this competitive sector are sold to retailers. At the end of period (t)
intermediate producers acquire (Kt+1) units of capital from capital goods producers. This capital
is for use in the subsequent periods. At the end of period (t+ 1) the rm has the option of reselling
the undepreciated capital in the open market. There are no capital adjustment costs at the rm
level.
To purchase capital, intermediate producers issue (St) claims for each unit of capital acquired
(Kt+1). These contingent claims are acquired by the banks. The price of each claim is the same as
of each unit of capital (Qt). Then, the value of capital acquired is equal to the value of contingent
claims
QtKt+1 = QtSt: (1.29)
Financial intermediation between banks and intermediate producers is frictionless. The claims
(St) can be thought as perfectly state-contingent debt. Every period the producer pays the full
return on capital to the bank.
Production of Intermediate Goods.
The production (Ymt) in this sector is given by
Ymt = At (UttKt)
 L1 t (1.30)
where (At) is the total factor productivity, (Kt) the capital acquired in the previous period
and used in this period. (Lt) is the labor demand and (Ut) the utilization rate. Following
Gertler and Karadi (2011), the term (t) is an exogenous shock to the quality of capital. This
shock can be interpreted as a sudden obsolescence on the capital4 and provides an exogenous
source of variation to the price of capital.
The relative price of the goods in this sector is (Pmt). In the appendix A.1, it is shown that
from prots maximization in this sector:
Labor demand:
4Gertler et al. (2012) provide the microfoundations for this shock.
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(1  )PmtYmt
Lt
= Wt:
Optimal utilization rate:
Pmt
Ymt
Ut
= bUttKt; (1.31)
where depreciation of capital is a function of the utilization rate. It is assumed that depreciation
takes the form
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t ; (1.32)
where () is the elasticity of depreciation respect to utilization rate.
Rate of Return on Capital.
The rms in this sector are perfectly competitive and gain zero prots state by state. Each period,
the rm pays to the bank the full return on capital. It is as if banks are the owners of the capital
on the rm. The return on capital is the remainder of the prots after paying the wage bill. From
the optimal conditions of the maximization problem of these rms, in appendix A.1 it is shown
that the return to capital is:
Rkt =
1
Qt 1

Pmt
Ymt
Kt
+ [Qt   t] t

: (1.33)
1.3.4 Capital Producers.
Competitive capital producers purchase the depreciated capital from the intermediate producers
at the end of the period (t). The capital is repaired and sold together with the new capital. The
cost of repairing worn out capital is unity. The value of selling one unit of new capital is (Qt).
Investment adjustment cost are associated with the net investment (Int):
Int = It   ttKt (1.34)
where (It) is the total investment.
Each period the rm maximizes
maxEt
1X
=t
 tt;
(
(Qt   1) Int   _i
2

In   In 1
In 1 + Iss
2
(In + Iss)
)
: (1.35)
The investment adjustment costs, associated with the net ow of investment, are
_i
2

In   In 1
In 1 + Iss
2
(In + Iss)
13
where (_i) is the inverse of the elasticity of net investment to the price of capital. Each of the
rms in this sector chooses the same level of net investment. So, it is not necessary to index
investment by rm. From this maximization problem the optimal price of capital
Qt = 1 +
_i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(1.36)
+_i

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss

 Ett;t+1_i

Int+1   Int
Int + Iss

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
:
1.3.5 Retailers.
Final output is a composite of a continuum of di¤erentiated retail goods. The only input of
production is the intermediate good. Retailers purchase inputs from the intermediate producers
and re-package it. The nal product is aggregated according to
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
ft df
 "
" 1
(1.37)
(Yft) is the output purchased to the retailer (f). (") is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Optimal Demand for Retailers.
As shown in the appendix A.1, from cost minimization, those purchasing the nal good have an
optimal demand for each variety equal to
Yft =

Pft
Pt
 "
Yt (1.38)
which implies the optimal price index
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
: (1.39)
Prot Maximization.
The only cost of production for the retailer is the price of the intermediate good. This cost is
given by (Pmt) because it takes only one unit of intermediate good to produce one unit of the retail
good. Each period, rms can adjust their price with probability (1  ). For the periods in which
the rm is not able to set prices, it indexes it to the lagged rate of ination.
In contrast to Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that this economy can be subject to a
cost-push shock. In particular, the government imposes a distortionary tax on sales. Following
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Chen et al. (2014), shocks to this tax, evolve according to
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t (1.40)
("t ) is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance (
2
t ) :
The rms problem in this sector is to choose the optimal price (P t ) to maximize its discounted
expected prots:
maxEt
1X
i=0
iit;t+i

(1   t) P

t
Pt+i
iQ
k=1
[t+k 1]
p   Pmt+i

Yft+i (1.41)
subject to
Yft+i =

P t
Pt+i
 "
Yt+i (1.42)
where t is the rate of ination from (t  i) to (t). And (p) is a parameter with values [0; 1] and
which measures the ination indexation. The rst order condition is
Et
1X
i=0
iit;t+i

P t
Pt+i
iQ
k=1
[t+k 1]
p   "
"  1Pmt+i

Yft+i = 0: (1.43)
As shown in the appendix A.1, the optimal price, implied by the solution to the previous
problem is:
P it
Pt
=
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
(1.44)
with
Ft = PmtYt + Ett;t+1
 "
t 
"
t+1Ft+1 (1.45)
and
Zt = (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Ft+1: (1.46)
Evolution of the price index.
Every period there is a share (1  ) of producers adjusting price optimally. The remaining ()
simply index their price to the previous period ination. Using the optimal price index (1.39) the
evolution of the price index
P 1 "t =

(1  ) (P t )1 " + 



t 1Pt 1
1 "
: (1.47)
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Price Dispersion.
As shown in the appendix A.1, price dispersion is dened as
t =
Z 1
0

Pft
Pt
 "
df: (1.48)
Using the law of movement of the price index and the denition of price dispersion this measure
evolves according to:
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1: (1.49)
1.3.6 Government Budget Constraint.
The government spending, which evolves exogenously, (Gt) and the payments on the debt acquired
previously (RtB
g
t ) are nanced with a tax on sales ( tYt), issue of new government bonds
 
Bgt+1

,
and using lump-sum taxation (Tt). The governments budget constraint is
Tt = Gt +RtB
g
t  Bgt+1    tYt (1.50)
The initial level of debt (Bgt ) is zero. The lump-sum tax ensures that the debt of the government
is stabilized over time and that its budget constraint is balanced, then
Tt = Gt    tYt: (1.51)
where government consumption (Gt) is xed at its steady state value (G). Regarding the steady
state government spending to GDP ratio,
 
G
Y

is 0:2, this is a conventional value, and between
1980-2010 the average was 19.8 percent (BEA NIPA table 1.1.10).
1.3.7 Aggregate Resource Constraint.
Consumption, government spending, total investment and the costs associated with the change in
investment adjustment are the demand faced by the nal producers. Then, the aggregate resource
constraint is
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
_i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) : (1.52)
1.3.8 Law of movement of Capital.
From the law of movement of capital
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Kt+1 = (1  t) tKt + It (1.53)
and the denition of net investment
Int = It   ttKt (1.54)
capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = tKt + Int: (1.55)
1.3.9 Monetary Policy.
Optimal policy is conducted in a Ramsey fashion. However, to gain some insights on the dynamics
of this competitive economy, the following section presents the results of the model when the
economy follows simple rules. I make use of the Fisher equation to relate nominal and real interest
rates
it = EtRt+1t+1: (1.56)
If monetary policy is not conducted in an optimal fashion, then simple rules are implemented
by a central bank following a Taylor rule to set the nominal interest rate. That rule is
it
i
= Et

it 1
i
R ht

i Yt
Y
Y
"it; (1.57)
where ("it) is an exogenous monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance (2m). Eventually
the policy maker can choose to smooth the interest rate, the size of this smoothing preference is
controlled by (R).
The set of all the equilibrium conditions is listed in the Appendix A.2.
1.4 Calibration.
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. To calibrate the model I follow the work of
Gertler and Karadi (2011), who in turn follow Primiceri et al. (2006). The habits parameter (h)
is set to 0.815. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution () is set to unity. The subjective
discount factor ( = 0:99) implies an annual real interest of 4.1 percent.
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (') takes a value of 0.276. The weight of labor in the utility
function is ( = 3:4). The elasticity of capital in the production function () takes a value of
0.33. The depreciation in steady state is 2.5 percent per quarter and the elasticity of marginal
depreciation to the utilization rate () takes a value of 7.2. The inverse of the elasticity of net
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investment to the price of capital

_i

is assumed to be 1.728.
The probability that a rm does not adjust its price this period ( = 0:779) implies that a rm
keeps its price for around 4 quarters. The size of the indexation of the price to the previous period
ination (p) takes a value of 0.241.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods is (" = 4:167). The value of this
coe¢ cient is very low. This implies a very large monopolistic distortion. The results are robust
to a more competitive economy. In the robustness section I make use of more standard values
for this parameters. In particular, [" = 11; " = 7]. The coe¢ cient measuring the reaction of the
nominal interest rate to changes in ination in the Taylor rule () is 1.5 and the the coe¢ cient
on output deviations is (Y ) is 0.5. I assume that the smoothing parameter (R) is zero. I assume
that ination in steady state is zero.
The persistence of the shock to productivity, the shock to the quality of capital, and the shock
to government spending take the values A = 0:95;  = 0:66; and g = 0:95, respectively. The
persistence of the shock to the probability of dying in the banking sector and to the cost-push
shock are  = 0:66 and  = 0:95, respectively. The government spending (G) is one fth of the
total output.
Following the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011), the spread between the rate of return on
capital and the riskless rate
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

is 25 basis points quarterly, which implies and annual
spread of 1 percentage point. The leverage ratio in steady state is assumed to be 4. And the trans-
fers to starting banks (!), is calibrated to match the leverage ratio. The value of this parameter
is 0.0022. It is assumed that the average survival time of a bank is 40 quarters, which implies a
probability () equal to 0.9715. The previous values for the nancial variables imply a share of
diverting funds equal to (0:3815). Table 1 summarizes the value of the parameters.
In order to compare some of the results to more conventional analyses of monetary policy, I
make use of a model without nancial frictions. This model is the conventional DSGE. Table 1
presents the list of the parameters for both cases.
In the next section I present the problem faced by a benevolent social planner who seeks to
maximize the social welfare in this economy. This problem is relevant because the social planer
delivers the e¢ cient allocation in this economy. The Ramsey planner would seek to mimic that
allocation.
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Table 1.1: List of Parameters
Parameter DSGE Financial
h Habits in consumption 0.815 0.815
 Subjective discount factor 0.99 0.99
 Disutility of labor 3.41 3.41
 Capital share 0.33 0.33
' Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.27 0.27
 Probability of survival banks  0.97
 Share of diverting loans  0.3815
! Transfer to starting banks  0.002
i Elasticity investment adjustment costs 1.72 1.72
 Elasticity of marginal depreciation to utilization 7.2 7.2
 Share of rms no adjusting price 0.77 0.77
p Degree of price indexation 0.241 0.241
" Elasticity of substitution 4.1 4.1
a Persistence coe¢ cient technology shock 0.95 0.95
 Persistence coe¢ cient quality shock 0.66 0.66
 Persistence coe¢ cient prob. of survival banks  0.66
i Persistence coe¢ cient monetary shock 0.75 0.75
 Persistence coe¢ cient cost-push shock 0.93 0.93
a St. dev. shock to productivity 0.01 0.01
 St. dev. shock to quality of capital 0.01 0.01
 St. dev. shock to survival probability 0.01 0.01
 St. dev. cost-push shock 0.0647 0.0647
i St. dev. monetary policy shock 0.01 0.01
 Ination coe¢ cient. Taylor rule. 1.5 1.5
Y Output coe¢ cient. Taylor rule. 0.5 0.5
R Smoothing parameter. Taylor rule. 0 0
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Table 1.2: Variables in Steady State
Variable DSGE Financial
C Consumption 0.5537 0.5375
R Real interest rate (quarterly %) 1.01 1.01
L Labor 0.3383 0.3333
Pm Price intermediate production 0.76 0.76
Y Output 0.8912 0.8488
Rk Return on capital (quarterly %) 1.01 1.26
Q Price of capital 1 1
K Capital 6.3676 5.6616
Ym Intermediate production 0.8912 0.8488
U Utilization of capital 1 1
I Investment 0.1592 0.1415
G Government spending 0.1782 0.1698
 Price dispersion 1 1
 Ination 1 1
i Nominal interest rate (quarterly %) 1.01 1.01
Spread Premium on capital (basis points) 0 25
 Leverage ratio 4
N Wealth of banks 1.4154
Ne Wealth surviving banks 1.4028
v Marginal return on bank assets 0.0037
 Marginal return on bank wealth 1.5110
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1.5 Social Planners Allocation.
In order to have a benchmark against which I can compare the results of the optimal policy exercise,
in this section, I describe and solve the problem faced by a social planner who seeks to maximize
the utility of the consumer subject to the resource constraint, and the production technology.
This social planner maximizes
Et
1X
t=0
t

ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 + '
L1+'t

; (1.58)
subject to the production function
Yt = At (UttKt)
 L1 t ; (1.59)
the evolution of depreciation
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t ; (1.60)
net investment
Int = It   ttKt; (1.61)
the evolution of capital
Kt+1   tKt = Int; (1.62)
and the aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
(Int + Iss) : (1.63)
The solution to this problem delivers the e¢ cient allocations (denoted with ())5:
Y  =

K
L

L (1.64)
with
U =

1   [1  ]
b
 1

= 1 (1.65)
K
L
=

1   [1  ]

 1
 1
(1.66)
L =
(
1  h
1  h
1  


K
L
 
C
L
 1) 11+'
(1.67)
5The Appendix A.3 shows the detailed derivation of these values.
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C
L
=

K
L
 
1 G  [] K
L
: (1.68)
After using the optimal value for utilization (U = 1) the equations for output, labor, and
capital can be written as
Y  =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
264
h
1 [1 ]

i (1+')
 1 
1 G
  []
h
1 [1 ]

i 1 2 '
 1
375
  1
1+'
(1.69)
K =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
264 1 G
h
1 [1 ]

i 1+'
1 
  []
h
1 [1 ]

i+'
1 
375
  1
1+'
(1.70)
L =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
" 
1 G
  []
h

1 [1 ]
i #  11+' : (1.71)
which are equations in terms of the deep parameters.
In the next section, I present and solve the Ramsey problem. I also present the main distortions
of this economy. These distortions prevent the economy to achieve the e¢ cient levels of activity.
The presence of these distortions can open the door to the policy trade-o¤s.
1.6 Ramsey Policy and Distortions.
1.6.1 Distortions.
In this section, I present the main distortions associated with this economy. In particular: monop-
olistic competition and sticky prices, and a positive spread between the lending and deposit rate
in the banking sector. The monopolistic competition and sticky prices are a conventional way to
provide monetary policy with the ability to a¤ect the real variables. The positive spread between
the lending and the deposit rate in the banking sector is a distortion that allows the nancial
imperfections to a¤ect the business cycle.
In order to have a better understanding of the e¤ects of each of the previous distortions over
the business cycle and stabilization policy, I make use of the proper subsidies just as a devices to
switch individual distortions on or o¤ in order to isolate their impact. 2
Monopolistic Competition.
In this section, I present the main distortions associated with this economy. From the optimal
conditions of the competitive equilibrium, the labor market equilibrium, in steady state is given
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by
L'+1 =

1  


UcPmY; (1.72)
where the marginal utility of consumption (Uc) in steady state is
Uc =

1  h
C (1  h)

:
It is possible to express the labor market equilibrium as a function of the deep parameters in
the economy and the capital-labor ratio as:
L =
(
1  h
1  h

1  


K
L
 
1 GK
L

  K
L
 1
Pm
) 1
1+'
: (1.73)
From the Social Planners allocation, I know that the e¢ cient level of labor is given by
L =
(
1  h
1  h

1  


K
L
 
1 GK
L

  K

L
 1) 11+'
(1.74)
(1.73) and (1.74) would be equal if the term (Pm) would be equal to unity in (1.73). The price
of the intermediated goods (Pm) is di¤erent from unity and it is a function of the parameter
governing the monopolistic competition in the economy. This has the e¤ect of distorting the levels
of economic activity in steady state. Assuming, for the time being, that no other distortions exist,
it is possible to get the e¢ cient level of economic activity if a subsidy in steady state eliminates
this distortion.
In steady state, the relative price of intermediate goods is given by
Pm =
"  1
"
;
which is di¤erent from unity. Subsidizing the sales of this good (mon) allows me to write the
equilibrium in the presence of this subsidy as:
1 =
"
"  1
1
1 + mon
Pm (1.75)
Then, the value of subsidy the that eliminates the distortion associated with monopolistic
competition is equal to
1 + mon =
"
"  1 : (1.76)
Given the values of the parameters used to calibrate the model, the subsidy (mon) is equal
to 0:3158. I assume that the subsidies are nanced using lump-sum taxes. This subsidy would
deliver the e¢ cient levels of the variables if no other distortion existed. However, the presence of
the imperfect banking sector also contributes to distort the economy.
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Positive spread.
In this model, the steady state value of the variables are also a¤ected by the presence of a positive
spread between the return on capital and the risk-free rate. From the optimal conditions of the
social planners allocation, the capital-labor ratio is
K
L
=

R  [1  ]

 1
 1
: (1.77)
In this nancial model, the capital-labor ratio, once the subsidy on sales is present, is given by
K
L
=

Rk   [1  ]
Pm (1 + mon)
 1
 1
: (1.78)
In models without frictions, capital is expanded until the point in which the return on capital 
Rk

is equal to the real interest rate (R), which in turn equates the inverse of the households
subjective discount factor,
Rk = R =
1

: (1.79)
However, in this model this is no longer possible because of the existence of a positive spread
in equilibrium associated with the nancial frictions. Hence,
Rk  R = Spread; (1.80)
with Spread > 0. Substituting (1.80) in (1.78)
K
L
=

R + Spread  [1  ]
Pm (1 + )
 1
 1
: (1.81)
Then, once the subsidy to the sales is in place (Pm (1 + mon) = 1), the di¤erence between
(1.81) and (1.77) is due to the imperfect banking sector. A subsidy to the acquisition of capital 
SP

can eliminate the spread. In this case, the capital-labor relationship is:
K
L
=

R + Spread+ SP   [1  ]

 1
 1
: (1.82)
The value of the subsidy that eliminates this distortion in equilibrium is
SP =  Spread (1.83)
after substitution and using

R = 1


K
L
=

1   [1  ]

 1
 1
: (1.84)
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which is the e¢ cient value of the variables when the two subsidies are implemented. When this
subsidy to the return on capital is present, I can eliminate the nancial distortion. In this case, I
return to the conventional DSGE. The presence of the two subsidies delivers the e¢ cient allocation.
1.6.2 Welfare Cost.
In this section, I present the measure of welfare used to analyze the welfare cost associated with
each distortion. In order to accurately compare welfare, I follow the work of Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004, 2007) and use a second-order approximation to the full model. I measure the welfare
cost as the amount of consumption that agents in the Ramsey regime are willing to renounce in
order to have the same welfare as in the alternative policy scenario. The level of welfare associated
with the time-invariant stochastic allocation in the Ramsey policy conditional on a particular state
of the economy in period zero is
V R0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU

CRt ; L
R
t

(1.85)
the variables
 
CRt ; L
R
t

are the contingent plans for consumption and labor under the Ramsey
policy. Similarly, an implementable regime has conditional welfare equal to
V I0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU

CIt ; L
I
t

(1.86)
As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I assume that at time zero, the value of all the variables
are equal to their non-stochastic Ramsey steady-state. Using this assumption helps to ensure that
the economy starts from the same initial point under all the alternative regimes. If the consumption
cost of following an alternative policy regime instead of the Ramsey policy on a particular state in
period zero is represented by

WC

the cost of the alternative policy is implicitly dened by
V I0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU
 
1 WCCRt ; LRt  : (1.87)
where

WC

is the fraction of consumption of the Ramsey regime that a household is willing to
renounce in order to be indi¤erent between that regime and the alternative policy. Using the
particular utility function
U = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 +  
L1+ t ;
solving equation (1.87) for

WC

and approximating to a second order, the cost of choosing an
alternative policy is
WC  1
2
(1  ) V R""   V I""2": (1.88)
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Table 1.3: Steady-State and Distortions.
Social Planner Benchmark DSGE SP Mon SP+Mon
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Consumption 0.7700 0.5375 0.5537 0.7487 0.7700
2. Investment 0.3203 0.1415 0.1592 0.2829 0.3203
3. Labor 0.4520 0.3333 0.3383 0.4424 0.4520
4. Capital 12.8126 5.6616 6.3676 11.3176 12.8126
5. Government 0.2726 0.1698 0.1782 0.2579 0.2726
6. Output 1.3628 0.8488 0.8912 1.2896 1.3628
The derivation of this measure of welfare cost is detailed in the Appendix A.4.
Welfare Costs of Each Distortion.
In this section, I present the welfare costs associated with each distortion in this model. By
using the appropriate subsidies, it is possible to eliminate the identied distortions: monopolistic
competition, nancial frictions, or it is possible return to the exible-price equilibrium.
Table 3 presents the values of selected variables in the steady state when di¤erent subsidies are
in place. The rst column shows the e¢ cient case. The second column presents the benchmark
case in the presence of the monopolistic and nancial distortions
The utilization of a subsidy to the excess return on capital
 
SP

delivers the allocation as-
sociated with the conventional DSGE. In the column (4), I make use of a subsidy to the sales in
steady state
 
Mon

in order to remove monopolistic competition. Hence, the nancial frictions
are the sole distortion.
As shown in table 3, the largest distortion in steady state is associated with the presence
of monopolistic competition. Table 4 shows the welfare cost in the non-stochastic steady state
associated with each of the cases described above. The cost is the percentage of the stream of
consumption of the social planners allocation that the agents would be willing to renounce in
order to have the same welfare as in the alternative case.
The monopolistic competition implies a cost of 1.02 percent, respect to the e¢ cient allocation
(column (3)). The presence of the friction in the nancial sector has a cost of 0.06 percent (last
column). When the two frictions are present, the welfare cost increases to 1.6 percent, this is the
benchmark case. Table 5 presents the conditional welfare cost when there is uncertainty in the
economy.
The highest conditional welfare cost is observed in the benchmark economy (1.85%). When
there is a subsidy to the excess return on capital
 
SP

, the conditional welfare cost is 1.26 percent
(column (3)). This is the cost of monopolistic competition and sticky prices.
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Table 1.4: Deterministic Welfare Cost
Social Planner Benchmark DSGE or SP Mon
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% SPA 1.6113 1.0216 0.0640
Table 1.5: Conditional Welfare (second order approximation)
Social Planner Benchmark DSGE or SP Mon Flex Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% SPA 1.8517 1.2567 0.5163 0.0484
When there is only a subsidy to monopolistic competition
 
Mon

, the conditional welfare cost
is 0.52 percent (column (4)). This is the cost of the nancial friction in the presence of uncertainty.
In the deterministic case, the cost of the nancial friction (0.064%) is a small fraction of the cost
of monopolistic competition (1.02%). However, when uncertainty is present, the nancial friction
has a considerable welfare cost (0.52%).
1.6.3 Ramsey Policy.
In this section, I present the optimal monetary policy in the presence of nancial frictions. The
Ramsey planner seeks to maximize the welfare of the society subject to the competitive equilibrium
conditions. I assume that the central bank is committed to follow the announced plan from a
timeless perspective (Woodford (2003)). As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), I assume that at
time (t) the Ramsey planner has been operating for an innite number of periods.
The period (t) objective function of the Ramsey planner is the utility function
Ut = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 +  
L1+ t : (1.89)
I assume that the discount factor of the Ramsey planner is equal to the subjective discount
factor of households in the competitive economy () : This policy maker maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
tU [Ct; Lt] (1.90)
subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions.
Then, the central bank maximizes the welfare function (1.90) subject to the competitive equi-
librium restrictions choosing at period (t) processes for the 30 endogenous variables Uct, Ct, t,
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Lt, vt, xt, t, zt, t, Kt+1, Nt, Net, Nnt, Rkt+1, Ymt, Qt, t, Ut, Int, Pmt, Gt, It, Yt, t, Ft, Zt, 

t ,
t, Rt, it and the 29 Lagrange multipliers.
The process for the shocks At,  t, t, t, gt are the same as those described in the competitive
equilibrium. The values for the variables listed above are given dated t<0, and also the values of
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the competitive equilibrium constraints are given at t<0.
Then, as explained in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), the structure of the optimality conditions
associated with the Ramsey equilibrium are time-invariant.
The Appendix A.5 presents the Lagrangian for the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
In the next section, I present the optimal monetary response when the economy is hit by: a
shock to the quality of capital, a shock to productivity, and a cost-push shock.
Shock to the Quality of Capital.
In the presence of a feedback loop between real and nancial activity, a decrease in the quality
of capital leads to a fall in the asset prices, which decrease the value of the bank. A banks
net worth is less valuable. This tightens the balance sheet constraint and reduces the supply of
credit. The decrease in the supply of loans makes credit more expensive, this is reected in the
higher premium on loans. In turn, this results in lower investment. The decrease in investment
and output depresses asset prices, which then feeds back into reduced net worth and investment,
creating a feedback loop between the nancial and real variables. This is the nancial accelerator,
which propagates and amplies shocks.
The e¤ects of not acting optimally are clearly observed in the Figure 2, in which the monetary
policy is set according to the conventional Taylor rule, in that case the volatility of ination and
the real and nancial variables is higher than in the optimal case. The optimizing central bank
would like to smooth this nancial accelerator.
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Figure 1.1: Optimal Policy. Shock to Quality of Capital.
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Figure 1. Optimal Policy. 1% Reduction in the Quality of Capital. Financial Model (solid) and DSGE (dashed).
In order to understand the relevance of the optimal policy in this economy with nancial
frictions, I conduct a series of comparisons. Firstly, gure 1 shows the optimal policy in this model
with nancial (solid lines) and compares the policy with that implemented in a model without
nancial frictions (dashed lines).
Secondly, gure 2 shows the impulse response to a decrease in the quality of capital when policy
is implemented via the conventional Taylor rule. The solid lines show the model with nancial
frictions and the dashed lines the model without such frictions.
Finally, I present the gap variables in the gure 3. In order to dene the gap variables, I follow
the work of Leith et al. (2015). This gap is the di¤erence between the actual value of the variable
and the value that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner as a percentage of the value
chosen by this planner. In other words, the gap is the di¤erence between the optimal and the
e¢ cient response.
Figure 1 shows that when there is optimal commitment, consumption shows similar optimal
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responses when nancial frictions are present and when the are absent. The greatest di¤erences
are observed in the ination, investment, nancial variables, and interest rates.
Compared to the optimal policy in the conventional DSGE (gure 1), monetary policy tends
to induce a larger reduction in the nominal interest rate. In the absence of nancial frictions, the
optimal policy is to stabilize ination. In contrast, in the presence of these frictions, monetary
policy is more expansionary. This leads to an initial burst of ination. On impact, the expansionary
policy serves to increase the price of capital. This policy seeks to appreciate the banks assets in
order to reduce the tightening of the banks balance sheet and foster an increase in the credit
supply, reducing the ine¢ ciency associated with the nancial friction. As a consequence of this
policy, the banks net worth prevented from falling as much as it would in the case of implementing
policy under the conventional Taylor rule (gure 2).
Figure 1.2: Taylor Rule. Shock to Quality of Capital.
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Figure 2. Taylor Rule. 1% Fall in the Quality of Capital. Financial Model (solid) and DSGE (dashed).
The optimal policy dampens the e¤ects of the shock on the nancial variables. For example,
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under simple rules, on impact, the net wealth of the banks falls 12.5 percent and the premium
on capital jumps 100 basis points. At the deepest of the recession, output is 1 percent below
equilibrium while investment is 5 percent below its long-term average. The conventional Taylor
rule produces larger uctuations in nancial and real activity and it is very costly in terms of
welfare (last row in table 6). In contrast, the optimal policy prevents this from happening.
The optimal policy stabilizes the nancial sector at the cost of increased ination. It is optimal
to trade-o¤ ination for nancial stability. The combination of monopolistic competition and
nancial frictions create a non-constant wedge between the exible-price economy and the e¢ cient
allocation. The objective of a maximizing policy maker is to keep the economy as close as possible
to the e¢ cient allocation. This explains the initial reaction of the central bank; the strong reduction
in the nominal interest rate keeps the economy as close as possible to its e¢ cient allocation.
The central bank induces a reduction in the nominal rate, which has the e¤ect of reducing the
real rate, via the Fisher relation, and increasing ination. The reduction in the real interest rate
has two e¤ects on the nancial sector. Firstly, it appreciates the prices of the assets, by stimulating
investment. Secondly, it reduces the cost of deposits for the banks. The central bank realizes that
in order to stop the feedback loop between nancial and real activity, it is necessary to protect the
protability of banks. If agents are content with the protability of the banking sector, then the
incentive constraint does not tighten. This avoids the ine¢ cient jump in the premium on capital
observed when the policy is conducted in a Taylor fashion.
In this way, the gap between the actual level of output and the e¢ cient allocation remains
as small as possible. If the central bank does not smooths the nancial accelerator, the feedback
loop between real and nancial variables pushes the economy away from the e¢ cient allocation.
Ination stabilization is suboptimal in the presence of nancial frictions.
There is an additional aspect of the optimal policy which I highlight. The initial reduction
of 1.5 percent in the real interest rate explains the initial increase in ination of 15 basis points.
This expansionary policy is reected on the output. Compared to the conventional DSGE, output
decreases only 0.1 percent, whereas in the DSGE the initial reduction is 0.2 percent. Given that
the nancial accelerator is procyclical, the optimal policy smooths its e¤ects. However, in the
subsequent periods the optimal policy is reversed.
For example, in the second period the central bank contracts the economy. The increase in the
nominal and real interest rate deate the price of the assets. The cost of credit increases in the
second period and investment and net wealth falls more than in the initial period. This change in
policy is explained by the desire of the central bank to achieve price-level control in the long-run.
In order to compensate for the initial increase in ination it is optimal to reduce ination in
the next period and keep this deation for the next three periods. After four periods, the ination
rate remains very close to its long-run equilibrium. This strategy of the central bank enables
e¤ective control of ination in the long-run. In turn, the control of ination in the long-run also
generates price level control (once the ination indexation has been removed) which is typical
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of the optimal commitment in models without nancial frictions (Woodford (2003)). Even when
nancial frictions are present, price level control holds under commitment.
Hence, the optimal policy in the short-run is to stabilize the nancial markets to prevent
ine¢ cient uctuation of real activity. However, once the feedback loop between nancial and
real variable has been smoothed, the central bank can focuses on ination control. The central
bank takes advantage of its commitment technology. It commits to initially contribute to stabilize
nancial markets in the short-run, at the cost of an increase in ination, while it stabilizes ination
in the long-run, reducing the attention to the nancial markets. This policy maximizes the social
welfare.
As a conclusion, the welfare maximizing policy is the one that protects the nancial sector. The
stability of the nancial sector prevents undesired uctuation of the real variables. The optimal
policy trades-o¤ nancial stability for ination. This trade-o¤ does not exist in the absence of
nancial frictions. Only after stabilizing the nancial sector, the central bank seeks price-level
control in the long-run. Price-level control is a result of optimal policy under commitment in the
benchmark New Keynesian model. This is robust to the introduction of nancial frictions.
Trade-o¤s Faced by the Ramsey planner. In order to understand the trade-o¤s faced
by the Ramsey planner in this economy, I make use of an additional policy instrument. Suppose
that the Ramsey planner has access to an optimal subsidy that eliminates the nancial distortion.
When this subsidy is in place if a shock reduces the quality of capital, the nominal interest rate
decreases by a smaller amount. This stimulates the private spending and prevents deation. In
that case, the nancial sector is stabilized using the subsidy to the return on capital. The nominal
rate stabilizes ination. This case is akin to the model without nancial frictions (dashed lines in
the gure 1).
Now, I remove the subsidy. Removing that subsidy implies that the response of the policy
maker changes completely. The policy maker seeks a protable banking sector and stable ination.
However, with only one instrument, the central bank has to renounce to stabilizing ination in
the short-run. The interest rate has to do the job of the subsidy. In this case, the optimal policy
is more expansionary. In this way, the cost of capital remains as close as possible to its long-run
level. In making all the banks content with their expected return on assets, the policy maker
helps them to meet their balance sheet constraint, and the optimal policy switches o¤ the nancial
accelerator. This policy protects the nancial system and avoids contagion to the real economy.
Financial health becomes a key objective of this policy maker. But, the policy maker cannot
simultaneously stabilize ination and the nancial sector. This is the case shown by the solid lines
in the gure 1.
Gap Variables. Figure 3 shows the gap between the response of the Ramsey policy and the
benevolent Social Planner. The economy is hit by a negative shock to the quality of capital. The
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left panel shows the model with nancial frictions. The right panel shows the model without
nancial frictions.
Figure 1.3: Gap Variables. Shock to Quality of Capital.
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Figure 3. Gap Variables. 1% Reduction in the Quality of Capital. Financial Model (left) and DSGE (right). The
gap is the di¤erence between the actual level of the variable under the optimal policy and the e¢ cient allocation
as a percentage of the e¢ cient allocation. A decrease in the output gap means that the economy is closer to the
e¢ cient allocation.
When the nancial frictions are present, the optimal response is to reduce the nominal interest
rate and increase ination in the initial periods (gure 1). This is possible because there is an
initial decrease in the output gap, the economy is closer to the e¢ cient allocation, (left panel, gure
3). This initial decrease in the output gap contributes to the increase in the ination. Because the
nancial accelerator is procyclical, the reduction in the gap smooths the feedback loop between
real and nancial variables. After this period, the output gap increases, which is associated with
the fall in ination in the second period. After these two periods the output gap decreases, which
explains the smooth return of ination to its long-run level and serve to stimulate the recovery of
the nancial variables.
This behavior is absent when the nal markets are frictionless (right panel, gure 3). In this
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case, the optimal policy is to stabilize ination. When the shock hits, the output gap increases
and has an additional increase in the next period. After this, the output gap starts to close, in this
way the central bank stabilizes ination at its long-run level.
The gure 3 captures some of the contributions of nancial frictions to the optimal policy.
However, the economies in that gure feature monopolistic competition. Figure 4 shows the gap
variables when there are nancial frictions, but the monopolistic competition distortion has been
removed. This isolates the e¤ects of the nancial friction.
In gure 4, a subsidy to the sales eliminates the distortion associated with the monopolistic
competition (solid lines).
Figure 1.4: Gap Variables. Shock to Quality of Capital.
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Figure 4. Gap Variables. 1% Reduction in the Quality of Capital. Financial Model (solid) . The solid lines show the
gap between the economy without monopolistic competition and the e¢ cient allocation. A decrease in the output
gap means that the economy is closer to the e¢ cient allocation.
When the nancial friction is the sole distortion in steady state, the optimal response, after a
shock to the quality of capital, implies a reduction in the output gap. In this way, the economy
is closer to its e¢ cient allocation and the e¤ects of the nancial accelerator are smoothed; the
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optimal monetary policy seeks to mimic the e¢ cient response. This is why the central bank
(gure 1) strongly reduces the interest rate in the benchmark case.
In the next section, I present the optimal policy when there is positive shock to productivity.
Shock to Productivity.
In the presence of a feedback loop between real and nancial activity, an increase in productivity
leads to higher asset prices, which revalues the banks assets. This has the e¤ect of loosening
the balance sheet constraint and contributes to increase the supply of credit. The credit becomes
cheaper, this is reected in the fall of the premium on loans. In turn, this stimulates investment.
The higher investment and output produce a boom in asset prices, which then feeds back into net
worth and investment. This is the nancial accelerator. Figure 5 shows the optimal response.
Figure 1.5: Optimal Policy. Shock to Productivity.
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Figure 5. Optimal Policy. 1% Increase in Productivity. Financial Model (solid) and DSGE (dashed).
Compared to the optimal policy under the conventional DSGE, monetary policy tends to be
35
contractionary. This leads to deation. On impact, the tightening of policy serves to ameliorate
the appreciation of the banksassets. This serves to prevent an overexpansion in the supply of
credit. Net worth is stopped to boom as it would be in the case of implementing policy under a
Taylor rule in the presence of nancial frictions (gure 6). This policy dampens the e¤ects of the
shock on the nancial variables.
There is a procyclical relationship between output and the premium on capital when nancial
and real shocks hit the economy. Because this positive shock to productivity would reduce the
premium on capital, banks could lend to non-nancial rms at lower rates. This would increase
investment. In order to prevent an overexpansion of investment, the central bank makes it more
expensive for banks to fund new assets. This is the reason behind the increasing real interest rate
in the rst period.
This policy is e¤ective at stabilizing the nancial sector and preventing an overexpansion. But
the cost is deation. It is optimal to trade-o¤deation for nancial stability. In the case of optimal
policy, less loans are granted to rms than in the case of policy implemented via simple rules (gure
6). This is so because the optimal response is to increase the nominal interest rate to keep the
economy as close as possible to the e¢ cient allocation. This prevents the boom observed under
the Taylor rule.
In the presence of nancial frictions, a one percent increase in productivity reduces ination
by 10 basis points. The central bank nds it optimal to undertake a monetary tightening in order
to stabilize the nancial markets. The monetary contraction reduces the boom in the nancial
sector, but at the cost of deation. In contrast, when the nancial frictions are absent, the optimal
policy is expansionary, and ination remains under control.
Figure 5 shows that in order to achieve price-level control, it is optimal for the central bank to
undo its initial policy from the second period onwards. The central bank exploits the benets of
commitment in order to stabilize nancial markets in the short-run and achieve price-level control
in the long-run. The policy of the central bank turns expansionary in the second period, and this
compensates for the initial deation. As in the case of the shock to the quality of capital, the
central bank deals initially with nancial stability. Once this is achieved, the central bank can deal
with ination control. The central bank nds it optimal to keep the nominal interest rate below
its long-run equilibrium for several periods. This compensates for the initial deation.
In conclusion, when productivity shocks arise and nancial frictions are present, the central
banks exploits the benets of commitment. In the short-run, it commits itself to nancial stabi-
lization. Once the ine¢ cient uctuation associated with the feedback loop between nancial and
real variables has been smoothed, it commits itself to price-level control in the long-run.
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Figure 1.6: Taylor Rule. Shock to Productivity.
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Figure 6. Taylor Rule. 1% Productivity Improvement. Financial Model (solid) and DSGE (dashed).
Cost-push shock.
In this section, I present the response of the Ramsey policy when there is a cost-push shock of one
percent. Figure 7 shows the optimal response. As in the case of a shock to the quality of capital,
the initial reaction needs to be very strong to prevent the starting of the nancial accelerator and
its contagion to the real sector. Indeed, the expansionary policy is very e¤ective reducing the
e¤ects of this recessionary shock.
In the conventional DSGE, this shock is contractionary and inationary and it creates a trade-
o¤ for policy. In the presence of nancial imperfections, the trade-o¤ remains. But given the
presence of the nancial accelerator, the trade-o¤ is bigger. The initial reaction of the central
bank is more inationary than in the absence of nancial frictions. This has the benet of a milder
recession, which prevents ine¢ cient uctuation of nancial and real variables. In this case, the
economy is kept as close as possible to the e¢ cient allocation.
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Policy. Cost-Push Shock.
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Figure 7. Optimal Policy. 1% Cost-Push Shock. Financial Model (solid) and DSGE (dashed).
In the next section, I deal with the implementation of optimal policy. In particular, I investigate
whether the simple rules can implement optimal policy.
1.7 Implementation of Optimal Policy.
In this section, I deal with the implementation of optimal policy. I present the results of the welfare
comparison across di¤erent regimes. Table 6 summarizes the main results. I restrict attention to
policy rules that have the form
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Table 1.6: Implementation of the Optimal Policy
Optimized  Y R SP Cost
Not Reacting to Financial Events
1. Non-Inertial 2.325 0 0 0 0.0058
2. Inertial 0.0505 0 0.95 0 0.0029
 1 Y 1 R SP Cost
3. Backward 2.578 0 0 0 0.0052
+1 Y+1 R SP Cost
4. Forward 2.017 0 0 0 0.0039
Reacting to Financial Events  Y R SP Cost
5. Non-Inertial 1.60 0 0 -0.78 0.0045
6. Inertial 0.144 0 0.95 -0.1631 0.0022
Non-Optimized
Non-Inertial  Y R SP Cost
7. Taylor Simple 1.5 0 0 0 0.0105
8. Taylor 1.5 0.5 0 0 0.0216
Inertial
9. Taylor Simple 1.5 0 0.85 0 0.0078
10. Taylor 1.5 0.5 0.85 0 0.0091
where (it) is the nominal interest rate and (i) is its long-run level, (t) is the ination rate and ()
the long-run level of ination. (Yt) represents output and (Y ) its steady-state level. () is the
policy coe¢ cient on ination deviations and (Y ) is the policy coe¢ cient on output deviations.
The index m can take three values 1,0, and -1. When m = 1, I refer to the interest rate rule as
backward looking, when m = 0 as contemporaneous, and when i = -1 as forward looking.
Given that the optimal policy suggests stabilizing the nancial variables, I explore the case
in which the policy rule contains a coe¢ cient (SP ) which measures the relevance of reacting to
deviations of the premium on capital Et
h
Rkt+1
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i
respect to its average
h
Rk
R
i
.
1.7.1 Not Reacting to Financial Events.
Non-Inertial Rules.
The welfare cost represents the percentage of consumption that agents in the alternative policy
scenario are loosing respect to the Ramsey regime. Optimized refers to a policy regime wherein the
policy coe¢ cients [; Y ; R; SP ] minimize the welfare cost. The search for policy coe¢ cients
was constrained to lie in the interval [0; 3].
When nancial frictions are present and the optimized rule contains only the policy coe¢ cients
[; Y ], the welfare-maximizing rule has policy coe¢ cients equal to [2:325; 0]. This is shown in
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Table 1.7: Implementation of Optimal Policy (DSGE)
Optimized Taylor No Y Taylor Rule
[; Y ] [; Y ] [; Y ] [; Y ]
[305; 0] [3; 0] [1:5; 0] [1:5; 0:5]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Welfare cost (%) 0.00001 0.003 0.0044 0.0204
the rst row of table 6. This policy costs 0.006 percent.
In order to have an understanding of the relevance of the coe¢ cients in the previous rule, I
compare these results to the case in which the nancial frictions are absent. Table 7 presents the
welfare costs of optimal rules in this case.
Initially, the search for the policy coe¢ cients was restricted to lie in the interval [0; 3]. In this
case, the policy coe¢ cient on ination takes the largest possible value and the cost is 0.003 percent
(column (2)). This rule implements the optimal policy, which in the absence of nancial frictions
is akin to price stability.
When the upper bound on the search for optimal coe¢ cient was removed, and it was allowed
to take any non-negative value, the policy coe¢ cient [] takes a value of 305 (column(1)). This
policy has a cost of 0.00001 percent. In this case, the policy coe¢ cient [] is large but nite. This
reects the desire of the optimizing policy maker to stabilize ination in the absence of nancial
frictions.
One di¤erence can be observed between the nancial and non-nancial models. In the conven-
tional DSGE, the larger the value of the coe¢ cient on ination, the higher the welfare. Columns
(1) and (2) in table 7, show this. However, this is not the case in the nancial model. For example,
when the nancial frictions are present, a policy rule with coe¢ cients [5; 0] implies a welfare cost
of 0.0064 percent. In the presence of nancial frictions, ination stabilization is not as desirable
as it is in their absence.
One similitude can be observed between these economies. In both cases, the coe¢ cient [Y ] is
equal to zero. Indeed, the costs increase as the value of the coe¢ cient [Y ] increases. For example,
the policy rule [1:5; 0], in the conventional model costs 0.0044 percent. But the conventional Taylor
rule, fourth column in table 7, implies a welfare cost of 0.0204 percent when nancial frictions are
added.
Similarly, in the nancial model, the rule [1:5; 0] has a cost of 0.0105 (row 7 in table 6). The
conventional Taylor rule [1:5; 0:5] costs 0.0216 percent (last row in table 6). Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007) show and explain the reasons behind the optimality of not responding to changes in
output in a model without nancial frictions. If the monetary rule contains a cyclical component,
in the face of productivity or supply shocks, the economy would not be allowed to adjust e¢ ciently.
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This can create price dispersion, which in models with sticky prices is costly. After observing the
results of the optimal rules, that result and explanation is robust to the presence of nancial
frictions.
Next, I show the e¤ects of allowing an inertial term in the previous rules. After that section,
I analyze whether a simple rule that reacts to nancial variables, such as the cost of credit, can
implement the optimal policy.
Inertial Rules.
In this section, I check the robustness of the previous results to the introduction of inertial pol-
icy rules. Woodford (2003, 2003b) and Sims (2013) show the advantages of introducing inertial
components in the policy rules.
An inertial policy rule is a good approximation to the optimal policy under commitment.
Reacting to an endogenous state variable serves the policy maker with the ability to exploit the
expectational advantages of commitment. By having persistence in the rule, the central bank can
anchor ination expectations, which could in turn improve the current policy trade-o¤s faced when
nancial frictions are present.
Row 2 in table 6 shows the inertial rule. The fact that the optimized rule is inertial suggest that
the central bank reacts more strongly to ination in the long-run than in the short-run. This is
observed also in the gures 1 and 5. The coe¢ cient on the lagged value of the nominal interest rate
takes the largest possible value. Reacting to contemporaneous ination has a very small weight.
It is optimal to not responding to output in this case. This rule welfare-dominates the non-inertial
rule in the presence of nancial frictions (row 1).
Backward Looking Rule.
The optimal backward looking rule also implies a zero reaction to the past level of output and to
the past level of the nominal interest rate (row 3). When the nominal interest rate reacts to the
past value of the variables, the cost are higher than in the contemporaneous or forward-looking
rules.
Forward Looking Rule.
The forward looking rule, a rule that responds to expected ination and the expected output
deviations, also does a good job in approximating the welfare implied by the optimal commitment.
This rule implies a strong reaction to future changes in ination and zero reaction to future
changes in output (row 4). When the rule is forward-looking the coe¢ cient on the lagged value of
the nominal rate is optimally driven to zero.
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1.7.2 Reacting to the Financial Variables.
When the nancial frictions are present, the optimized policy coe¢ cient [] takes a smaller value
than in the model without these frictions. Ination stabilization is not as desirable in this case as
it would be in the absence of the nancial frictions6. However, to what extent does reacting to
changes in the cost of credit (the premium on capital) improve social welfare?
Rows 5 and 6 of table 6 provide an answer. If the monetary rule can react to changes in the
spread between the return on capital and the risk-free rate, there are welfare gains. If, in addition,
the rule is inertial, that rule is the welfare maximizing one (row 6).
Comparing rows 1, and 5, there is a cost-reduction of 0.0013 percent if monetary policy reacts
to changes in the cost of credit. There are also welfare gains respect to the Taylor rule.
When the rule is inertial (row 6), the relevance of the feedback coe¢ cient on the nancial
variable decreases but the welfare gain respect to the not reacting to changes in the cost of credit
increases to 0.0036 percent (row 1 minus row 6). This is the welfare maximizing rule because
making the policy rule history dependent serves to anchor ination expectations. This allows the
central bank to react to the nancial events in the short-run and commit itself to increase the rate
if necessary in the future. By exploiting the commitment technology, it is possible for the central
bank to react to nancial events in the short-run and ination in the long-run.
1.7.3 A Summary of Optimal Implementation.
The welfare maximizing rule reduces the volatility in the nancial markets. In the presence of
nancial frictions, ination stabilization is not as desirable as it is in their absence.
A simple rule that reacts to changes in the cost of credit is able to implement the optimal policy.
Making that rule history dependent allows the central bank to smooth nancial volatility in the
short-run and commit itself, if necessary, to revert its policy in the future to achieve price-level
control. This rule mimics the Ramsey policy.
1.8 Robustness Checks.
1.8.1 Monopolistic Competition.
The main distortion in the model is due to the presence of monopolistic competition. The elasticity
of substitution across goods (") governs the degree of monopolistic competition in steady state.
The value of this parameter used in the benchmark calibration follows the estimation results of
Primiceri et al. (2006). However, this implies a markup of around 30 percent, which is in the
6The determinacy properties are not altered by the introduction of the term reacting to changes in the spread
on capital. The Taylor principle continues holding.
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Table 1.8: Welfare comparison. Productivity shock
Optimized (" = 4:17)  Y R SP Cost
1. Non- Inertial 2.1883 0 0 0 0.000045
2. Inertial 0.3170 0 0.95 0 0.000031
No Optimized
No Inertial
3. Taylor Simple 1.5 0 0 0 0.00071
4. Taylor 1.5 0.5 0 0 0.00110
Inertial
5. Taylor Simple 1.5 0 0.95 0 0.00040
6. Taylor 1.5 0.5 0.95 0 0.00100
upper bound of the conventional values. Hence, as a robustness check, I use a more competitive
economy by increasing the value of (").
In the nancial accelerator model, monopolistic competition is important because it results in
a non-constant gap between the e¢ cient and the natural allocation. And then, this can create a
trade-o¤ between ination and nancial stabilization.
In order to understand if the policy trade-o¤s remain in a more competitive economy, I derive
optimal policy and its implementation for the case in which the economy is more competitive. For
example, choosing a value of " = 11 , which would imply a markup of about 10 percent in steady
state. The optimal policy is similar to that in the benchmark case. It is optimal to allow ination
to increase after a shock to productivity, a nancial shock, or a markup shock. However, the size
of the trade-o¤ decreases. This is in line with Leduc and Natal (2015), who found in a model with
a nancial accelerator, similar to that in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) that the policy
trade-o¤s under monopolistic competition, price stickiness and nancial frictions are increasing in
the monopolistic competition.
1.8.2 Only Shocks to Productivity.
Optimized Rules.
When nancial frictions are present and only productivity shocks are considered, the policy rule
that implements the optimal policy, is inertial. These results are shown in table 8.
A central result is that when nancial frictions are present, and the economy is subject only
to a productivity shock, the coe¢ cient on ination is large, but it is several orders of magnitude
smaller than when these frictions are absent. For example, in the conventional model, if there are
only productivity shocks the welfare cost decreases in the size of the coe¢ cient on ination.
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Figure 1.8: Welfare and Productivity Shocks
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
W
el
fa
re
 C
os
t X
 1
00
10 -3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Y=0, R(-1)=0
Y
0 0.5 1 1.5
W
el
fa
re
 C
os
t X
 1
00
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.01
=2.1883, R(-1)=0
Welfare Cost. Financial Model. Productivity Shock
Figure 8. Welfare Cost in a Model with Financial Frictions and only Productivity Shocks. Top panel shows the
welfare cost of increasing the feedback coe¢ cient on ination. Bottom panel shows the welfare cost of increasing
the feedback coe¢ cient on output.
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Figure 1.9: Welfare and Productivity Shocks (DSGE)
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Figure 9. Welfare Cost in the DSGE Model and Only Shocks to Productivity. Top panel shows the welfare cost
of increasing the feedback coe¢ cient on ination. Bottom panel shows the welfare cost of increasing the feedback
coe¢ cient on output.
Figure 8 shows that when nancial frictions are present, welfare decreases if the weight of
ination in the policy rule is larger than 2.1883. Welfare costs are also increasing as the coe¢ cient
on output increases. Finally, gure 11 shows the same information as in gure 10 but for the
conventional DSGE. In contrast, welfare costs are decreasing as the ination coe¢ cient increases.
In this case, the policy rule would select a very large coe¢ cient on ination.
1.8.3 When all the shocks are present.
Figures 10 and 11 show the welfare cost if a shock to the quality of capital, a cost-push shock,
and a shock to productivity are present. The top plot of gure 10 shows the welfare cost as the
ination coe¢ cient increases in the presence of nancial frictions. Figure 11 shows the case for the
conventional model.
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Figure 1.10: Welfare and Shocks
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Figure 10. Welfare Cost in a Model with Financial Frictions and Various Shocks. The shocks are: a productivity
shock, a shock to the quality of capital and a cost-push shock. Top panel shows the welfare cost of increasing
the feedback coe¢ cient on ination. Bottom panel shows the welfare cost of increasing the feedback coe¢ cient on
output.
In gure 10, the analysis consider a set of shocks: a technology shock, a shock to the quality of
capital and a cost-push shock. These shocks have been introduced previously in the text and the
equation for them are contained in the quations 30, 31 and 34 in the Appendix A.5. In particular,
the shock to the quality of capital follows Gertler and Karadi (2011) and it is introduced to mimic
a nancial crisis. The technology shock is a sudden decrease in the productivity in the economy,
following previous literature, and the cost-push shock is a sudden increase in the markup of the
rms.
The key di¤erence between the two cases is that in the conventional model the cost decreases
on the ination coe¢ cient (), while in the nancial model there is a maximum value for this
coe¢ cient. In the conventional model, after a value of 5 the cost is closely at. For small values
of () this cost decreases quickly as the ination coe¢ cient increases. In the nancial model the
cost is also decreasing for small values of (). But, this cost has a minimum at 2.325. For larger
values the cost increases. These plots reect the results of table 6. In both cases, welfare decreases
as the coe¢ cient on output increases.
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Figure 1.11: Welfare and Shocks (DSGE)
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Figure 11. Welfare Cost in the DSGE Model and Various Shocks. The shocks are: a productivity shock, a shock to
the quality of capital and a cost-push shock. Top panel shows the welfare cost of increasing the feedback coe¢ cient
on ination. Bottom panel shows the welfare cost of increasing the feedback coe¢ cient on output.
1.9 Conclusion.
In a standard New Keynesian model with a banking sector that faces balance sheet constraints, the
optimal policy seeks to stabilize the nancial markets by reducing the volatility of the cost of credit;
a healthy nancial sector is desirable. In this framework, there is a trade-o¤ between ination
stabilization and nancial stabilization. This holds if the economy is subject only to a productivity
shock or if the economy becomes more e¢ cient by reducing the monopolistic competition.
The implementation of optimal policy suggests stabilizing the spread between the return on
capital and the risk-free rate. When a shock hits the economy, this policy suggests an aggressive
reaction in the initial periods.
The simple rule that mimics optimal policy suggests a zero coe¢ cient on changes in output, and
a non-zero coe¢ cient to changes in the premium on capital with respect to its long-run average.
Stabilizing the nancial sector enhances social welfare. In contrast, a strong anti-inationary stance
may be welfare decreasing. Additionally, inertial rules serve to anchor ination expectations in the
long-run, while stabilizing nancial markets in the short-run, mimicking the optimal policy under
commitment.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Unconventional Policy.
Abstract.
I analyze optimal policy in a New Keynesian model with a banking sector that faces balance
sheet constraints. The central bank now has access to two policy instruments: the nominal interest
rate and credit easing through asset purchases. In addition, I consider the implementation of the
optimal policy.
In the presence of nancial frictions, if a negative shock hits the economy there are stabilization
and welfare gains from allowing the central bank to participate in direct lending activities. In the
benchmark case, these gains represent 0.3 percent the consumption of the Ramsey economy. The
combination of the monetary rule and the asset purchase rule implement the optimal mix of policy.
2.1 Introduction.
As a consequence of the Great Recession, the understanding of the interactions between banking
and monetary policy has become a central issue in policy design. The severity of the nancial
crisis has exposed the limitations of the conventional tools utilized by the central bank to stabilize
the economy. Recent research has found that shocks to the nancial sector are important drivers
of business cycles. For example, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), in a model with a feedback loop
between nancial and real events, nd that nancial shocks are the key drivers for output, invest-
ment, the external nance premium, the federal funds rate, and hours worked in the postwar U.S.
economy.
Given the relevance of nancial shocks as drivers of business cycles, and the limitations observed
by conventional monetary policy in stabilizing the economy, it is relevant to analyze the optimality
of equipping the central bank with additional policy instruments. This is the focus of this chapter.
If nancial frictions are present, how should the central bank react to a negative nancial shock?
Are the conventional policy instruments enough to stabilize the economy? What additional policy
tools should the central bank be provided with in order to stabilize the economy?
48
In this paper, I answer these questions. In a model with nancial frictions, such as that
presented in the previous chapter, I introduce an additional policy instrument: central banks
direct lending in the nancial markets.
In this model, the banking sector faces endogenous nancial constraints due to the presence
of a moral hazard problem. In particular, in every period the bank can divert a share of the
funds available for lending. The households impose a constraint on the banksbehavior in order
to prevent this situation. This incentive constraint imposed by households to banks has the e¤ect
of restricting the supply of credit. If a shock damages the value of banksassets, the cost of credit
rises and this depresses investment spending, which contributes to amplify the disruption to the
banks balance sheet. The amplication e¤ect can be such that the conventional policy is not
enough to stabilize the economy. Hence, there is room for central banks intermediation in the
private markets, such as that observed during the Great Recession.
In this framework, if the central bank is allowed to act as intermediary in the private lending
market, the central bank issues riskless bonds to households and utilizes these funds to issue loans
to banks or to non-nancial rms at the market interest rate. The advantages of the central bank
in the nancial markets relies on the assumption that it always honors its debts. However, it is less
e¢ cient at monitoring and choosing the right investment opportunities than the private sector.
These e¢ ciency costs limit the ability of the central bank to participate in nancial markets.
If there is a shock that disrupts economic activity, the optimal unconventional policy suggests
increasing the central banks participation in private lending markets. In turn, this reduces the
overall size of the economic disruption. Government direct lending reduces nancial stress by
increasing the total supply of funds intermediated in the economy. This decreases the cost of
credit and stabilizes the premium over the riskless rate. The balance sheet of private banks is
stabilized and the nancial accelerator e¤ect is muted. With two policy instruments, the central
bank improves its policy trade-o¤s. Simple rules can implement the optimal mix of policy: the
conventional Taylor rule is complemented by a rule that governs the central banks lending as a
function of the nancial variables (in particular, the deviations in the cost of credit).
I focus on the Quantitative Easing program (QE 1) because it was the largest in magnitude
of the three QE programs implemented by the FED1. In particular, the combined stimulus of
purchasing Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) agency debt (1.2 percent), Mortgage Backed
Securities (8.7 percent) and Treasuries (2.1 percent) amounted to 12 percent of the economy
(Fawley and Neely (2013))2.
The weight of evidence suggests that QE1 was more e¤ective than QE2 or Operation Twist.
Gertler and Karadi (2013) highlight di¤erent reasons for this: the stimulus under QE1 was larger
1Gagnon et al. (2011) estimate that between December 2008 and March 2010, the fed purchased 22 percent of
the 7.7 trillion stock of longer-term agency debt, xed-rate agency MBS and Treasury securities outstanding at the
beginning of the LSAP.
2QE2, which mainly focused on the purchase of long-term government bonds represented 8.9 percent of GDP
(4.2 percent in Treasuries and 4.7 percent in the maturity extension program). QE3 was the less important program
and represented 1.1 percent of the economy.
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than the stimulus under the following interventions; it included purchases of private assets and
not just government securities; and, it was undertaken at the height of the crisis when nancial
markets and institutions were under maximum a­ iction.
It would be interesting, in future versions, to extend this analysis of optimal policy to the case
in which the central bank purchase both private and public securities3.
The plan of this paper is as follows: in the second section I present the model and introduce
the unconventional policy instrument. The model in this chapter is similar to the model in the
rst chapter. Hence, in section two, I present only the parts of the model that must be amended
in order to introduce the asset purchases. The third section presents the calibration of the model.
In the fourth section, I present the optimal unconventional monetary policy exercise. In the fth
section, I present the implementation of the optimal mix of policy. The last section shows the
literature review.
2.2 The Model.
This model is a DSGE similar to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) but mod-
ied in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to include nancial intermediaries that face balance sheet con-
straints.
In this model, there are ve groups of agents: households, nancial intermediaries, non-nancial
producers, capital-goods producers, and retailers. The household sector contains two groups of
agents: bankers and consumers. There is perfect risk-sharing within each household.
As a consequence of the incentive constraint imposed by the savers on the banks, these banks
limit the supply of credit. The banks, which have a nite horizon to guarantee dividend payments,
are owned by households, who transfer an amount of resource to the new bankers. The capital-good
producers purchase, repair the worn out capital, and sell the repaired and new capital to the non-
nancial producers. The non-nancial producers are required to borrow from the banks in order
to fund their capital acquisition. In doing so, the non-nancial producers issue state contingent
claims on the returns of each unit of capital to the banks. Hence, borrowing and lending at this
level is frictionless. Retailers purchase inputs from the non-nancial rms and set the price of their
products considering Calvo-type price stickiness.
The central bank has two policy instruments: the nominal interest rate, and asset purchases.
Because the central bank is assumed to not be constrained, as the private banks are, if there is
a shock which disrupts nancial intermediation, the central bank can ameliorate the e¤ects by
purchasing private assets. These purchases increase the price of the asset, which revalues the
banks balance sheet, ameliorating the e¤ects of the nancial constraint. This, in turn, reduces
3In Gertler and Karadi (2013), the central bank can intermediate both public and private securities. The e¤ects
on the economy are stronger in the case of purchasing private securities. This result relies on the assumption that
the nancial friction is more pronounced in the private markets than in the government sector.
50
the cost of credit and investment spending and the overall level of activity can be stabilized.
Next, I present the sections of the model which need to be amended in order to introduce central
bank direct lending. In particular, the unconventional policy a¤ects the banking sector and the
policy section in the model. All the remaining relationships are similar to the model presented in
chapter 1. Appendix B.2 lists the full set of equilibrium conditions.
2.2.1 Private Financial Intermediation.
Banks.
Balance Sheet. The nancial intermediary (j) receives deposits from households (Djt+1). These
deposits pay the short-term real interest (Rt+1) from (t) to (t+ 1). These funds complement the
accumulated wealth of banks (Njt). The banks make use of these two sources of funds to issue
loans to producers. Loans pay the rate
 
Rkt+1

between (t) and (t+ 1).
The quantity of nancial claims on intermediate producers that the bank holds is
 
SPjt

, its
relative price is (Qt). Then, each period the value of assets held by the representative bank is 
QtS
P
jt

and its total liabilities plus capital are (Djt+1 +Njt). The balance sheet of the bank is:
QtS
P
jt = Djt+1 +Njt: (2.1)
Evolution of Wealth. Banks net wealth evolves according to:
Njt+1 = R
k
t+1QtS
P
jt  Rt+1Djt+1; (2.2)
which is the di¤erence between the return on its assets
 
Rkt+1QtS
P
jt

and the cost of its liabilities
(Rt+1Djt+1). Solving (2.1) for deposits and using (2.2), allows to express the evolution of wealth
in terms of assets and the capital accumulated by the bank:
Njt+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtS
P
jt +Rt+1Njt; (2.3)
where the term

Rkt+1  Rt+1

is the assets premium over the riskless rate.
The banker will not fund a project with a return lower than the cost of deposits. If the
discount factor applied by the bank to assets between period (t) and (t+ i) is

it;t+i

, then the
next condition should apply for the bank to operate
Et
1+it;t+1+i

Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i
  0; (2.4)
in any period (i  0). In frictionless capital markets this relationship holds with equality. When
the nancial frictions are present this risk-adjusted premium may be positive. The presence of a
positive spread in equilibrium will translate into ine¢ ciently low levels of capital.
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When a shock arises, this spread can uctuate. This uctuation in the spread will translate
into ine¢ cient uctuations of the real activity. If the shock damages the banksbalance sheet and
if the central bank faces some constraint in its ability to reduce the nominal interest rate, there is
some room for unconventional policy to stabilize this spread.
Incentive constraint. In order to issue loans to the producers, the bank uses its accumulated
wealth and the funds raised by selling deposits to the savers. It is assumed that banks face
frictions in this process of borrowing from households. This friction reduces the ability of the bank
to issue new loans. Given this frictions, the commercial bank cannot fully exploit the arbitrage
opportunities in the borrowing and lending markets. This explains the existence of the positive
premium in equilibrium.
The friction exists because every period the bankers can divert a fraction (t) of total deposits.
When the households realize this, they force the bank to shut down and households can recover
only the remaining (1  t) fraction of deposits. The earnings to the bank of diverting funds are
the total funds they can divert
 
tQtS
P
jt

. In order to avoid that the banker absconds with these
funds, the households impose an incentive constraint to the bankers:
Vjt  tQtSPjt: (2.5)
The term (Vjt) is the expected present value of the banks nancial activity if it remains in the
industry; this is what the bank would lose if it is forced to leave the industry. The term
 
tQtS
P
jt

is what the banker would gain if it absconds with the funds. The bank assesses this trade-o¤ and
acts optimally. The bank would remain in the industry as long as the benets from doing so cover
the benets from absconding with a share of assets.
The household would place deposits in the bank only if the benet for the bank of lending
and borrowing is at least as large as the benet for the bank from diverting funds. In this way,
the households ensure that the bank will not abscond with funds and households will condently
deposit in that bank.
Eventually, the share of diverting assets (t) can be subject to an exogenous shock. An increase
in this ratio can be interpreted as an increase in the probability of cheating, which increases the
nancial stress and precipitates a nancial crisis. In particular, this exogenous shock evolves as
lnt =  ln [t 1] + "t ; (2.6)
where ("t) has mean zero and variance (
2
t).
Bank Maximization Problem. The possibility of making prots in the intermediation process
acts as an incentive for the banker to remain in the industry as long as possible. The problem of
the bank is to maximize the expected value of its terminal wealth (Vjt)
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Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) ii+1t;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) ; (2.7)
where
Njt+1+i =

Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iS
P
jt+i +Rt+1+iNjt+i: (2.8)
Optimal Conditions for Banks. In the appendix A.2 it is shown that the banks maximization
problem can be expressed as
Vjt = vtQtS
P
jt + tNjt; (2.9)
where
vt = Et (1  ) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett;t+1xt;t+1vt+1; (2.10)
and
t = E (1  ) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett;t+1zt;t+1t+1: (2.11)
The term (vt) is the marginal expected gain for the bank of increasing one unit of assets while
keeping the net wealth without change. Similarly, (t) is the marginal expected return for the
bank of increasing wealth in one unit while the assets remain constant.
The term
zt;t+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
;
is the gross growth of private net wealth over the period (t) and (t+ 1). Over the same period,
the banks assets have a gross growth of
xt;t+1 =
Qt+1S
P
t+1
QtSPt
: (2.12)
Leverage Ratio of Private Banks. In frictionless nancial markets the bank would seek to
increase assets until the point in which the discounted return on capital equates the discounted
cost of deposits. The risk-adjusted premium would be zero. However, in this model, the incentive
constraint prevents the bank to arrive to that point. After substituting the conjectured solution
of the banks problem (2.9) in the incentive constraint (2.5)
tQtS
P
jt + tNjt  tQtSPjt ; (2.13)
and solving for assets, the leverage ratio is
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QtS
P
jt
Njt
=
t
t   t ; (2.14)
when this constraint holds with equality. The term
h
QtSPjt
Njt
i
is the leverage ratio of private banks
(), which can be dened as the ratio of loans to banks net wealth. Hence,
t =
t
t   t : (2.15)
The leverage ratio (t) is a function of the diverting rate (t) and the protability of the
banking industry (vt; t). If the protability of banks increase, either by an increase in (t), the
protability of each unit of assets, or in (t), the protability of each unit of accumulated wealth,
the bank can issue more loans without breaking the incentive constraint.
In contrast, if the diverting of funds increases (t) the maximum tolerated leverage ratio de-
creases. This reduces the amount of loans issued by banks, in order to avoid breaking the incentive
constraint, and increases the premium, increasing the cost of credit and precipitating a recession.
The evolution of banks wealth (eq.(2.3)) can be expressed as:
Njt+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1
	
Njt; (2.16)
after the substitution of the leverage ratio.
Evolution of Aggregate Private Leverage Ratio. The components of the key variables in
the leverage ratio are the same for each bank. Then, aggregating

QtS
P
jt = tNjt

over banks, the
total assets intermediated by private banks
 
QtS
P
t

and the banks net wealth (Nt) are a function
of the private leverage ratio
QtS
P
t = Nt; (2.17)
this means that the maximum amount of loans issued by the private banks
 
QtS
P
t

is limited by
the leverage ratio (t) times the bankscapital (Nt). If a shock decreases the value of the banks
capital, the amount of loans issued by banks would decrease, precipitating a recession. In this
context, there is room for central banks direct lending.
Evolution of AggregateWealth of Private Banks. The evolution of private banksaggregate
wealth is the sum of two components. The wealth associated with the banks surviving until the
previous period (Net) plus the aggregate wealth of the starting banks (Nnt).
Nt = Net +Nnt: (2.18)
The fraction of bankers surviving at t is (). Then, using the aggregate expression of (2.16),
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Net = 

Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt
	
Nt 1: (2.19)
The (1  ) f new bankers receive starting funds proportional to the previous period interme-
diated assets. It is assumed that the new bankers receive a fraction
 
w
1 

of this assets to start
business. Then evolution of aggregate wealth is
Nt = 

Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt
	
Nt 1 + wQtSPt 1: (2.20)
In the next section, I describe the central banks direct lending activities.
2.2.2 Central Banks Lending.
Share of Central Banks Lending. Given the nancial friction, and possibly some restrictions
on the central bank to reduce the nominal interest rate, complementary policies may be useful to
stabilize the economy. In particular, I assume that the central bank can implement direct lending
to private rms4.
When the central bank participates in the nancial intermediation the value of total nancial
assets in the economy[QtSt] ; is
QtSt = Qt

SPt + S
G
t

; (2.21)
where

QtS
P
t

represents the value of private assets and

QtS
G
t

the value of assets intermediated
by the government.
If the government is able to intermediate each period a fraction
h
QEt
i
of total assets, then
QEt =
QtS
G
t
QtSt
: (2.22)
When QEt = 0, I return to the same case described in the rst chapter, where only private
intermediation and conventional monetary policy exist.
Funding the Central Banks Lending. The assets intermediated by the government are
funded by issuing riskless government bonds. Households purchase these risk-free bonds

Bgt+1

and in exchange they receive the rate [Rt+1] between period (t) and (t+ 1). The advantage of
the government in this scenario is that it always honors its debts. Then, households rely on the
government to purchase as much debt as the central bank requires. The nancial friction exists
only between households and private banks.
4The solution to the model is identical if, instead, I assume that the central bank lends to private banks at
the market interest rate and then the private bank use these funds to lend to non-nancial rms (the same overall
balance sheet constraint arise) and hence, it does not matter to assume one or the other type of governments
lending.
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The amount of debt issued by the government equals the amount of assets the government
lends to the non-nancial rms (or to the banks)
QtS
G
t = B
g
t+1: (2.23)
If the private banks could issue as many loans as demanded by non-nancial rms (2.23) would
be equal to zero, in frictionless nancial markets, for instance. However, in periods of nancial
distress, given the nancial friction, the central banks intermediation could be non-zero. Hence,
the central bank could fulll the nancial needs of non-nancial markets. This would reduce the
nancial distress and would ameliorate the e¤ects of recessions.
Return on Central Banks Lending. When allowed to participate in the lending activities,
the government exploits the arbitrage opportunities in the nancial market. The government
lends the funds obtained from households to the non-nancial rms at the rate of return of capital
observed in the market

Rkt+1

. The prots for the central bank of its nancial intermediation are
equal to 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

Bgt+1; (2.24)
which must be taken into account in the governments budget constraint.
I assume that the central bank is not balance-sheet constrained, as the banks are. It issues
riskless government bonds and lend those funds to non-nancial rms. However, the central bank is
less e¢ cient than private banks in regards to the nancial activities. In particular, the government
faces e¢ ciency costs per unit of loan to non-nancial rms. Those costs are [& t] and are related
to the costs of evaluating and monitoring investment opportunities. I assume these costs are not
present in private markets given that banks have specic knowledge of the market in which they
are participating.
The e¢ ciency costs of the central bank intermediation can increase if there are deviations
respect to the share of assets held by the central bank in steady state. In particular, the cost
function is:
& t =
(
1 +
1
2

QtS
G
t
Qt 1SGt 1
  1
2)
QtS
G
t : (2.25)
2.2.3 Total Assets in the Economy.
The total amount of assets in the economy is:
QtSt = QtS
P
t +QtS
G
t ; (2.26)
which can be written as
QtSt = tNt + 
QE
t QtSt; (2.27)
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after the substitution of (2.17) and (2.22). Alternatively,
QtSt =
1
1  QEt
tNt: (2.28)
The previous relationship is the total amount of loans intermediated in the economy. The term
(QtSt) represents the total needs of funds by the producers. In models in which only conventional
policy is present, like that presented in the previous chapter, it is assumed that private banks
alone satisfy these needs. In particular, that

QEt = 0

, and that the government decided not to
participate in the nancial markets.
However, when the government decides to participate

QEt > 0

, given a level of demand for
loans, the supply of nancial assets is now complemented by the government. This contributes
to the reduction of the tightening of the balance sheet of the banks, which is translated into a
reduction in the cost of credit.
2.2.4 Government Budget Constraint.
Government spending (Gt) ; the costs associated with the nancial intermediation of the govern-
ment (& t), the purchase of non-nancial rms assets, and the payments of the debt acquired
previously (RtB
g
t ) are nanced with a tax to sales ( tYt), issue of new government bonds
 
Bgt+1

,
with the revenue from the participation in the credit markets
 
RktB
g
t

and using lump-sum taxation
(Tt).
The governments budget constraint can be written as
Gt + & t +RtB
g
t = Tt +  tYt +R
k
tB
g
t +B
g
t+1: (2.29)
Government spending evolves exogenously. In particular
Gt = Ggt
where (G) is the steady state level of government spending [G = 0:2Y ]. This spending can be
subject to an exogenous shock (gt) which evolves as
ln (gt) = g ln (gt 1) + "gt (2.30)
where the ("gt) is an i.i.d. process with mean zero and variance
 
2g

:
Distortionary taxation is xed at its steady state value and it serves only as a cost push shock
which evolves exogenously as
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t ; (2.31)
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("t ) is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance
 
2t

.
In addition, the government has access to lump-sum taxation which guarantees that the debt
does not explode over time. Any gains or losses from the governments nancial activity are
returned lump-sum to the households. The nancial participation of the government is fully
funded with the issue of new debt
 
Bgt+1

which completely nances government intermediationh
QEt QtKt+1
i
.
The lump-sum taxes evolve as
Tt = Gt + & t  

Rkt  Rt

Bgt    tYt   QEt QtKt+1; (2.32)
after substituting lump-sum taxes in the governments budget constraint
Bgt+1 = 
QE
t QtKt+1: (2.33)
2.2.5 Aggregate Resource Constraint.
Consumption, government spending, and the e¢ ciency costs associated with the governments
nancial intermediation, total investment and the costs associated with the net investment ad-
justment are the demand faced by the nal product. Then, the aggregate resource constraint
is
Yt = Ct + It +
_i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) +Gt + & t: (2.34)
2.2.6 Policy.
Monetary Policy.
The link between real and nominal interest rate (it) is given by the Fisher equation
it = EtRt+1t+1: (2.35)
When the economy is analyzed utilizing simple rules, the central bank follows a Taylor rule to
set the nominal interest rate; that rule is
ln

it
i

= R ln

it 1
i

+ (1  R)

 ln
ht

i
+ Y ln

Yt
Y

+ "it; (2.36)
where ("it) is an exogenous monetary policy shock. Eventually the policy maker can choose to
smooth the interest rate; the size of this smoothing preference is controlled by (R).
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The Governments Financial Intermediation Policy.
When the policy is implemented via simple rules, given that the government has an additional
instrument a rule for that policy must be introduced. In particular, I assume that the governments
nancial intermediation targets the deviation of the premium with respect to its steady state. This
assumption relies on the fact that optimal policy suggests to stabilize this premium. In particular,
the rule for the governments intermediation follows
QEt = QEEt

log

Rkt
Rt

  log

Rk
R

: (2.37)
where the coe¢ cient (QE) reects the importance the government assigns to the deviations of the
premium from its steady state. The set of all the equilibrium conditions is listed in the Appendix
B.2.
2.3 Calibration.
I calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency. the calibration section is divided into four sub-
sections: in the rst, I detail the choice of the non-nancial parameters; this is followed by the
calibration of the nancial parameters; in the third subsection, I present the policy variables, where
I show the calibration of the unconventional policy rule; the calibration of the e¢ ciency costs is
presented in the last subsection. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark calibration.
2.3.1 Non-Financial Sector.
Two main sources are used to calibrate the non-nancial parameters: U.S. National Accounts and
estimated models of the U.S. economy. In the non-nancial sector, 4 parameters match historical
averages of their empirical counterparts: the share of capital on national income (), the subjective
discount factor (), the depreciation rate () and the share of the government spending
 
G
Y

: The
disutility of labor (), is calibrated to match the working hours. And the remaining 11 non-nancial
parameters are taken from the results of the estimated model in Primiceri et al. (2006).
Based on Historical Averages.
The share of capital on national income, the subjective discount factor, the depreciation rate and
the relevance of government spending

; ; ; G
Y

match the historical averages of their empirical
counterparts.
The steady state share of capital to national income () is set to 0:33. This value for 
approximates the observed compensation of employees as a share of national income (1  ) (BEA
NIPA table 1.12).
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Table 2.1: List of Parameters
Consumers Persistence of Shocks
h Habits in consumption 0.815 a Technology 0.96
 Subjective discount factor 0.9951  Quality of capital 0.89
 Disutility of labor 3.9401 g Gov. spending 0.98
Financial Sector  Diverting funds 0.98
 Probability of survival banks 0.9716 i Monetary policy 0.58
 Share of assets diverted 0.3825  Cost-push 0.854
! Transfer to starting banks 0.0035 St. dev. of Shocks
Non-Financial Firms a Technology 0.0068
 Capital share 0.33  Quality of capital 0.0037
' Inv. Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.27 g Gov. spending 0.0065
i Elasticity inv. adj. costs 1.72  Diverting funds 0.0088
 Elasticity of marginal dep. 7.2 i Monetary policy 0.0038
 Depreciation rate 0.025  Cost-push 0.00103
 Share of rms no adjusting price 0.77 Policy Variables
p Degree of price indexation 0.241  Ination coe¢ cient. Taylor rule 2.19
" Elasticity of substitution 6.0 Y Output coe¢ cient. Taylor rule 0.20
R Smoothing parameter. Taylor rule 0.39
QE Feedback Parameter Asset Purchases 24.8
QE E¢ ciency costs Asset Purchases 0.0025
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The subjective discount factor  = 0:995062, matches an average real rate of interest rate of
2.0 percent (FRED). As seen in the work of Yun (1996), I assume that the rms can, without
cost, index their prices to the steady-state rate of ination. The depreciation rate () takes the
value 0.025, implying a 10 percent annual depreciation (BEA NIPA table 1.11). Regarding the
steady state government spending to GDP ratio,
 
G
Y

is 0:2, this is a conventional value (BEA
NIPA table 1.1.10). The weight of the disutility of labor (), is 3:94. This value was calibrated
assuming a steady state value of working hours of 0.33, a common value in the literature. The
remaining parameters for the non-nancial sector are taken from estimated studies. Next, I present
the values for these parameters.
From Estimated Models.
Following Primiceri et al. (2006), I assume the following values for the non-nancial parameters.
The habits parameter (h) is set to 0.815. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (') takes a value of
0.276. The elasticity of marginal depreciation to the utilization rate () takes a value of 7.2. The
inverse of the elasticity of net investment to the price of capital (i) is assumed to be 1.728.
The probability that a rm does not adjust its price this period ( = 0:779) implies that a rm
keeps its price for around 4 quarters. The size of the indexation of the price to the previous period
ination (p) takes a value of 0.241.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods (") is 6. In the estimated results by
Taheri (2014), this elasticity takes a value close to 4.1, similar to that estimated by Primiceri et al.
(2006) and utilized by Gertler and Karadi (2011). In Villa (2014), it is assumed that the elasticity
would imply a gross markup of 1.25 in steady state. And in the majority of the literature using
calibrated New Keynesian models this elasticity is between 6 and 11. When assuming that " = 6,
I am in the middle of the range of values used for this parameter in models with and without
nancial frictions5.
Shocks.
Following Taheri (2014), the persistence of the shock to productivity, the shock to the quality
of capital, the monetary shock and the shock to government spending take the values A =
0:96;  = 0:89, i = 0:58 and g = 0:98, respectively. The persistence of the shock to the
share of diverting funds in the banking sector and to the cost-push shock are  = 0:9782 and
 = 0:85, respectively. The parameters for the shocks to the diverting funds follow the work
of Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), who present estimates for a shock to the contractual relations
between borrowers and lenders, in a model of the nancial accelerator. For the cost-push shock I
follow Primiceri et al. (2006), who estimate this shock as a shock to the elasticity of substitution.
5As a robustness check I do exercises with di¤erent values of this elasticity. The e¤ects of a more competitive
economy imply larger values for the real variables in steady state. But the optimal policy does not change. These
results are available upon request.
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The standard deviation of the shock to productivity, the shock to the quality of capital, the
monetary shock, and the shock to government spending take the values a = 0:0068;  = 0:0037,
i = 0:0038 and g = 0:0065, respectively. These are the same values estimated by Taheri (2014).
For the shock to the diverting funds  = 0:0088, following Nolan and Thoenissen (2009). And I
take the estimates of Primiceri et al. (2006) for cost-push shock  = 0:00103.
2.3.2 Financial Sector.
In this section, I explain my choice regarding the nancial parameters. Firstly, I present the results
of the choice of the three parameters that are particular to the nancial sector. After that, I explain
how I selected these values.
The survival probability of banks (), equals 0:9716 and matches a life interval of 35 quarters.
The share of diverting funds () is 0:3825, which is consistent with a spread of 100 basis points
in equilibrium. The share of funds transferred to starting bankers (w) is 0:0035, after assuming a
leverage ratio of 4 in the banking sector.
I explain now the evidence behind each of these values.
Survival Probability.
The survival probability of banks () exists in the model to avoid banks increasing their size up
to the point where they do not longer need to borrow from households. In this case, the incentive
constraint would not bind.
The value of the survival probability in the banking industry is consistent with the share of
diverting funds, and the share of starting funds implies that banks survive on average 35 quarters,
 = 0:9716. This is in line with the work of Gertler and Karadi (2011). In their estimation
exercises, Taheri (2014) and Villa (2014) assume that this parameter is xed at this value before
the estimation exercise.
Spread and Share of Diverting Funds.
The calibration implies a share of diverting funds () of 0:3825. The share of diverting funds ()
is set to target a spread of 100 basis points in steady state. This value of the spread reects the
historical spread between AAA-BAA corporate bonds for the U.S. economy between 1954 and 2015
(FRED).
The spread between the AAA bond and the 10 years Treasury bills is around 100 basis points.
Finally, between 2005 and 2015, the average spread between government bonds and mortgages
rates was in this neighborhood of 100 basis points (FRED). Assuming a spread of one percent in
steady state therefore reects the evidence on di¤erent measures of the spread.
Next, I present the evidence on the leverage ratio which serves to pin down the startup transfers
to banks.
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Leverage Ratio and Transfers to Banks.
The leverage ratio in steady state serves to pin down the startup transfer, (!). The share of funds
transferred to the starting bankers is ! = 0:0035. This is the result of targeting a steady state
leverage ratio of 4, in line with the leverage ratio observed in the U.S. nancial sector.
Next, I present the di¤erent sources that register the possible values of the leverage ratio for
the U.S. economy.
Banking Sector and Corporate Sector. In the previous crisis the leverage ratio of the banks
in troubles were considerably higher than the average for the banking sector or for the corporate
business sector. For example, during 2007, for the Big-5 investment banks that ratio was between
25 and 35 (Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012)). However, for commercial banks the leverage ratio (total
assets to equity in the banks) had an average of 10.4 between 2000-2007, before the crisis (FRED).
And the non-nancial corporate sector showed a ratio of assets to equity of 2 (FRED).
To capture the overall leverage ratio in the economy, given that QE1 was designed to support the
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) and banks, I take the weighted average of the leverage
ratio of these institutions. This weighted average showed a ratio of 4.05 on average between 2000
and 2007.
Financial Sector. As a robustness check I utilize data from OECD and FED. I utilize informa-
tion on the U.S. nancial corporations6. I construct the leverage indicator as the ratio of nancial
assets to shares and other equity. The average of this indicator between 2000 and 2013 was 3.75.
And during 2007-2008, this average was 4.07.
Thus, the leverage ratio measured as a weighted average of commercial banks and non-nancial
corporations or measured for the overall nancial corporations has observed a value of about 4.
2.3.3 Policy Variables.
The coe¢ cients of the monetary policy rule take values from an estimated DSGE model with
nancial frictions in Taheri (2014). This estimated model also provides the information for the
autorregresive coe¢ cients in the shock processes and their variances.
I rely on empirical evidence associated with the overhead costs of the banking industry, and
on the FEDs share of assets held at the end of QE1 and its associated reduction in the spread, in
order to calibrate the unconventional policy rule and the e¢ ciency costs associated with it.
6Financial corporations include both public and private rms in the nancial business. This includes monetary
institutions, depository corporations, nancial auxiliaries and insurance companies and pension funds. This is a
broader indicator than just commercial banks.
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Nominal Interest Rate Rule.
In order to calibrate the monetary rule, I follow the work of Taheri (2014): the coe¢ cient measuring
the reaction of the nominal interest rate to changes in ination in the Taylor rule () is 2.19; the
feedback coe¢ cient on output deviations (Y ) is 0.2; the smoothing parameter (R) is 0.39. This
is the benchmark calibration for the nominal interest rate.
Asset Purchases Rule.
In order to calibrate the parameters associated with the unconventional policy, I follow the next
rule
QEt = 0 + QEEt

log

Rkt+1
Rt+1

  log

Rk
R

; (2.38)
where 0 is a constant and QE is the feedback parameter on changes in the spread respect to its
long-run level.
The benchmark calibration takes the values 0 = 30:5, and QE = 24:8. In the appendix B.3,
I explain the strategy followed to calibrate that rule.
E¢ ciency Costs.
Calibrating the e¢ ciency costs is relevant for the welfare analysis and policy advice. For example,
a fully optimal exercise, with zero e¢ ciency costs, imply that the central bank will purchase all the
assets in the economy. As the e¢ ciency costs increase, the optimal asset holdings by the central
bank decrease.
Once the asset purchases rule has been calibrated, I can calibrate the e¢ ciency costs associated
with that evidence. The strategy is to assume that the FED did not implemented a larger program
because the e¢ ciency costs prevent that to happen. Hence, in this section, I nd numerically
the value of the e¢ ciency costs that imply that the rule with feedback coe¢ cients equal to the
benchmark case (0 = 30:5, QE = 24:8) was welfare maximizing. The e¢ ciency cost used as
benchmark in the calibration is  = 0:0025.
2.4 Ramsey Policy and Welfare.
2.4.1 Welfare Cost.
In this section, I present the measure utilized to calculate welfare costs across di¤erent policy
regimes. In the most of the cases, I use the welfare associated with the Ramsey policy as a
benchmark. Against the welfare implied by the Ramsey policy, I compare the welfare associated
with following simple rules for conducting policy. The advantage of those alternative regimes is
that they can be easily implemented by a central bank.
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I measure the welfare cost as the amount of consumption that agents in the alternative regime
are willing to accept in order to have the same welfare as in the benchmark economy.
To accurately compare welfare across di¤erent policies, I need to use a second-order approxi-
mation to the full model. Hence, I follow the work of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007).
Using the particular utility function
U = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 +  
L1+ t ;
the consumption cost

WC

; of choosing an alternative policy
 
V I""

relative to the time-invariant
Ramsey policy
 
V R""

, after approximating the result up to a second order, is:
WC  1
2
(1  ) V R""   V I""2": (2.39)
The derivation of this measure of welfare cost is identical to the used in the Chapter 1 and is
detailed in the Appendix A.4.
2.4.2 Optimal Policy.
The Ramsey planner seeks to maximize the welfare of the society subject to the competitive
equilibrium conditions. I assume that the central bank is committed to following the announced
plan from a timeless perspective. As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), I assume that at time
(t) the Ramsey planner has been operating for an innite number of periods.
The period (t) objective function of the Ramsey planner is the utility function
Ut = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 +  
L1+ t : (2.40)
I assume that the discount factor of the Ramsey planner is equal to the subjective discount
factor of households in the competitive economy () : This policy maker maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
tU [Ct; Lt] (2.41)
subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions.
Then, the central bank maximizes the welfare function (2:41) subject to the competitive equi-
librium restrictions choosing at period (t) processes for the 31 endogenous variables Uct, Ct, t,
Lt, vt, xt, t, zt, t, Kt+1, Nt, Net, Nnt, Rkt+1, Ymt, Qt, t, Ut, Int, Pmt, Gt, It, Yt, t, Ft, Zt, 

t ,
t, Rt, it, 
QE
t and the 29 Lagrange multipliers associated with the 29 equilibrium conditions. The
processes for the exogenous shocks are given. The values for the variables listed above are given
dated t<0, and also the values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the competitive equi-
librium constraints are given at t<0. Then, as explained in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), the
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structure of the optimality conditions associated with the Ramsey equilibrium are time-invariant.
The Appendix B.2 presents the Lagrangian for the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.
There are welfare gains to allowing the central bank to utilize unconventional means to stabilize
the economy. The optimal level of the asset purchases depends heavily on the e¢ ciency costs
assumed. The fully optimal case with zero e¢ ciency suggests that the central bank holds all
the assets in the economy. There is a level of e¢ ciency costs which prevent the central bank in
participating at all in the nancial markets.
2.4.3 Impulse-Response Analysis.
In order to have a better understanding of the role of the asset purchases, I present the impulse-
response gures for an economy with exible-prices and without policy, and for the same economy
with exible prices but with asset purchases as the policy instrument. In this economy, the
monopolistic competition and the nancial frictions are present.
When the central bank implements asset purchases, it holds 59.6 percent of assets, the optimal
level of asset purchases given the calibrated welfare costs (Table 3).
2.4.4 Shock to the Quality of Capital.
Flexible Prices.
In this section, I present the response of this economy to a one percent decrease in the quality of
capital. Figure 1 presents two cases: the decentralized economy in which no policy is available
(crosses), and the optimal policy with asset purchases (circles).
This shock reduces the value of the banks assets. This tightens the balance-sheet constraint.
Without policy, the shock decreases the banks net wealth in 4 percent (crosses). Given the
endogenous leverage constraint, if there is a negative shock hitting banks balance sheet, they
would require a higher return on their assets in order to be able to issue new loans and to meet
the incentive constraint imposed by households.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Asset Purchases. Flexible Prices
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Figure 1. Optimal Asset Purchases. Flexible Prices. 1% Decrease in the Quality of Capital. Asset Purchases
(circles), No Policy (crosses).
If the expected return on the assets increases, the banks can meet their balance-sheet constraints
after the negative shock has hit the value of their accumulated wealth. However, the return on
the banksassets is at the same time the cost of credit for non-nancial rms. Hence, a shock
damaging the banksbalance sheet damages the investment spending through the increase in the
cost of credit. In turn, the reduction in the investment spending reduces the demand for loans,
depreciating the value of the banks assets. Loans are the banksassets. Hence, the balance sheet
of the banks are damaged again. The feedback loop between the real and nancial variables starts
on. There is room for the unconventional policy to stabilize this economy.
As a consequence of the presence of the nancial accelerator, the recession is deeper. Without
implementing any kind of policy (crosses in the gure), this shock can produce a recession that is
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7 times deeper than in the optimal policy case (circles in the gure).
Figure 2.2: Optimal Asset Purchases. Gap Variables
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Figure 2. Gap Variables. Flexible Prices. 1% Decrease in the Quality of Capital. Asset Purchases (circles), No
Policy (crosses). A decrease in this gap means that the economy is closer to the social planners allocation; this is
captured by a less negative value in this gap.
If the expected value of the bank decreases, as a consequence of the shock, the incentive
constraint tightens and the banks are able to issue new loans only if there is an increase in the
return on their assets. This starts on the feedback loop between nancial and real variables.
The central bank can prevent the starting of the nancial accelerator by purchasing assets. On
impact, the asset purchases increase. The increase in the governments nancial intermediation
increases the demand for the rms assets and appreciate the value of the banks. This policy
increases the price of the assets of 0.25 percent on impact, and the real interest rate falls 0.7
percent, reecting the increase in the price of the asset. Hence, the asset purchases have two
e¤ects: they revalue the banks assets and they decrease the real interest rate, which makes the
cost of deposits cheaper. Both e¤ects protect the protability of the banks. Without any policy
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intervention, the shock produces a jump on the spread (12 basis points), which is four times the
increase in that variable in the presence of asset purchases (3 basis points). Hence, the optimal
policy is to increase the nancial intermediation in order to appreciate the value of banksassets.
Otherwise, the commercial banks nd it optimal to raise the cost of funding for rms, exacerbating
the negative e¤ects of the shock.
Why does the central bank nd it optimal to follow an aggressive expansionary policy in the
rst period and a contractionary policy in the second period?
The economy has two distortions: monopolistic competition, and the nancial friction. Hence,
the economy is far away from the e¢ cient allocation. The maximizing policy-maker would like to
push the economy toward the e¢ cient allocation. However, in order to produce more, households
have to work more. If the central bank pushes continuously the output gap above its initial level,
more working hours are required to produce the additional output.
Figure 2 shows that the expansionary policy decreases the output gap on impact (right panel).
This is supported by an increase in the working hours (a source of disutility), and the policy
maker compensates the households with a decrease in the consumption gap (a source of utility),
which is supported by the e¤ect of the asset purchases on the real interest rate, balancing the
sources of utility and disutility of the households. The central bank can do this because it is act-
ing under commitment. Given that the central bank is acting under commitment, it can promise
that the initial inationary process will be reverted in the following periods, hence it is exploiting
the expectational benets of commitment. In particular, the central bank decreases the output
gap this period, in order to prevent the starting of the nancial accelerator, and it promises to
reverse its policy in the next period (so that households do not overwork) in order to maximize
the social welfare. This explains the behavior of the asset purchases. The central bank is balanc-
ing the householdssources of utility and disutility and exploiting the expectational benets of
commitment.
In addition to not increasing the working hours more than is desirable for households, the
central bank is acting under its ine¢ ciency in the intermediation of assets. The e¢ ciency costs,
which are increasing in the level of assets held by the central bank, prevent this institution from
implementing a more expansionary policy. Overall, this policy smooths the nancial accelerator
and prevents the large deviation in the output gap observed in the absence of policy.
In the next section, I reintroduce the nominal inertia and the monetary policy in this model
with optimal asset purchases.
Reintroducing the Sticky Prices.
Finally, in this section I introduce the nominal friction. Prices are sticky as in Calvo (1983) and
the central bank can use the nominal interest rate and asset purchases as policy instruments when
nancial frictions are present.
Three sources of ine¢ ciency exits in this case: monopolistic competition, the positive spread
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in equilibrium, and the inability of rms to adjust prices every period.
When nancial frictions are present, and a shock to the quality of capital hits the economy,
ination increases (lines with stars in gure 3). This is not observed in the absence of these frictions
(diamonds in gure 3); the central bank does not nd it optimal to trade ination for something
else when the nancial markets are frictionless. However, this not the case when the nancial
frictions are present. It is optimal to trade ination for reductions in the output gap. Figure 3
shows the results.
With sticky prices and without nancial frictions, uctuating ination is the dominant source
of welfare loss. Hence, the central bank stabilizes ination (blue diamonds in gure 3). In this
case, the central bank has one policy instrument available, but only ination represents a challenge
for the central banks objectives. Then, it is possible to successfully stabilize ination. Ination
stabilization more than compensates for the increase in the output gap (central panel in gure 4).
With nancial frictions and nominal rigidities, the nancial sector represents an additional
challenge for the central bank. With only the nominal interest rate available (this case is akin
to the problem presented in chapter 1) the central bank nds it optimal to increase ination in
order to stabilize the economy, even when this is a source of welfare loss. This serves to stabilize
the economy close to its e¢ cient allocation, which compensates the households for the discomfort
associated with the increase in ination.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Asset Purchases. Shock to Quality of Capital
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Figure 3. Optimal Policy. 1% Decrease in the Quality of Capital. Unconventional (Black stars), Zero E¢ ciency
Costs (dashed), and Conventional DSGE (blue diamonds).
If the central bank has access to asset purchases, this shock remains inationary. However, it
is optimal to show a reduction in the output gap (left panel in gure 4). The movement in the
nominal rate is similar in magnitude and direction to that when the central bank can utilize only the
conventional instrument. However, the asset purchases serve to decrease the output gap in almost
1 basis point. In the presence of nancial frictions, movements in the output gap become more
relevant for the central bank because bad economic events encourage the feedback loop between
real and nancial events, which is damaging. This pattern of exchanging increases in ination
for reductions in the output gap are better observed as the central bank becomes more e¢ cient
(dashed lines in gure 3 and 4).
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Figure 2.4: Unconventional Policy. Gap Variables
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Figure 4. Gap Variables. 1% Decrease in the Quality of Capital. Unconventional (Black stars), Zero E¢ ciency
Costs (dashed) , and Conventional DSGE (blue diamonds). A decrease in this gap means that the economy is closer
to the social planners allocation; this is captured by a less negative value in this gap.
As the central bank becomes more e¢ cient in the lending activities, the output gap decreases
even more. However, a larger increase in ination is observed. The losses for su¤ering a higher
ination in this case, are compensated with the gains from a reduction in the output gap. In
this e¢ cient case, the output gap decreases 7 basis points on impact. In the rst period, the
central bank, trades-o¤ the welfare losses from the ination increase, in exchange for the reduction
in the output gap. The central bank can use more intensively its policy instrument because
it faces almost zero e¢ ciency costs, hence it can support higher welfare costs associated with
increasing the ination because at simultaneously it can encourage a smaller output gap. When
the unconventional instrument is e¢ cient, the speed of convergence of output to its long-run level
is faster than in the other cases. In this way, the central bank maximizes the social welfare.
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Table 2.2: Welfare Cost (Percentage of S.P. Consumption)
DSGE E¢ cient Benchmark No Asset Purchases.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cost (%) 0.534 0.541 0.708 1.006
When the nancial frictions are present, the expansionary monetary and unconventional policy
decrease the output gap and the ination increases. However, this arrangement is welfare increas-
ing. With the two policy instruments, the central bank can control the increase in the cost of credit
and reduce the negative e¤ects on investment spending. The reduction in the nominal interest rate
and the increase in the asset purchases increase the demand for capital. This, increases the price of
capital and prevents a damage to the banksbalance sheet. If the central bank is highly e¢ cient in
the nancial intermediation, the policy is largely expansionary on impact, decreasing considerably
the output gap (dashed lines in gure 4).
What is the contribution of asset purchases to welfare? Table 5 shows that when the economy
has nancial frictions and only the nominal interest rate as policy instrument, the welfare cost is
more than 1 percent of the stream of consumption of the social planners allocation (last column).
The introduction of the unconventional instrument is welfare increasing and the welfare cost de-
creases to 0.7 percent. Hence, the central banks nancial intermediation improves welfare by 0.3
percent.
In table 4, I did not subsidize the steady state in order to eliminate the distortion associated
with the monopolistic competition, hence, the steady state of all the cases is a¤ected by such
distortion.
If the nancial friction is completely eliminated and the central bank implements only con-
ventional policy, monopolistic competition and sticky prices cost 0.53 percent of the stream of
consumption of the social planners allocation (rst column). As the central bank becomes a more
e¢ cient intermediary, the welfare gains can mimic those of the case without nancial frictions
(second column).
In the next section, I present the optimal policy in this model after a negative shock to pro-
ductivity.
2.4.5 Shock to Productivity.
In this section, I present the behavior of this economy after a decrease of one standard deviation
in productivity. Figure 5 shows the exible price case. The lines with circles show the optimal
asset purchases. The red crosses show the non-policy case.
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Flexible Prices.
This shock is recessionary, On impact, output falls 0.25 percent. However, in the presence of
the optimal policy (circles), the recession is milder than in the absence of policy (crosses). This
shock hits the value of the banks assets and turns on the feedback loop between nancial and
real variables. Without policy, the shock decreases the equity in the banks by 6 percent . The
commercial banks have to meet their balance sheet constraint. This induces an increase in the
cost of credit. If there are no asset purchases, the spread increases 18 basis points, whereas the
optimal asset purchases stop this increase.
Figure 2.5: Unconventional Policy. Shock to Productivity. Flexible
Prices
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Figure 5. Optimal Asset Purchases. Flexible Prices. 1% Decrease in Productivity. Asset Purchases (circles), No
Policy (crosses).
The asset purchases increase slightly in the rst period, this stops the fall in the price of
74
the assets. Without this policy, the price of the assets fall almost 1.5 percent, which is highly
damaging to the nancial health and produces a large increase in the output gap. In contrast,
the asset purchases contribute to revalue the banks capital (the price of the assets falls only 0.2
percent on impact), and the net wealth decreases only 1 percent on impact. However, this policy
is less expansionary than if a shock to the quality of capital hits.
If a shock to productivity hits, the central bank increases its participation in the nancial
markets, and in the second period the policy turns contractionary, in order to not overstimulate
the economy. The role of the central bank in this case is to stop the nancial accelerator, but it
commits itself to not doing more than that.
Figure 6 shows that it is optimal to allow the output gap to increase when the shock hits (right
panel). However, the increase is not as large as in the absence of the unconventional policy. This
is due to the fact that the central bank would like to prevent the instability associated with the
nancial accelerator, but it would not like to overstimulate the economy. This policy reduces the
labor gap, which discomforts the households, and the central bank compensates these households
with a mild reduction in the consumption gap. The central smooths the feedback loop between
real and nancial variables.
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Figure 2.6: Unconventional Policy. Shock to Productivity. Gap Vari-
ables
Year
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Figure 6. Gap Variables. Flexible Prices. 1% Decrease in Productivity Asset Purchases (circles), No Policy (crosses).
A decrease in this gap means that the economy is closer to the social planners allocation; this is captured by a less
negative value in this gap.
Reintroducing Sticky Prices.
In this section, I reintroduce the nominal inertia and present the optimal mix of monetary and
asset purchases policy. Figure 7 shows the results.
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Figure 2.7: Unconventional Policy. Shock to Productivity. Sticky
Prices
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Figure 7. Optimal Policy. 1% Decrease in Productivity. Unconventional (Black stars), Zero E¢ ciency Costs
(dashed), and Conventional DSGE (blue diamonds).
The benchmark case, in which conventional and unconventional policy is implemented, is shown
by the black lines with stars. The model without nancial frictions is shown by the blue diamonds,
and the dashed lines show the e¢ cient case.
On impact, output decreases 0.25 percent. To ameliorate the e¤ects of this recessionary shock,
the nominal interest rate decreases 72 basis points on impact (black stars). As a consequence,
ination increases 2 basis points. The asset purchases decrease slightly on impact and show a
further decrease in the next period. After these two periods, the asset purchases recover and it
remain above the long-run level for the next nine years. In the rst period, the output gap increases
8 basis points in the benchmark case (left panel in gure 8). In this case, the central bank utilizes
the widening in the output gap to ameliorate the ination pressures. The central bank utilizes the
nominal interest rate to reduce the cost of credit and to revalue the net wealth in the banks. This
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contributes to smoothing the nancial accelerator. However, the central bank has to face a higher
ination rate. This increase in ination is tamed by the contractionary unconventional policy. If
the unconventional policy were more expansionary, ination would increase even more.
The optimal monetary policy is expansionary, which creates ination pressures. The contrac-
tionary unconventional policy seeks to ameliorate these pressures. The output gap widens (gure
8). In contrast, if the nancial friction is eliminated, the nominal interest rate is contractionary
and ination is under control at all times. In this case, the output gap increases to help the central
bank to control ination.
Figure 2.8: Unconventional Policy. Shock to Productivity
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Figure 8. Gap Variables. 1% Decrease in the Productivity. Unconventional (Black stars), Zero E¢ ciency Costs
(dashed) , and Conventional DSGE (blue diamonds). A decrease in this gap means that the economy is closer to
the social planners allocation; this is captured by a less negative value in this gap.
In the rst period, the combination of expansionary conventional policy and contractionary
unconventional policy decreases the price of capital, however, the decrease is not as large as it
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would be in the absence of the asset purchases. The decrease in the price of capital damages
the balance sheet of banks by decreasing the value of their assets. The balance sheet of the
banks is further weakened when the policy becomes more contractionary in the second period. As
a consequence, the premium on capital increases, reecting the weaker nancial position of the
nancial intermediaries. The cost of credit increases, depressing investment and consumption. The
mix of policy serves to control ination from the second period onwards. But in the rst period,
the central bank smooths the e¤ects of the nancial accelerator.
After these two periods, the nominal interest rate returns to equilibrium. After the third period,
and when the nominal interest rate is back at equilibrium, the central bank nds it optimal
to increase its asset purchases. And these purchases remain above equilibrium for the next 9
years and they converge very slowly to equilibrium. Given the optimal mix of conventional and
unconventional policy, consumption shows a faster return to equilibrium.
In this case, the central bank would not like to overstimulate the economy, in order to prevent a
further rise in ination. With a more e¢ cient intermediation, it can stabilize ination and prevent
an ine¢ cient level of real and nancial activity. The central bank trade-o¤s improve as it has a
more e¢ cient instrument. In the next section, I analyze whether simple rules can implement this
optimal policy commitment.
2.5 Implementation of Optimal Unconventional Policy.
In this section, I present the implementation of the optimal mix of policy. The implementation is
via simply rules, which maximize the social welfare. The benchmark for comparison is the welfare
implied by the Ramsey allocation under unconventional optimal policy. I measure the welfare cost
as the amount of consumption that agents in the Ramsey regime are willing to renounce in order
to have the same welfare as in the alternative policy scenario.
Table 5 summarizes the welfare results regarding di¤erent rules.
The nominal interest rate rule takes the form
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and the rule governing the assets purchases takes the form
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2.5.1 Unrestricted Rules.
The numerical search for the policy coe¢ cients was unrestricted and then restricted.
Row 2 in table 5 shows that the ination coe¢ cient () takes a large value (40:4), as does the
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Table 2.3: Implementation of the Optimal Unconventional Policy
Welfare Cost (%)  Y R QE
1. Taylor 0:4157 2:2 0:2 0:39 0
2. Optimized. Unconstrained. 0:0951 40:4 0 0:85 196
3. Optimized. Constrained 0:1269 5 0 0:95 25
feedback coe¢ cient on the asset purchases (QE = 196). The rule shows a degree of inertia (R) of
0:85. It is optimal to move the unconventional instrument when there are nancial pressures. It is
optimal that the central bank increases its asset purchases when the premium on capital is above its
long-run average. The rule shows that not reacting to changes in real activity is optimal (Y = 0).
This is the welfare maximizing rule in the presence of nancial friction and asset purchases. The
welfare gains respect to the case where it is utilized only the Taylor rule are about 0.32 percent of
consumption.
Given that the feedback coe¢ cients in the welfare maximizing rule, described above, are larger
than the coe¢ cients commonly utilized in the simple rules, I restrict the interval for the search of
the policy coe¢ cients to take more conventional values. In the next section I explain the results.
2.5.2 Restricted Rules.
I impose the next restrictions on the value of the feedback coe¢ cients: the ination coe¢ cient ()
cannot take values larger than 5. The coe¢ cient (QE) was restricted to a maximum of 25. This
means that if the spread increases 1 basis point then the asset purchases increase by 0.25 percent
of the stock of capital. The results are: the policy coe¢ cients for ination and asset purchases
take the largest possible value; it continues being optimal not reacting to changes in output; and
the rules show a high degree of inertia. Row 3 in table 6 summarizes these results.
Given that the di¤erence in the cost between the restricted and the unrestricted case is small
(0.03 percent of consumption), the restricted rule can serve as guidance for the optimal implemen-
tation of monetary and unconventional policy in the presence of nancial frictions.
In the next section, I present the impulse-response functions of these optimal rules when the
economy is hit by: a shock to the asset purchases, a monetary policy shock, a shock to the quality
of capital, a cost-push shock, a shock to productivity, and a sudden increase in the diverting share
of funds.
In particular, the monetary rule takes the form:
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with the optimized coe¢ cients [R = 0:95;  = 5; Y = 0]. And the rule for assets purchases:
QEt = QEEt

log

Rkt
Rt

  log

Rk
R

; (2.45)
with [QE = 25].
The analysis compares two cases for each shock. The case in which the central bank can use
both, the Taylor rule, and the asset purchase rule with the optimal coe¢ cients  = 5; Y = 0;
R = 0:95; and, QE = 25, and the case in which the central bank can use only the nominal
interest rate. In this last case, the Taylor rule governing the changes in the nominal interest rate
is calibrated as in the estimated model of Taheri (2014), with:  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39;
and, QE = 0.
2.5.3 Impulse-Response Functions.
In this section, I present the impulse-response functions in this economy. The e¤ects of nancial
shocks (for example, a shock to the quality of capital or a sudden increase in the moral hazard
problem in the banking sector) can be curbed using the combination of conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy. Even in the face of non-nancial shocks (for example a productivity
shock), the central bank can improve welfare if it can use both conventional and unconventional
instruments. In contrast, if only conventional instruments are utilized when the economy is subject
to nancial frictions, the economy cannot be completely stabilized. Finally, in the presence of a
cost-push shock, the central bank can improve on its ability to stabilize ination and the nancial
markets if it can implement conventional and unconventional policy.
Asset Purchases Shock.
Figure 9 presents the e¤ects on the economy of increasing the asset purchases in 1 percent. I
assume that this shock has no persistence.
This shock is expansionary. An increase in the assets purchases implies an increase of almost
1 basis point in output. The e¤ect is small, however. As a consequence of the shock, consumption
increases, but the increase is small, around one order of magnitude less than the increase in output.
The behavior of labor mimics that of output.
The main e¤ects of this shocks are observed on the nancial sector. In particular, the increase
in asset purchases reduces the premium by 10 basis points. This serves to stimulate investment
spending which increases 4 basis points. This has a positive e¤ect on the valuation of nancial
assets.
The price of nancial assets increases almost 10 basis points on impact. The increase in the
value of assets and the reduction in the cost of credit improves the balance sheet of the nancial
intermediaries. In consequence, the wealth in the banking sector increases by about 0.4 percent
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on impact. The shock has a small e¤ect on the nominal and the real interest rate, which basically
move in the same direction as ination.
Overall, changes in this policy instrument a¤ect mainly the nancial sector. Its expansionary
e¤ects reduce the cost of credit, increasing investment spending. The increase in asset purchases
increases the demand for the rmsassets. This, in turn, increases the assets price and net wealth
in the banking sector, reducing the pressure on the banks balance sheet.
Figure 2.9: Simple Rules. Increase in Asset Purchases
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Figure 9. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 1% Increase in the Asset Purchases. Solid lines  = 5; Y = 0;
R = 0:95; 
QE = 25.
Monetary Policy Shock.
In this section, I present the response of this economy to an increase of 25 basis points in the
nominal interest rate. Figure 10 shows the results.
As a consequence of this shock, there is a reduction in the output and the ination. The e¤ects
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of this shock can be reduced if the unconventional policy is in place. Ination behaves similarly in
both models. However the deation is slightly smaller in the unconventional policy case. The fall
in output is ameliorated with respect to the conventional monetary policy case. When policy can
be implemented through unconventional means, the largest reduction in output is 0.22 percent.
When the central bank has access only to the conventional Taylor rule, the fall in output increases
to 0.30 percent. The behavior of the premium on capital and its e¤ects on the investment spending
contribute to explain the di¤erences observes in the reaction of output.
An increase in the central banks nominal interest rate increases the cost of credit. This explains
the increase in the risk premium and the fall in net wealth. The banking sector in this economy
issues deposits to the households in order to nance the issuing of loans to the producers. The
bank also makes use of its own accumulated wealth in order to issue new loans to the non-nancial
producers. The deposits in the banks pay the short-term real interest rate. And the opportunity
cost of the accumulated net wealth is the also the real interest rate.
This monetary surprise increases the real interest rate, as long as the prices are sticky. The
increase in the real interest rate translates into an increase in the cost of deposits. This reduces
the protability of banks. Because the banks must meet their balance sheet constraint, they
require a larger premium for their loans. This increases the cost of credit. Because of the presence
of nancial frictions and the deterioration of the banksbalance sheet, the premium on assets
increases and it remains above its steady state for more than four years.
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Figure 2.10: Simple Rules. Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 10. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 25 Basis Points Increase in the Nominal Interest Rate. Solid lines
 = 5; Y = 0; R = 0:95; 
QE = 25. Dashed  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39; 
QE = 0:
The increase in the cost of credit reduces the investment spending. On impact, the investment
spending falls 0.8 percent if the central bank simultaneously implements asset purchases and con-
ventional monetary policy. If the central bank implements only the conventional monetary policy
(dashed lines) the recession on investment is deeper because the cost of credit increases more.
The reduction in investment depresses the price of capital goods. This reduction in the value of
assets activates the nancial-accelerator mechanism. When the reduction in investment spending
reduces the value of the assets, the net wealth of the banks decreases. This deteriorates the banks
balance sheet. In order to meet their incentive constraint, the banks require an increase in the
return on assets. This, in turn, increases the costs of credit for non-nancial rms, reducing the
investment spending.
The slow recovery in production and investment is associated with this behavior of the premium
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on capital. However, if the central bank is also implementing the unconventional policy, the
monetary shock is less recessionary because the asset purchases prevent a larger increase in the
cost of credit. In this case, the net wealth of the banks decreases less and the banks balance sheet
tightens less than in the absence of the unconventional policy. The unconventional policy deals
with this by increasing the share of assets in 0.5 percentage points. This policy is persistent and
has its main e¤ects on the cost of credit and the nancial sector.
Ination behaves similarly in both cases. This means that if the central bank has access to
the two policy instruments, it can achieve a given level of ination with a smaller uctuation in
output and in the nancial variables. While the monetary instrument is contractionary, the un-
conventional instrument can be expansionary. This combination of policy can balance the nancial
and inationary uctuations. And this will improve the central banks trade-o¤s. The monetary
policy can deal with the inationary e¤ects of shocks, while the unconventional instrument serve
to ameliorate the e¤ects of that policy on the real and nancial uctuation.
Shock to the Quality of Capital.
The shock is a decrease of one percent in the quality of capital. Figure 11 presents the response
of this economy when, in addition to the conventional Taylor rule, the unconventional policy is
implemented (solid lines). The dashed lines show the case in which only the conventional monetary
policy is implemented, via the Taylor rule.
Due to the presence of the nancial accelerator, the initial fall in output is larger than if
the nancial frictions were not present. If the central bank can implement conventional and
unconventional monetary policy, the recession is milder (solid lines) than if it has access only to
the conventional Taylor rule (dashed lines). When the central bank has access to the two policy
instruments, the recession in output, investment, and employment is almost one-half smaller than
if the central bank has access only to the monetary policy.
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Figure 2.11: Simple Rules. Shock to the Quality of Capital
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Figure 11. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 1% Decrease in the Quality of Capital. Solid lines  = 5; Y = 0;
R = 0:95; 
QE = 25. Dashed  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39; 
QE = 0:
The mix of the unconventional and conventional policy is very e¤ective in producing a less
severe recession. With respect to the conventional Taylor rule, the economy contracts only 0.2
percent on impact and the deepest fall in output is 0.3 percent. When the central bank implements
conventional policy the output falls up to 0.45 percent.
This optimal policy implies that employment remains very close to equilibrium on impact. In
contrast, the conventional Taylor rule implies a reduction of 0.2 percent at the moment of the
shock. The optimal policy is very e¤ective at avoiding a large fall in equity and investment. The
optimal policy mix implies less volatility in ination than in the conventional case.
When the central bank utilizes the unconventional policy to stabilize the nancial markets,
it is possible to stimulate the economy by reducing the nominal interest rate to ght the initial
deation. However the gains in output stabilization are due to the unconventional instrument
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because the asset purchases stabilize the spread and the investment spending.
The unconventional policy implies that, on impact, the spread moves only 3 basis points. In the
conventional case this spread increases 15 basis points. This unconventional policy stabilizes the
nancial sector, as suggested by the Ramsey exercise. In order to stabilize the nancial markets,
the central bank increases its participation in the private markets by almost 1 percentage point on
impact and it is optimal to remain in the lending activities for a long period. Ten years after the
shock the participation in the nancial activities is close to equilibrium.
The reduction in consumption is quite similar when conventional and unconventional policy is
utilized. However, the deepest fall in consumption is smaller when the unconventional policy is
utilized. Capital accumulation shows a better schedule when the central bank can intermediate
nancial assets.
Investment spending is the component of aggregate demand which shows the greatest e¤ects
of the unconventional policy. This is so because the nancial accelerator works mainly through its
e¤ects on investment spending. The unconventional policy has its main e¤ects on switching this
accelerator o¤.
Investment decreases 0.8 percent at the moment of the shock (it decreases 1.0 percent when
only conventional policy is implemented). If it is not possible to implement unconventional policy,
then, the largest fall in investment would be about 2 percent (two periods after the shock). When
it is possible that the central bank purchase assets to reduce the nancial distress, the largest fall
in investment is 1 percent (two periods after the shock). The asset purchases serve to stabilize the
investment spending. This stabilization of the spread and of the investment spending contributes
to the revaluation of assets, improving the balance sheet of the nancial intermediaries.
In order to explain the behavior in the real sector it is necessary to look at the nancial variables.
The shock initially reduces the value of assets of banks by reducing their quality. This loss in the
value of assets tightens the credit conditions. The reduction in the value of assets reduces the
value of the net wealth of banks, deteriorating the banksbalance sheet.
The deterioration of the banksbalance sheet increases the premium on capital. Given that
the banks must meet their incentive constraint, when a shock negatively a¤ects the value of assets,
banks require a higher return on their assets. Because the rate of return on these assets is equivalent
to the cost of credit for non-nancial rms, the demand for investment decreases. Accordingly, the
demand for loans falls. If only conventional policy is implemented the deepest fall in investment
is equal to 1.7 percent. When the central bank can purchase private assets this reduction is equal
to 1.2 percent.
This reduction in the demand for loans contributes to the reduction in the price of the nan-
cial assets which decreases again the value of net wealth accumulated. This contributes to the
tightening of the nancial constraint. The cost of credit increases and the demand for investment
decreases. So, the initial exogenous shock reduces the value of assets. The second round e¤ects
generate an endogenous reduction in the value of banksassets through the reduction in the de-
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mand for assets and the price of these assets. The nancial accelerator is this procyclical feedback
loop between nancial and real events.
This e¤ect can be reduced if the central bank utilizes an additional instrument to stabilize
the nancial sector. For example, when the central banks has access to assets purchases then the
nancial sector can be stabilized more e¢ ciently. This is shown by the solid lines in the gure 11.
When only conventional monetary policy is implemented, the initial fall in the net worth is
around 5 percent. However, when unconventional policy is also implemented, the reduction in
the wealth of banks is only 4 percent. The fall in net wealth tightens the banksbalance sheet.
This tightening of the nancial conditions is stronger when the central bank has only one policy
instrument.
The increase in the demand for private loans, as a consequence of the assets purchases, serves
to stabilize the price of the nancial assets and the wealth in the banking sector. The price of the
nancial assets decreases only 0.5 percent. If the central bank does not intermediate assets, the
reduction in the price of assets would be about 1 percent.
The unconventional policy also serves to generate a smaller reduction in the nominal and real
interest rate in order to stabilize the economy. The overall participation of the government in the
lending market increases in 1 percentage point. The central bank withdraws from the nancial
markets slowly.
Overall, when nancial frictions are present and nancial shocks hit, if the central bank has ac-
cess to conventional and unconventional instruments, its ability to stabilize the economy improves.
The conventional instrument can stabilize ination. The unconventional instrument serves to sta-
bilize the nancial markets. A better result in terms of output variation and ination variation is
achieved. This is reected in the welfare gains with respect to the conventional Taylor rule.
Cost-Push Shock.
In this section, I consider the e¤ects of an increase of one percent in the cost-push variable. Figure
12 shows the response of the economy to this shock.
The decrease in the output is larger when only the conventional monetary policy is implemented
(dashed lines). This is explained by a larger decrease in investment. Even when non-nancial shocks
hit the economy, the presence of the unconventional policy improves the results in the real economy.
Consumption shows a deeper recession when only conventional policy is implemented. As a
consequence of this shock, working hours decrease. 4 years after the shock, employment is close to
its long-run equilibrium.
The recession decreases the demand for capital goods. In turn, the investment spending reduces
and the price of the assets fall. As a consequence, net wealth decreases 1.5 percent. This reduction
is almost 4 percent when only conventional policy is implemented (dashed lines). This deteriorates
the banksbalance sheet and increases the premium on capital. The increase in the cost of credit
is 3 times larger if the unconventional policy is not implemented and the reduction in the price of
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capital almost doubles.
At the moment of the shock, the premium between the return on capital and the risk-free
rate moves around 10 basis points when there are no asset purchases. In the unconventional case
this spread moves only 2 basis points. This is due to the increase in the assets purchases in 0.5
percentage points.
The e¤ects of the increase in this cost of credit depress the investment spending. In turn, the
fall in demand investment reduces the value of the assets. The devaluation of the nancial asset
contributes to the reduction in the value of equity in the banking sector. The nancial-accelerator
is present and the demand for capital goods can have a smaller reduction when the central bank
utilizes its new policy instrument to stabilize the nancial markets.
Figure 2.12: Simple Rules. Cost-Push Shock
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Figure 12. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 1% Cost-Push Shock. Solid lines  = 5; Y = 0; R = 0:95;
QE = 25. Dashed  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39; 
QE = 0:
As a consequence of the cost-push shock, there is an increase in the ination. This shock
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is recessionary and inationary. However, the ination increases less than in the conventional
exercise. If this shock hits, the nominal interest rate is less contractionary if the central bank has
access to asset purchases. The increase in the asset purchases serves to stabilize the nancial and
real activity, while the nominal interest rate deals with the inationary consequences of this shock.
When the nancial frictions are present, and a cost-push shock hits the economy, if the central
bank can implement unconventional policy, the real and nancial variables show a less volatile
behavior. This contributes to the improvement in the welfare schedule for the consumers. With
two policy instruments, the central bank improves the welfare of the society when nancial shocks
hit (for example, a shock to the quality of capital), but also when non-nancial shocks hit (for
example, when a cost-push shock hits).
Productivity shock.
Figure 13 shows the response of this economy when there is a decrease of one percent in produc-
tivity. This shock has the e¤ect of increasing ination. In order to depress the economy and to
avoid additional increases in ination, the central bank increases the nominal interest rate. The
increase in the nominal rate is considerably smaller if the asset purchases are in place. If only
conventional monetary policy is implemented (dash lines), the real interest rate increases and the
aggregate spending decreases in order to tame the inationary pressures. However, the required
contraction in output, when the central bank has access to unconventional policy, is slightly smaller
than when only conventional policy can be implemented. In this case, the monetary policy is less
contractionary than in the absence of the unconventional policy, and the assets purchases are
expansionary.
Consumption decreases initially 0.15 percent and its hump-shaped response has a minimum
four years after the shock when this variable is 0.5 percent below its long-run equilibrium.
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Figure 2.13: Simple Rules. Productivity Shock
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Figure 13. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 1% Decrease in Productivity. Solid lines  = 5; Y = 0;
R = 0:95; 
QE = 25. Dashed  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39; 
QE = 0:
The increase in the real rate has e¤ects on the real spending and on the nancial sector. The
cost of credit increases because of the change in the real rate but also because of the uctuation
in the value of the net wealth of banks. However, unconventional policy serves to stabilize the
premium and it produces a smaller reduction in the value of the equity in the banking sector.
For example, if only the conventional monetary policy is implemented, the net wealth of the
banks falls 3 percent on impact and the premium on capital jumps 10 basis points. However,
the implementation of the unconventional policy reduces the e¤ects of this shock on the banks
balance sheet and net wealth falls only 1 percent, while the premium on capital increases only 2
basis points.
When the premium on capital increases, investment spending decreases and this feeds back into
the nancial sector. Because banks are less healthier, the cost of credit is increased and investment
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and capital accumulation fall. The presence of the nancial sector generates a deeper recession in
the economy if only conventional policy is implemented.
The central bank can achieve a better trade-o¤ in terms of output and ination stabilization
if it has access to two policy instruments. The unconventional policy improves the trade-o¤s of
the central bank in a competitive economy even if non-nancial shocks hit the economy. The
increase in the central banks intermediation, in 0.5 percentage points reduces, the increase in
the spread. The conventional monetary policy is less contractionary in this case, and together,
the conventional and unconventional policy can create a smaller output contraction and they can
reduce the inationary pressures, increasing the social welfare.
Shock to the Share of Diverting Funds.
Figure 14 shows the response of the conventional and unconventional policy when a shock to
the share of diverting funds hits the economy. In particular, this shock is a sudden increase of
1 standard deviation in the share of funds that banks can divert. A worsening of the agency
problem is due to exogenous factors. This shock generates nancial distress and a recession. The
unconventional policy is very e¤ective at stabilizing this shock.
The unconventional policy is very e¢ cient at stabilizing the economy when this shock arises.
Output decreases only 0.04 percent initially (solid lines). By contrast, the conventional policy
implies a reduction of 0.1 percent in output (dash lines).
Ination remains very close to its long-run level in both cases. As a consequence, the Taylor rule
suggests a reduction in the nominal and real interest rates to stimulate spending, which is reected
in the initial increase in consumption. However, if the central bank has access to unconventional
policy, the nominal interest rate is kept very close to its long-run level, the nominal interest rate
is less expansionary in this case. The unconventional policy takes care of this nancial shock.
This unconventional policy is very e¢ cient at stabilizing the nancial activity. The increase in the
assets purchases serves to keep under control the cost of credit and to avoid a disruption in the
investment and the real sectors. On impact, the asset purchases increase in 0.5 percentage points.
However, the unconventional policy is persistent. Ten years after this shock, the asset purchases
have not returned to equilibrium.
There is an increase of 8 basis points in the premium when there are no unconventional policy.
This is reected in the less benevolent behavior of investment spending and net wealth.
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Figure 2.14: Simple Rules. Financial Shock
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Figure 14. Implementation of Optimal Policy. 1% Increase in the Diverting Share of Funds. Solid lines  =
5; Y = 0; R = 0:95; 
QE = 25. Dashed  = 2:19; Y = 0:2; R = 0:39; 
QE = 0:
The unconventional policy is very e¢ cient at facing nancial shocks. It can generate a smaller
recession and almost fully stabilize the nancial crisis. The nominal interest rate is utilized to
support ination stabilization and to give a hand to the unconventional instrument to achieve
a faster recovery. There are stabilization and welfare gains from allowing the central bank to
participate in direct lending activities, even when the nominal interest rate is far from the zero
lower bound constraint and in spite of the e¢ ciency costs.
This means that unconventional asset purchases represent an e¢ cient policy instrument to face
di¤erent kind of shocks. The e¤ects of nancial and non nancial shocks (for example, a shock
to the quality of capital or a sudden increase in the moral hazard problem in the banking sector)
can be curbed using the combination of the conventional and unconventional monetary policy. In
contrast, if only conventional instruments are utilized when the economy is subject to nancial
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frictions and nancial crisis, the economy cannot be completely stabilized.
2.6 Related Literature.
There is a set of literature analyzing the impact of the Large Scale Asset Purchases Program
(LSAP) on long-term rates. Gagnon et al. (2011), Khrishnamurthy and Vissing (2011), Chris-
tensen et al. (2011), and DAmico and King (2010), present compelling evidence that the uncon-
ventional policy measures employed by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) since the
end of 2008 have signicantly lowered longer-term Treasury yields. Joyce et al. (2012) also present
a summary of the di¤erent studies which have empirically estimated the e¤ects of the di¤erent
LSAP in the U.S., U.K., and Europe.
IMF (2013 a) summarizes the wide spectrum of unconventional policies implemented around
the world since the Great Recession. They show that for the U.S., the purchase of private securities
through the QE1 program largely contributed to stabilize that economy.
Gilchrist et al. (2015) also support the view that unconventional policy reduced the costs of
borrowing for rms and households. Lowering the term premia accounts for the most of the
reduction in those borrowing costs. According to their results, unconventional asset purchases had
e¤ects not only on the government-bonds rates but also on the private assets such as Mortgage
Backed Securities. In their results the unconventional policy does not a¤ect ination. The e¤ect
on the interest rates is completely due to the changes in the real rate.
However, the focus of the current paper is more in the line of the e¤ects of unconventional
policy using DSGE models. In this line of research Joyce et al. (2012), describe the channels
of transmission of quantitative easing. They also explore the conditions in which credit easing
is e¤ective in promoting the real activity. They show that as long as the credit frictions are
binding in equilibrium and agents are heterogeneous in their asset holdings, the asset purchases
foster economic activity. If the constraints do not bind, then the asset purchases displace the
private intermediation. Their main focus is on analyzing the portfolio rebalancing channel of asset
purchases. Vayanos and Vila (2009) develop a model of preferred portfolio habitats, in which asset
purchases are non-neutral and their e¤ects work mainly through the portfolio rebalancing channel
described in Joyce et al. (2012). In this line of research, Ellison and Tischbirek (2014), using short
and long-term bonds, analyze the e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy. The analysis
builds on a preferred habits assumption, which considers preferences of investors for specic asset
maturities. Long and short-term government debt are not perfect substitutes. In this framework,
they allow the central bank to arbitrage across the maturities. This provides a wider set of policy
instruments to the central bank. This can lead to signicant welfare gains with respect to the case
where the central bank uses only one instrument.
Carlstrom et al. (2014) develop a model with segmented markets in which households can
buy long-term asset through the banking sector. However, the banks cannot arbitrage the return
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di¤erentials because the amount of deposits they can receive is limited by the net worth of the bank.
In this case, asset purchases are non-neutral. A monetary policy that includes the term premium
in a Taylor rule can dampen movements in the market segmentation distortion. In particular,
welfare is improved if the rule can react to changes in the term premium.
Chen et al. (2012) analyze the e¤ects of LSAP programs, in particular Quantitative Easing 2
(QE2). Their estimated model allows for government bonds market segmentation. In contrast to
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), Del Negro et al. (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), who focus
on private markets, the authors evaluate the e¤ects of government bonds purchases. Their mod-
elling strategy is to assume that households have heterogeneous preferences for assets of di¤erent
maturities. In their model, the risk premium that arises in the model as a consequence of transac-
tion costs is a positive function of the supply of long-term Treasury securities. If the government
purchases assets, then the supply diminishes. This reduces the risk premium component of the
interest rate. Hence, the rate of return decreases. If the central bank commits itself to keep the
nominal interest rate at zero for at least four quarters, the e¤ects of LSAP II are smaller than a
25 basis point cut in the nominal interest rates.
In contrast to them, I consider binding nancial constraints in the supply-side of credit. Banks
cannot extend additional credit because they face a leverage constraint, which always binds. In
the current paper, central bank direct lending is welfare enhancing because it increase the supply
of credit, which the commercial banks cannot. Similar to them, I also nd that asset purchases are
welfare improving.
Araújo et al. (2015) consider the e¤ects of the central bank purchases of a risky asset. This
policy complements conventional interest rate policy. In their model there are collateral constraints.
The e¤ects of asset purchases are: they relax the nancial constraint, increase aggregate demand,
and even achieve a Pareto improvement. They nd that so long as there are some binding nancial
constraint, as exposed by Joyce et al. (2012), pure changes in the central banks balance sheet, can
a¤ect asset prices, the allocation of resources and the general level of prices. The friction in their
model arises because all privately issued nancial claims must be collateralizable. This framework
allows them to analyze how collateral constraint matter for the e¤ects of both conventional and
unconventional monetary policies. In contrast to them, I analyze asset purchases in a model in
which the nancial friction limits the supply, rather than demand of credit.
Correia et al. 2013, present a model in which the rms require to borrow in advance in order to
produce. There is a nancial friction limiting the ability of the rms to rise funds. In the presence
of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) that constrains the nominal interest rate, subsidizing the interest
rate on loans is the optimal policy. They assume a model without monopolistic competition and
exible prices. In this case the conventional monetary policy has little room to manoeuvre. In their
model, direct lending by the central bank would be desirable when the banks are balance-sheet
constrained.
Brendon et al. (2011) in a model with a housing sector and with collateral constraints as in
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Iacoviello (2005), also analyze the optimal monetary and unconventional policy. They compare the
benets of commitment respect to discretion. The unconventional instrument is an asset purchases
of private securities. This a¤ects the spreads on private borrowing rates. As in the present paper,
these purchases have the e¤ect of increasing the price of the assets, contributing to directly relax the
collateral constraint. The benets of the unconventional instrument are magnied in the presence
of the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) or when the central bank cannot commit to its announced policy.
In contrast, I do not deal with the ZLB, neither with discretionary policy. These can be avenues
for future research.
Reis (2016) analyses the e¤ects of quantitative easing (QE) on welfare. He concludes that the
QE can ameliorate the welfare losses associated with the decrease in the aggregate demand and
nancial disruption associated with a scal crisis. Managing the central banks balance sheet can
serve to stabilize ination and the real activity. However, his paper focuses more on the scal
implications of QE, than on the interaction of monetary and unconventional issues. I do not deal
with scal issues in this paper.
Gerali et al. (2010) study the relevance of credit supply factors in business cycle uctuations.
Their model contains an imperfectly competitive banking sector. The spread between the lending
and borrowing rates depend on the capital to assets ratio and on the degree of stickiness of the
interest rate. After estimating the model they nd that shocks a¤ecting the banking sector are
able to explain the largest share of contraction of economic activity in the past recession. However
they do not analyze unconventional policy measures.
In summary, the most of the empirical literature has found positive e¤ects of the central banks
direct lending on stabilizing the economy. The DSGE literature nd it optimal to include the
unconventional instrument if there is some nancial friction which limits the arbitrage opportunities
in the economy. These frictions can take the form of preferred habits models, collateral constraints,
or constraints to the supply of credit in the economy.
In particular, I follow the case in which there are limits to the supply of credit. In these
circumstances, the commercial banks cannot increase the supply of funds because they face an
endogenous leverage constraints. In bad times, these constraints tighten and the cost of credit
increases, precipitating a severe recession. Hence, the central bank can intermediate assets in that
market. I analyze optimal policy under commitment. Similarly to the most of the studies, I nd
that if the private intermediaries face nancial stress and reduce the lending, the central banks
direct intermediation can contribute to smooth uctuations in ination and in real and nancial
variables. As some of the literature presented above, the optimal policy can be implemented via
simple rules. The conventional Taylor rule is complemented by an asset purchase rule which has
a feedback coe¢ cient on the deviations of the cost of credit from its long-run average.
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2.7 Conclusion
As a consequence of the Great Recession, the understanding of the interactions between banking
and monetary policy has become a central issue in policy design. The severity of the nancial
crisis has exposed the limitations of the conventional tools utilized by the central bank to stabilize
the economy. In this chapter, I analyzed whether, there are welfare gains of equipping the central
bank with an additional policy instrument.
In an economy with nancial frictions , the central bank now has access to two policy instru-
ments: the nominal interest rate and credit easing through asset purchases. If a negative shock
hits the economy there are stabilization and welfare gains from allowing the central bank to par-
ticipate in direct lending activities. The trade o¤s for the central bank improve in the presence
of monopolistic competition, nancial frictions, and two policy instruments, respet to the case in
which there is only monetary policy available.
The optimal policy can be implemented via simple rules. One rule sets optimally the nominal
interest rate, while the other set the central bank policy nancial intermediation. This arrange-
mente is welfare improving and the central bank improves its policy trade o¤s.
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Chapter 3
Macro-prudential and Monetary Policy
Abstract.
I present an extension of a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector to analyze
macro-prudential policy.
The consumers are heterogeneous. One group of consumers has a utility function with internal
habits (savers). The other group possesses external habits (borrowers).
Reserve requirements function as the prudential instrument. These reserves contribute to
increase welfare, to reduce overborrowing, and alter the steady-state composition of the leverage
ratio in the banking sector; the bank is more leveraged on its loans to rms and less leveraged on
its loans to consumers than in the absence of this policy.
If a nancial shock hits, the monetary contraction is reinforced by the prudential response.
However, if a supply or a cost-push shock hit, the monetary and the prudential policy act in
opposite directions. The main e¤ect of the prudential policy is to curb the excessive borrowing
associated with the ine¢ cient consumption.
3.1 Introduction.
The Great Recession of 2007-09 emphasized the relevance of nancial events for macroeconomic
stability. Financial stability matters. It matters more than previously thought (Clarida (2012)).
Ination targeting is a key element of macroeconomic stability, but it may be insu¢ cient to ensure
nancial stability; monetary policy might be supported with additional instruments that target
for some nancial stability concerns such as credit growth, leverage, or asset prices. In this paper,
I analyze the optimal mix between monetary and macro-prudential policy.
There are a number of papers which have been designed to capture nancial frictions fol-
lowing the nancial crisis. In particular, the conventional New Keynesian framework for analyz-
ing optimal policy (Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Woodford (2003)) has
been adapted to consider nancial imperfections (Cúrdia and Woodford (2010), Woodford (2012)
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Christiano et al. (2013)). Typically, these more sophisticated models include nancial frictions
based on the nancial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG(1999), henceforth) or
some collateral constraint (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) or can include some of the previous fric-
tions together with an imperfectly competitive (Gerali et al. (2010)) or balance-sheet constrained
(Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)) banking sector.
The new literature make it possible to consider nancial intermediaries with a meaningful role
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These literatures can consider cases of under-
borrowing such as we saw in the aftermath of the nancial crisis and can consider the Quantitative
Easing (QE) policies to alleviate the slowdown originating in the nancial sector.
Additionally, some of these models have made clear that individual nancial institutions do
not internalize the e¤ects of their behavior on society. This lack of internalization of the agents
behavior justies the introduction of a regulatory authority, and it has raised the question of
whether and how to optimally mix monetary and macro-prudential policy.
For example, Quint and Rabanal (2014), Gelain and Ilbas (2014) and Christiano et al. (2005)
have extended the nancial frictions literature to consider macroprudential policies. These models,
based on the BGG(1999) nancial accelerator mechanism or the Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
banking model, imply an economy with underborrowing. However, when the underlying friction
implies under -rather than over-borrowing then it is di¢ cult to motivate the use of macroprudential
instruments which will further depress borrowing. As a consequence, these papers tend to consider
macroprudential policy as a stabilization tool outside of steady state.
Other papers succesfully introduce a tendency towards over-borrowing, which is a more natural
environment in which to consider macro-prudential policies. Some examples are: Collard et al.
(2017) in which the limited liability and deposit insurance creates a socially excessive level of
borrowing. Here, prudential policies play a role in taming the excessive risk taking.
In current paper, we add to the literature by analyzing the optimal interaction between mone-
tary and prudential policy in a model with a banking sector similar to that in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). The main contribution of this paper lies in considering a model where there can be simul-
taneously over and under-borrowing in the economy. The nancial friction limits borrowing by
rms, while a consumption externality creates over-borrowing by some households. Interestingly,
macro-prudential policy has a di¤erential impact on these which is that gives the instrument its
e¢ cacy relative to conventional policy. We consider the ability of our model to explain both the
run-up to the nancial crisis and its aftermath and consider what role macroprudential policy
could play in both preventing the crisis and o¤setting the e¤ects.
3.1.1 A Preview of the Model.
I depart from current models by introducing heterogeneity in householdspatience, habits prefer-
ences and net wealth in a model with a frictional banking sector such as that by Gertler and Karadi
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(2011). The rst type of heterogeneity is common in the literature analyzing nancial imperfec-
tions (for example, Cúrdia and Woodford (2010)). The second and third type of heterogeneity are
less common in the studies referring to optimal macro-prudential policy.
Why is it necessary to introduce di¤erences in householdspatience? The di¤erence in patience
creates borrowers and savers in equilibrium. This can create a role for the nancial intermediaries
to lend to households. In this model, banks, facing a balance-sheet constraint, raise deposits from
savers and issue loans to borrowers and rms.
Why is it necessary to introduce wealth heterogeneity? During the Great Recession, di¤er-
ences in households net worth were and important driver of the dynamics of aggregate vari-
ables in the U.S. In particular, the wealth-poor households explained more than 20 percent
of aggregate consumption; and their precautionary motives accelerated the fall in consumption
(Krueger et al. (2016))1. Hence, the relevance of poor households in the U.S. make it appropriate
to include them when modeling this economy. I consider these di¤erences.
Broer et al. (2016) analyze the implications for monetary transmission in a New Keynesian
model with two groups of households (workers and capitalists). Capitalists receive income only
from their equity ownership. Workers obtain their income only from labor. Similarly, I use the
equity on the rms as an approximation to net wealth. Di¤erences in the ownership of this equity
introduce wealth inequality in the model. In contrast to Broer et al. (2016), I allow the two groups
of households to derive income from wealth and labor, and both groups smooth consumption2.
Why is it relevant the habits heterogeneity? The heterogeneity in the habits preferences is
relevant for the optimal policy. The current literature considering habits and nancial frictions,
choose between external or internal. And given that this modelling decision is not innocuous for
optimal policy, the choice should be backed by some empirical evidence.
Why the choice of habits preferences is relevant for optimal policy? Because the externality
introduced by external habits can contribute to overconsumption and overborrowing. Consider
an economy with external habits, monopolistic competition, and banksbalance-sheet constraints.
The rst and third friction make the economy ine¢ ciently small. However, the external habits
make borrowing ine¢ ciently large. Hence, in the presence of nancial frictions, monopolistic
competition and external habits and using a plausible calibration, the economy is ine¢ ciently
large (Leith et al. (2012), and Leith et al. (2015)).
In this context, prudential regulation can reduce overborrowing. This policy makes agents
internalize the externalities which originated the ine¢ cient borrowing. Reserve requirements, the
prudential instrument, increase the cost of credit. Debtors have less incentives to borrow. Over-
borrowing and risk-taking decrease. The economy is less vulnerable to the amplication e¤ects of
1Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Kaplan and Violante (2014), Kaplan et al. (2014), Krueger et al. (2016), and
Gornemann et al. (2016) have shown the e¤ects of heterogeneity on the macroeconomy.
2In Broer et al. (2016), the wealth-rich do not smooth consumption, their consumption is a function only
of wealth. The capitalists (or wealth-rich) have a behavior similar to the hand-to-mouth consumers in
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) or Galí et al. (2007); and closely resemble the wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers
in Kaplan et al. (2014).
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shocks. Macro-prudential policy is welfare increasing in this context.
With internal habits this is not the case. In this paper, the aim of macro-prudential policy
is to curb overborrowing, with habits of internal kind, the level of lending is not changed by the
internal habits. Hence, prudential policy would not act by reducing excessive nancial activity.
What is the right modelling decision? To answer this, I separate the households in two groups.
The external (habits) consumers are the wealth-poor households of the empirical evidence3. The
rich group is captured in the model by the internal (habits) consumers. I allow the relative
consumption between these two groups to dene the relevance of habits, rather than selecting in
an ad hoc way the type of habits.
Why is it relevant to consider the Ramsey-optimal prudential policy? Prudential policy can
potentially alleviate part of the distortions associated with the frictions in the economy, in addition
to its stabilization properties. If well, simple rules can be an approximation to how policy is
implemented in central banks, much of the current literature analyzing the interaction between
monetary and prudential policy consider only the coe¢ cients entering the simple rules. That
literature is putting aside one important benet of prudential policy; its contribution to eliminate
or reduce steady-state distortions, and this could lead to an under appreciation of its potential
benets. I consider both, the Ramsey-optimal contingent plans, and the ability of simple rules to
mimic these plans.
Why does the current literature nd it optimal to introduce a prudential instrument? Suppose
there is a demand shock. In the boom, credit, real activity and the marginal cost of rms increase.
Firms with the opportunity to adjust price would do so and ination would rise. Risk-taking also
increments. The Taylor rule and the prudential rule jointly determine a less volatile environment.
The task for the central bank is well dened: the Taylor rule deals with ination stabilization;
whereas the prudential instrument deals with excessive risk-taking. The monetary rule calls for
a contractionary setting. The prudential rule calls for a more astringent policy. Curbing the
business cycle, due to the monetary tightening and the reinforcement by the prudential response,
contributes to smooth ination, output, and nancial volatility. Welfare increases.
In these frameworks, there are relatively small welfare improvements because they take only
the contributions of prudential policy to smooth uctuations, missing the benets associated with
the reduction of the ine¢ ciencies in the steady state (exceptions are Collard et al. (2017) and
De Paoli and Paustian (2013)).
How much of the contribution of the prudential instrument to welfare is due to its contribu-
tion to ination control and how much to its contribution to nancial stability? Potentially, the
strongest contribution of prudential policy in such environments could be its reinforcement of in-
ation control, which in models with sticky prices is a big contributor to social welfare. It is not
clear if the policy mix implemented would still deliver welfare benets in the absence of sticky
3As pointed out by Krueger et al. (2016), this group represents a large share of the population and consumption.
They have access to nancial markets but hold almost zero net wealth. Their precautionary motives contribute to
explain the large drop in consumption during the Great Recession.
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prices. Considering the Ramsey-optimal contingent plan could deliver a clearer answer. And, in
contrast to most of the current literature, I do so.
To the best of my knowledge, no other paper has yet studied optimal macro-prudential policy
under net wealth, habits heterogeneity4, and an overborrowing problem associated with ine¢ cient
consumption. I ll in this gap.
I proceed now to present a brief review of related literature. The next section contains two
subsections. The rst presents the studies analyzing the interaction between monetary and pru-
dential policy via simple rules. The second presents the studies which use Ramsey-optimal policy
as their benchmark for analysis. The number of papers in this last section is less extensive; the
current paper adds to this branch of literature.
3.2 Related Literature.
The nancial frictions can be modeled on the demand (e.g. some limits to borrow associated with
the value of collateral or default risk) or supply side of credit (e.g. an imperfect banking sector
which limits the value of loans issued). The most of the current literature analyzing the welfare
implications of prudential policy assume that prudential and monetary policy are implemented via
simple rules.
Duncan and Nolan (2015) and Galati and Moessner (2013) provide extensive surveys on the
literature concerning micro-prudential, macro-prudential policy, and its interaction with the other
dimensions of government policy.
3.2.1 Macroprudential Policy as a Stabilization Tool.
As noted in the introduction, some of the current literature introduce macroprudential policy
as a stabilization tool in an underborrowing framework. In particular, to the monopolistically
competitive economy they add a frictional nancial sector that further reducer the nancial activity.
For example: Kannan et al. (2012) follow Iacoviello (2005), they set a rule for monetary policy and
another for the macro-prudential authority. Then, they optimally nd the value of the feedback
coe¢ cients entering the policy rules, but they leave aside the steady-state considerations of such
instrument. In such an economy the prudential instrument could work as a subsidy rather than
a tax on borrowing in order to foster credit growth. Similarly, Unsal (2011) nd that macro-
prudential policy is welfare improving but they do not deal with steady state considerations.
In Angelini et al. (2012) conduct their welfare analysis based on an ad hoc loss function. When
a shock hits the supply of credit, and produces nancial distress, prudential policy is welfare
4Quint and Rabanal (2014) estimate a two countries model for the euro area. They consider savers and borrowers
with external habis. Their degree of external habits be di¤erent, but they do not deal with the issue of considering
di¤erent kind of habits.
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improving. However, they do not consider introducing the prudential instrument as a way to solve
the steady state nancial problem.
Similarly to the current paper, Quint and Rabanal (2014) consider habitsheterogeneity, but
of the same kind. Borrowers can have a di¤erent value of their external habits than savers. They
optimize the coe¢ cients in the policy rules. But, do not deal with the issue of the steady-state
value of the prudential instrument.
Levine and Lima (2015) extend the model in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to introduce a subsidy
to net wealth and a tax on lending. They optimize their policy rules and nd that, leaning against
nancial markets is welfare increasing. Their policies rules work as a stabilization device rather
than a device to correct the ine¢ ciencies in steady state.
Leduc and Natal (2015) also pursue the optimal policy in a model in which entrepreneurs face
credit constraint. Their demand for credit is limited by the value of the rm. This is another
example of an economy with a problem of underborrowing in steady state. Hence, the prudential
instrument can be use only as a stabilization device. The steady-state in this economy is highly
distorted. The monopolistic competition distortion is reinforced by the external premium distor-
tion. It is not clear in this study how reserve requirement, which have the e¤ect of increasing the
cost of credit and reinforce distortions, can contribute to eliminate the underborrowing distortions
in steady state.
The number of paper that introduce prudential policy in an overborrowing framework is more
limited. Next, I present some of these papers.
3.2.2 The Case of Ramsey Policy.
Clerc et al. (2015) analyze the e¤ects of capital requirements on the steady-state welfare. Banks
have incentives to overborrow because of the limited liability and deposit insurance. The macro-
prudential instrument is welfare increasing because it reduces the banks risk-taking. Collard et
al. (2017) jointly determine optimally the nominal interest rate and bank-capital requirements.
The nancial distortion is due to limited liability and deposit insurance. This creates a socially
excessive risk-taking by banks. The prudential instrument is a banks capital requirement. The
Ramsey planner sets both instruments to maximize social welfare. In contrast, I use reserve
requirements as the prudential instrument.
De Paoli and Paustian (2013) analyze the welfare implications of cooperation between mone-
tary and macro-prudential authorities. Firms can borrow only a certain fraction of their net worth,
as in Carlstrom et al. (2010). The policy authority optimally sets a tax on borrowing to control
leveraging. If faced with cost-push shocks, policy authorities should cooperate and commit to a
given course of action. If monetary and macro-prudential tools are set independently and under
discretion, they suggest that assigning conservative mandates (à la Rogo¤ [1985]) and having one
of the authorities act as a leader can mitigate coordination problems.
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There is a di¤erent branch of the literature which considers occasionally binding constraints.
Jean and Korinek (2010 and 2016), Bianchi (2011), Benigno et al. (2013), are some examples. The
benets of such approach is that they are able to analyze optimal prudential policy in good and
bad times. This modeling strategy allows the prudential authority to prevent risk-taking during
good times. As a consequence, in bad times, the economy is in a better position to face shocks. In
contrast, in the current paper, nancial constraints are always binding.
Bianchi and Mendoza (2011) examine the e¤ects of a credit externality in a model with col-
lateral constraint, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Borrowers do not internalize that their
borrowing increases systemic risk. The prudential instrument depresses borrowing when the econ-
omy is growing, reducing the magnitude of the nancial crisis if bad shocks occur. The social
planners allocation is the benchmark for comparison. However, they do not deal with the inter-
action of monetary and prudential policy.
Next, I present the benchmark model for analysis, which considers: heterogeneity in the house-
holds preferences; the Ramsey-optimal plan; and, simple rules and their ability to mimic the
results of the Ramsey plan.
3.3 The Model.
The model I use for the analysis is a DSGE similar to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007) but modied in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to include nancial intermediaries that
face balance-sheet constraints. In this framework, an agency problem between borrowers and
lenders limits the amount of funds that banks can lend. The amount of loans that can be inter-
mediated by the banking sector depend on the value of the net wealth in this sector.
There are ve groups of agents: households (savers and borrowers), banks, goods producers,
capital-goods producers and retailers. I depart from the assumption of a representative consumer.
In the model there will be two groups of consumers. They di¤er from each other in their patience,
in the way they form habits in consumption, and in their net nancial position. Next, I discuss
the characteristics of households.
3.3.1 Households.
Households choose consumption (Ct), labor (Lt) and savings
 
Dht

to maximize their utility. Each
household has a continuum of members. Within the household there is perfect consumption insur-
ance. There are two types of agents inside each household. At each period, the fraction (1  f)
represents workers and (f) bankers. A household owns the banks managed by its members. The
deposits of this household, are in intermediaries that it does not own.
The survival horizon of banks is nite. Introducing this nite horizon has the e¤ect of ensuring
that over time the banks do not reach the point where they can fund all the investment from their
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own capital. () is the probability that a bank operates until the next period. This probability is
independent of how long the agent has been a banker. The average survival length of a bank is 
1
1 

.
The relative share of workers and bankers is constant. Each period, the number of bankers
leaving the industry is (1  ) f . The same number of workers become bankers. Households provide
their new bankers with starting funds. When a bank leaves the industry its retained prots are
returned, lump-sum, to its owner.
Consumers.
There are two groups of consumers in the model. The impatient households derive utility from
an external habits specication. The number of these consumers is (). The representative
consumer of the second group is a patient saver and has a utility function showing internal habits
in consumption. There are (1 ) consumers in this group.
To ensure they both have the same quantity of labour in equilibrium, I assume that they have
di¤erent attitudes toward work. In particular, the disutility of labour would be di¤erent.
Borrowers.
Following Leith et al. (2012) and Leith et al. (2015), I assume that this group of consumers form
habits at the level of an aggregate consumption good. The habit-adjusted composite good of the
household n is (Xn;t)
Xnt = C
Ex
n;t   hExCExt 1,
and the household ns consumption, CExn;t is an aggregate of the continuum of goods i 2 [0; 1] ;
CExn;t =
Z 1
0
 
CExit
n " 1" di "" 1 ;
(") is the elasticity of substitution between goods and CExt 1 is the cross-sectional average of con-
sumption.
The maximization problem of the representative consumer in this group can be expressed using
the Lagrangian:
L = Et
8<:
1P
i=0
dt+s
 
Ext
i h 1
1 

CExn;t+i   hExCExt+i 1
1    Ex
1+'
 
LExn;t+i
1+'i
+Ext+i

Wt+iL
Ex
n;t+i + 
Ex
t+i   TExt+i  Rbt+i

qt 1+iBExt 1+i

+

qt+iB
Ex
t+i
  CExn;t+i
9=; ;
where, LExn;t are the per capita working hours, 
Ex
t and T
Ex
t are the prots and the lump-sum taxes
of the external-habits consumers. Wt is the real wage.
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This group of households is more impatient than the savers. This is captured by the subjective
discount factor
 
Ext

. Then, households with external habits are allowed to borrow from the
commercial banks. Given that borrowers are more impatient than savers Ext < , where  is
the discount factor of the savers. This assumption separates households in savers and borrowers.
Every period they acquire loans with value of
 
qtB
Ex
t

, where qt is the price of one unit of per
capita borrowing
 
BExt

. Rkt is the real interest rate paid from period t-1 to t. 
1


is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
 
hEx

measures the degree of external habits, 
Ex

is the weight of labour in the utility and (' 1) is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
The rst order condition respect to consumption is:
Et
Ex
t = dtEt
"
1
CExn;t   hExCExt 1

#
: (3.1)
Respect to labour:
dt
Ex
 
LExn;t
'
= Ext Wt: (3.2)
Respect to borrowing:
Et
Ex
t qt = 
ExtEt
Ex
t+1qtR
b
t+1: (3.3)
And the budget constraints:
WtL
Ex
n;t + 
Ex
t  Rbt

qt 1BExt 1

+

qtB
Ex
t
  TExt = CExn;t : (3.4)
The marginal utility of consumption at period (i = 0) can be expressed as:
UExct = dtEt
"
1
CExn;t   hExCExt 1

#
: (3.5)
Then, optimal labour supply is
Ex
 
LExn;t
'
UExct
= Wt: (3.6)
And the consumption-saving decision
1 = ExtEt
dt+1
dt
UExct+1
UExct
Rbt+1: (3.7)
Savers.
The maximization problem of the savers can be expressed using the Lagrangian:
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L = Et
8<:
1P
i=0
dt+i
i
h
1
1 
 
CIt+i   hIntCIt+i 1
1    
1+'
 
LIt+i
1+'i
+t+i

Wt+iL
I
t+i + 
I
t+i   T It+i +Rt 1+i

DIt 1+i
  DIt+i  CIt+i
9=;
where,
 
CIt

is the per capita consumption, LIt working hours, 
I
t ; T
I
t and D
I
t are the prots, the
lump-sum taxes and the deposits of the internal-habits consumers. () is the subjective discount
factor of this group.
 
Int

is the weight of labour in the utility. All the other parameters and
variables are identical to those of the external-habits consumers.
The rst order conditions respect to consumption is:
t = Et
"
dt 
CIt   hIntCIt 1
   dt+1 hInt 
CIt+1   hIntCIt

#
: (3.8)
Respect to labor:
dt
Int
 
LIt
'
= EttWt: (3.9)
Respect to savings:
Ett = EttRt: (3.10)
And the Budget constraints:
WtL
I
t + 
I
t +Rt 1

DIt 1
  DIt   T It = CIt : (3.11)
The marginal utility of consumption at period (i = 0) can be expressed as:
U Ict = Et
"
dt 
CIt   hIntCIt 1
   dt+1hInt 
CIt+1   hIntCIt

#
: (3.12)
Then, optimal labour supply is
dt
Int
 
LIt
'
U Ict
= Wt: (3.13)
And the consumption-saving decision
1 = Et
U Ict+1
U Ict
Rt:
3.3.2 Banks.
Banks assist in channeling funds from savers to borrowers. In addition, they engage in maturity
transformation. They hold long-term assets, funded with short-term liabilities. Banks in the model
aim to capture the entire banking sector: investment banks as well as commercial banks.
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Balance Sheet and Evolution of Wealth.
The nancial intermediary (j) receives deposits from households with internal habits (Djt). These
deposits pay the short-term real interest (Rt) from (t) to (t+ 1). These funds complement the
accumulated wealth of banks at the end of period t, (Njt). The banks make use of these two
sources of funds to make loans to producers and to the households with external habits.
The bank funds two type of assets: the loans granted to rms

Sfjt

and the loans granted to
the households with external habits
 
SExtjt = B
Ex
jt

, where () is the number of households with
external habits funded by this bank. Loans to rms pay the rate
 
Rkt+1

between (t) and (t+ 1).
Loans to consumption pay the rate
 
Rbt+1

over the same period. The di¤erence in the return on
assets is due to the di¤erent ability of the bank to divert funds. The bank can divert a fraction ()
of its assets on rms, but a fraction () of its consumer loans. In equilibrium, () is calibrated
to match the observed di¤erence in the lending rates. The relative price of loan to rms is (Qt).
I assume that the only di¤erence between the loans to consumption and the loans to rms
is the di¤erent ability of the bank to divert each type of assets. Hence, following the work of
Gertler et al. (2012), I normalize the units of loans to consumption so that each unit is a claim to
the future returns on one unit of the capital in the rms held by the bank. Allow Zft = 
PmtYmt
tKt
be
the ow of return at period (t) by one unit of banks holding of rms assets5. The relative price
of the loans to consumption is (qt). Then, the interest rate on loans to consumption is given by
EtR
b
t+1 = Et
t+1
qt
h
Zft+1 + qt+1 (1  t+1)
i
: (3.14)
The payo¤ to loans to consumption is adjusted by the physical depreciation and the quality of
capital that underlies the banks loans to rms. The general equilibrium of the model determines
Zft and qt.
Each period the total value of assets held by the representative bank is:
QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt :
Let (Njt) be the value of equity that the intermediary (j) holds at the end of period (t). The
balance sheet of the representative bank is
QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt = Njt +Djt; (3.15)
where the assets of this bank are funded with the deposits received from the households with
internal habits (Djt) and its accumulated wealth (Njt). The total deposits received by the bank
are
Djt = (1 )DIjt
5Zt is determined optimally as the result of the maximization of the non-nancial rms.
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The banks net wealth evolves as the di¤erence between the return on its assets and the cost
of funding them,
Njt = R
k
t 1Qt 1S
f
jt 1 +R
b
t 1qt 1S
Ext
jt 1  Rt 1Djt 1; (3.16)
which is the di¤erence between the return on loans

Rkt 1Qt 1S
f
jt 1 +R
b
t 1qt 1S
Ext
jt 1

and the cost
of deposits (RtDjt 1).
The balance sheet of the banks eq.(3.15) can be inserted in the evolution of the banks wealth
eq. (3.16), to obtain
Njt =

Rkt 1  Rt 1

Qt 1S
f
jt 1 +

Rbt 1  Rt 1

qt 1SExtjt 1 +Rt 1Njt 1: (3.17)
The term

Rkt 1  Rt 1

is the premium over the riskless rate for each unit of loans to rms.
The private bank has a premium equal to

Rbt 1  Rt 1

over the riskless rate for each unit of loan
to consumption. The term [Rt 1Njt 1] is the banks benet of retained earnings.
Incentive Constraint.
There is a frictionless process of lending and borrowing between producers and banks and between
banks and borrowers. The possibility of making prots encourages the banker to remain in the
industry as long as possible. When the risk-adjusted premium is positive, the intermediary would
like to expand assets to exhaust the prot opportunities. However, an agency problem between
banks and depositors reduce the ability of the bank to issue new loans.
In particular, every period the bankers can divert a fraction () of loans to rms and a fraction
() of loans to consumption. In order to avoid that the bank absconds with the funds, the
households impose an incentive constraint to the bank. The cost to the banker of diverting funds
is that the households can force the bank to shut down and households can recover the fraction of
assets.
For the households to be willing to supply funds to the banker, the next incentive constraint
must be satised:
Vjt  QtSfjt + qtSExtjt : (3.18)
The left-hand part (Vjt) is the expected present value of the banks nancial activity if it
remains in the industry. This is what the bank would lose if it is forced to leave the industry. The
term 

QtS
f
jt

is what the bank would gain if it absconds the loans to rms, while
 
qtS
Ext
jt

is the gain if it absconds with the loans to consumption. The banks asses this trade-o¤ and acts
optimally. The bank would remain in the industry as long as the benets from doing so cover the
benets from absconding with a share of funds.
The household would deposit in the bank only if the benet for the bank of lending and
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borrowing is at least as large as the benet for the bank from diverting funds. This contract limits
the ability of the banking sector to raise funds from households. As a consequence, the banks have
limits on the loans they can issue. This will impact the level of capital that rms can accumulate
and the level of the variables in equilibrium.
Maximization of Prots.
Banks are not interested in funding projects with an expected discounted cost larger than its
expected discounted return. A fraction

ownershipExt

of the representative bank is owned by the
households with external habits in consumption. The remaining

1 ownershipExt

of prots of this
bank belongs to households with internal habits.
The prots of the bank are returned to households. Hence, the relevant discount factor for
those resources is the weighted average of the discount factor of each group of households. In
particular, the resources are discounted at the rate
Et

ownershipExt 
ExtU
Ex
ct+1
UExct
+

1 ownershipExt


U Ict+1
U Ict

(3.19)
between period (t) and (t+ 1). Between period t and (t+ i) the discount factor is
Ett;t+1+i = Et

ownershipExt
 
Ext
1+i UExct+i
UExct
+

1 ownershipExt

1+i
U Ict+i
U Ict

: (3.20)
At the end of period t, the bank maximizes its expected discounted terminal wealth according
to
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) : (3.21)
Substituting the evolution of wealth eq.(3:17)
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i Rkt  RtQtSfjt + Rbt  Rt qtSExtjt
+RtNjt
!
(3.22)
The bank then maximizes eq. (3:22) subject to the incentive constraint (3:18). The conjectured
solution is
Vjt = 
f
tQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (3.23)
The maximization produces the marginal benet of issuing and additional loan to rms

vft

vft = Ett;t+1
t+1
 
Rkt  Rt

: (3.24)
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The marginal benet of issuing and additional loan to households
vExtt = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  Rt

: (3.25)
And the marginal prots of accumulating an additional unit of net worth (t)
t = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

: (3.26)
The prot maximization of this bank implies that the marginal return on the two assets are
equalized, this means that
h
Extt = 
f
t
i
. And

t+1 = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

; (3.27)
is the banks augmented discount factor.
Leverage Ratio.
From the maximization conditions of the bank, the optimal leverage ratio is given by
t
  ft
=
QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt
Njt
; (3.28)
which can be written as
t =
t
  ft
:
The previous expression means that the maximum amount of loans issued by the representative
bank is limited by the maximum leverage ratio tolerated by the household. This leverage ratio
is function of the diverting preference of the banks and the protability of the banking industry.
The maximum amount of loans is also restricted by the amount of accumulated wealth of the bank
(Njt).
The components of the leverage ratio are the same for each bank. After aggregating (3.28),
QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t =

t
  ft

Nt: (3.29)
the overall demand for assets in the economy

QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t

can be written as a function of
the leverage ratio and the accumulated wealth (Nt) in the banking sector.
Evolution of Aggregate Net Wealth.
The evolution of aggregate wealth (Nt) is the sum of two components: the net worth of the existing
banks (Net), and the net wealth of the new banks (Nnt)
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Nt = Net +Nnt: (3.30)
The fraction of bankers () at (t  1) survives until (t). Then, using the aggregate expression
of eq. (3:17) and the denition of leverage,
Net = 
"
Rkt 1  Rt 1
 Qt 1Sft 1
Nt 1
+

Rbt 1  Rt 1
 qt 1SExtt 1
Nt 1
+Rt
#
Nt 1: (3.31)
As in Gertler and Karadi (2013), I assume that the newly entering bankers receive start-up
funds from the households. Because the bank is jointly owned, the total transfer received by the
households is a weighted sum of the size of each group. It is assumed that this start-up funds are
equal to a small fraction of the value of assets that exiting bankers had intermediated in their nal
operating period.
There are (1  ) banks exiting every period. It is assumed that each period the households
with external habits transfers the fraction
 

1 

w

of the intermediated assets in the previous
period to their new bank. The household with internal habits transfer a fraction
 
1 
1 

w

. There
are (1  ) new banks this period. Hence, in the aggregate, the startup transfer to banks ish
Nnt = w

QtS
f
t 1 + qt 1S
Ext
t 1
i
.
The evolution of aggregate wealth is
Nt = 
"
Rkt 1  Rt 1
 Qt 1Sft 1
Nt 1
+

Rbt 1  Rt 1
 qt 1SExtt 1
Nt 1
+Rt
#
Nt 1 +w

QtS
f
t 1 + qt 1S
Ext
t 1

:
(3.32)
3.3.3 Non-nancial Intermediate Producers Firms.
The production (Ymt) in this sector is given by
Ymt = At (UtKt)
 L1 t (3.33)
The income for the rms is the value of its product (PmtYmt) plus the income coming from
the reselling the undepreciated capital. The costs are: the wage bill (WtLt), the return on the
capital acquired in the previous period and paid in this
 
Rkt

Qt 1Kt and assuming that cost of
replacement of worn out capital is unit, the prots problem for the rm in this period is to choose
(Ut) and (Lt) to maximize
PmtYmt + [Qt   t] tKt  RktQt 1Kt  WtLt (3.34)
subject to eq.(3:33).
The labour demand is:
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(1  )PmtYmt
Lt
= Wt; (3.35)
the optimal utilization rate is:
Pmt
Ymt
Ut
= bU t tKt; (3.36)
after assuming the depreciation function:
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t (3.37)
Return to Capital.
The return to capital is the remaining of the prots after paying the wage bill and the other costs
of production. Substituting the optimal condition (3:35) in the prots equation (3:34) total prots
should be zero as long as the rms pays all the return to capital to the banks
PmtYmt +Qt (1  t) tKt  RktQt 1Kt   (1  )PmtYmt = 0
simplifying and solving for the return to capital
Rkt =

Pmt
Ymt
Kt
+Qt (1  t) t

1
Qt 1
(3.38)
where the value of the marginal productivity of capital is
h
Pmt
Ymt
Kt
i
:
3.3.4 Capital Producers.
Competitive capital producers purchase the depreciated capital to the intermediate producers at
the end of the period (t). The capital is repaired and sold together with the new capital. The
cost of repairing worn out capital is unity. The value of selling one unit of new capital is (Qt). As
in Gertler and Karadi (2011), investment adjustment cost are associated with the net investment
(Int):
Int = It   ttKt (3.39)
where (It) is the total investment.
Each period the rm maximizes
maxEt
1X
=t
t;
"
(Q   1) In   i
2

In   In 1
In 1 + Iss
2
(In + Iss)
#
: (3.40)
Because these rms are owned by the members of both households, the relevant discount factor
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is the same as for the banks
Ett; = Et

ownershipExt
 
Ext
1+i UExct+i
UExct
+

1 ownershipExt

1+i
U Ict+i
U Ict

The investment adjustment costs, associated with the net ow of investment, are
i
2

In   In 1
In 1 + Iss
2
(In + Iss)
where (i) is the inverse of the elasticity of net investment to the price of capital. Each of the rms
in this sector chooses the same level of net investment. So, it is not necessary to index investment
by rm. From this maximization problem the optimal price of capital
Qt = 1 +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(3.41)
+ i

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss

  Etit;t+1

Int+1   Int
Int + Iss

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
:
3.3.5 Retailers.
Final output is a composite of a continuum of di¤erentiated retail goods. The only input of
production is the intermediate good. Retailers purchase inputs from the intermediate producers
and re-package it. Final product is aggregated according to
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
ft df
 "
" 1
(3.42)
(Yft) is the output purchased to the retailer (f). (") is the elasticity of substitution across varieties.
Optimal Demand for Retailers.
As shown in the appendix, from cost minimization, those purchasing the nal good have an optimal
demand for each variety equal to
Yft =

Pft
Pt
 "
Yt (3.43)
which implies the optimal price index
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
: (3.44)
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Prot Maximization.
The only cost of production for the retailer is the price of the intermediate good, then this cost
is given by (Pmt) because it takes only one unit of intermediate good to produce one unit of the
retail good. Each period rms can adjust their price with probability (1  ). For the periods in
which the rm is not able to set price it index it to the lagged rate of ination.
In contrast to Gertler and Karadi (2011) I assume that this economy can be subject to a
cost-push shock. In particular, the government imposes a distortionary tax on sales. Following
Chen et al. (2014) shocks to this tax, evolve according to
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t (3.45)
("t ) is i.i.d. with mean zero and variance (
2
t ) :
The rms problem in this sector is to choose the optimal price (P t ) to maximize its discounted
expected prots:
maxEt
1X
i=0
it;t+i

(1   t) P

t
Pt+i
iQ
k=1
[t+k 1]
p   Pmt+i

Yft+i (3.46)
subject to
Yft+i =

P t
Pt+i
 "
Yt+i (3.47)
where t is the rate of ination from (t  i) to (t). And (p) is a parameter with values [0; 1] and
which measures the ination indexation. The discount factor of those prots is the weighted by
the size of each group of households.
The rst order condition is
Et
1X
i=0
it;t+i

(1   t) P

t
Pt+i
iQ
k=1
[t+k 1]
p   "
"  1Pmt+i

Yft+i = 0: (3.48)
As shown in the appendix, the optimal price, implied by the solution to the previous problem
is:
P it
Pt
=
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
(3.49)
with
Ft = PmtYt + Ett;t+1
 "
t 
"
t+1Ft+1 (3.50)
and
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Zt = (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Ft+1: (3.51)
Evolution of the price index.
Every period there is a share (1  ) of producers adjusting price optimally. The remaining ()
simply index their price to the previous period ination. Using the optimal price index, the
evolution of the price index can be written as
P 1 "t =

(1  ) (P t )1 " + 



t 1Pt 1
1 "
: (3.52)
Price Dispersion.
As shown in the appendix, price dispersion is equal to
t =
Z 1
0

Pft
Pt
 "
df: (3.53)
Using the law of movement of the price index and the denition of price dispersion this measure
evolves according to:
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1: (3.54)
3.3.6 Government Budget Constraint.
The government spending, which evolves exogenously, (Gt) and the payments on the debt acquired
previously
 
Rt 1B
g
t 1

are nanced with a tax on sales ( tYt), issue of new government bonds (B
g
t )
and using lump-sum taxation (Tt). The governments budget constraint is
Tt = Gt +Rt 1B
g
t 1  Bgt    tYt (3.55)
The initial level of debt
 
Bgt 1

is zero. The lump-sum tax ensures that the debt of the govern-
ment is stabilized over time and that its budget constraint is balanced, then
Tt = Gt    tYt (3.56)
where the government consumption (Gt) evolves exogenously
Gt =
G
Y
gt:
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with (gt) equal to
ln (gt) = g ln (gt 1) + "gt (3.57)
where the ("gt) is an i.i.d. process with mean zero and variance
 
2g

: The evolution of the
distortionary taxation follows
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t :
3.4 Aggregation.
3.4.1 Labour Market.
Total labour demand is
Lt = L
Ex
t + (1 )LIt (3.58)
Using the market wage in the per capita supply of labour of the households with external habits
LExt =

(1  ) U
Ex
ct
Ex
PmtYmt
Lt
 1
'
: (3.59)
And using the market wage in the per capita supply of labour of the households with internal
habits
LIt =

(1  ) U
I
ct
Int
PmtYmt
Lt
 1
'
: (3.60)
Using equation 3:59 and 3:60 in 3:58 and solving for aggregate labour (Lt),
Lt =
("
()

UExct
Ex
 1
'
+ (1 )

Uct

 1
'
#
[(1  )PmtAt (UttKt)]
1
'
) '
'+
: (3.61)
3.4.2 Financial Markets.
The rms equate issue one unit of security for each unit of capital. This capital can be used in
production after it is a¤ected by a exogenous shock (t). Then, total amount of loans issued to
the rms is
QtS
f
t = QttKt+1; (3.62)
the total amount of loans issued to the households is
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qtS
Ext
t = qtB
Ex
t ; (3.63)
where () is the number of household with external habits. The total deposits in the economy are

Dt = (1 )DIntt

:
3.4.3 Aggregate Resource Constraint.
Consumption, government spending, total investment and the costs associated to the change in
investment adjustment are the demand faced by the nal producers. Then, the aggregate resource
constraint is
Yt = C
Ex
t + [1 ]CIt +Gt + It +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) : (3.64)
3.4.4 Law of movement of Capital.
From the law of movement of capital
Kt+1 = (1  t) tKt + It (3.65)
and the denition of net investment
Int = It   ttKt (3.66)
the capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = tKt + Int: (3.67)
3.4.5 Deposits.
The aggregate deposits in the economy are
Dt = [1 ]DIt : (3.68)
For the households with external habit, demand for borrowing is
BExt 1 + Et
1X
i=0
iQ
m=0

1
Rbt+m
 
Ext+i +Wt+iL
Ex
t+i   TExt+i

= Et
1X
i=0
iQ
m=0

1
Rbt+m
 
CExt+i

: (3.69)
Aggregate transfers from the government are
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Tt = Gt    tYt;
the households with external habits receive
h
TExt =

transferExt

Tt
i
, and the households with in-
ternal habits receive the remaining of the transfers
 
T It =
 
1 transferTt, where transfersExt 
can be di¤erent from the population size.
Similarly, prots received by the households with external habits are
h
Extt =

ownershipExt

t
i
and households with internal habits receive Intt =

1 ownershipExt

t, where t are the total
prots and

ownershipExt

is the participation of the households with external habits in the rms.
3.5 Macro-Prudential Policy.
IMF (2013) denes systemic risk as the tendency of the nancial sector to amplify adverse aggregate
shock. This is the result of macro-nancial feedback mechanisms that result in an over-exposure to
such adverse aggregate shocks. In this model with endogenously constrained banking sector, the
maximizing behavior of individual banks leads the aggregate economy to have an overexposure to
positive and negative shocks. In particular, the leverage ratio, which is the result of optimization
of individual nancial intermediaries, serves as a multiplier of any shock hitting the net wealth of
the sector.
The role of macro-prudential policy is to detain those feedback processes that drive the economy
towards a vulnerable position. By reducing the procyclical feedback between asset prices and credit
the macro-prudential policy can detain the volatility of the business cycle.
I follow the work of Claessens et al. (2013, 2014) in dening the reserve requirement (Brevt )
as an instrument of macro-prudential policy. Kashyap and Stein (2012) suggest the use of this
instrument as a Pigouvian tax in order to make nancial institutions to internalize the e¤ects of
their activity on society6. This macro-prudential instrument can a¤ect the e¤ect of shocks ex ante,
by making the banks to optimally choose a smaller leverage ratio. And can also a¤ect the economy
once the shock hits. In addition, the macro-prudential instrument serves as a tax on consumption
making the agents to internalize the e¤ects of their consumption externality on borrowing. The
Macro-prudential regulator can change every period its macro-prudential instrument to make the
economy converge to the regulators objectives.
3.5.1 Reserve Requirements (RRs).
In the model, the bank has access to three assets. Loans to non-nancial rms (QtS
f
t ), the loans
to households
 
qtS
Ext
t

and Reserve Requirements (Brvt ). To fund those assets the bank has two
6The denition of reserve requirements here matches the denition in IMF (2012 a) : Central banks can use
variations in the level of RRs to a¤ect broader credit conditions. When RRs are remunerated below the policy rate
or are unremunerated, a variation in the level of the requirement imposes a tax on lending.
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sources of funds: Deposits (Dt) and accumulated wealth (Nt). The bank can optimally choose the
assets it would like to intermediate each period. This problem is subject to the incentive constraint
imposed by households, to the cost of funding the deposits and to the reserve requirement imposed
by the regulator.
Its balance sheet is:
QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t +B
rv
t = Nt +Dt (3.70)
These reserve requirements are assets which the bank holds but which cannot lend. They are
held at the vaults of the central bank. These assets are short-term assets which can be used to face
any adverse shock which decreases the ability of banks to raise deposits. Banks in the economy
are highly vulnerable to nancial shocks because they are specialist in transforming short-term
liabilities into long-term assets. Then, there is a mismatch between the term structure of their
lending and their borrowing. The reserves requirements aim to reduce this mismatch. The central
bank has full control of this instrument.
In particular, the central bank can set a reserve requirement equal to a fraction of the deposits
issue by the commercial bank
Brvt = [1  rest ]Dt (3.71)
This restriction says that after the commercial bank have collected deposits Dt, the central
bank force them to hold the fraction (1   t) as reserves. These funds cannot be intermediated.
If the total assets of the banks are QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t , then, every period the banks can intermediate
resources equal to
QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t = Nt + 
res
t Dt (3.72)
where 0  res < 1.
Over time, the net wealth of the bank evolves as the di¤erence between the return on its assets
and the cost of funding them, this includes the taxing and subsidizing
Nt = R
k
t 1Qt 1S
f
jt 1 +R
b
t 1qt 1S
Ext
jt 1  Rt 1Dt 1: (3.73)
Even when the commercial bank intermediates only rest Dt of its new deposits, it has to pay
the cost of raising the full amount of the deposits. Here, I try to capture the idea that the reserve
requirement can act as tax on nancial intermediation (IMF (2012 a)).
Solving eq. (3.72) for deposits and using eq. (3.73)
Nt =

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1; (3.74)
This provide incentives for the bank to accumulate more wealth.
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The reserve ratio (1  rest ) a¤ects the accumulation of wealth. When the reserve ratio increases
(rest , smaller) each unit of accumulated wealth is more valuable

Rt
rest
Nt

. The external cost of
banks funds has increased and the bank values more each additional unit of accumulated equity.
At the same time, the increase in the reserve ratio decreases the premium over the risk free rate
associated with each type of loan (Sft 1 and S
Ext
jt 1). This can alter the banks incentives to issue
loans to the external consumers.
By a¤ecting the protability of assets, the central bank directly a¤ects the commercial banks
incentives to expand their liabilities. With a positive value of reserves, the central bank incentives
the nancial intermediaries to accumulate more equity and to borrow less.
3.5.2 Maximization with Reserve Ratio.
The bank maximize its terminal wealth. At the end of period (t), a surviving bank has a probability
of dying tomorrow equal to (1  ). Then, at the end of period t, the bank maximizes its expected
discounted terminal wealth according to
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) (3.75)
which takes into account the evolution of terminal wealth (3.74). This problem is subject to the
incentive constraint imposed by households
Vjt  
h
QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t
i
. (3.76)
The maximization problem delivers the maximum amount of assets the bank can intermediate
QtS
f
t + qtS
Ext
t =
t
  vft
Nt; (3.77)
where
t = Ett;t+1
t+1
Rt
rest
; (3.78)
vft = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest 1

;
vExtt = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  
Rt
rest

; (3.79)
with
Extt = 
f
t ;
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the banks augmented discounts factor is

t+1 = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

;
and
t =
t
  vft
is the maximum leverage ratio chosen by rms, taking into account the macro-prudential policy
1
rest

and the subsidies and taxes
 
 bt ; 
s
t

. In the next analysis, the tax and subsidies would not
be used out of equilibrium. If used, they would be used only to a¤ect the steady state of this
economy.
The macro-prudential authority can a¤ect the optimal leverage ratio (3:77) by a¤ecting its
components

t and v
f
t

, which is behind the multiplier e¤ect of nancial shocks over the real
activity.
There is a trade-o¤ when the central bank optimally selects this ratio. On one hand, a high
value of reserves ratio decreases the leverage ratio. Total assets and total capital in the economy
are a positive function of this leverage ratio. This decreases the overall value of the real activity
in equilibrium. On the other hand, a smaller leverage ratio has the e¤ect of a smaller multiplier
e¤ect of negative shocks.
This leverage ratio is increasing in the marginal value of and additional unit of banks capital
(t). An increase in the reserve ratio decreases 
res
t , the share of assets that banks can intermediate
from the deposits, this increases the term

1
rest

and has the e¤ect of increasing the marginal value
of accumulated capital in the bank (t), it is more protable for banks to accumulate net wealth.
The opportunity cost of borrowing from households has increased.
This has the e¤ect of increasing (t). Implicitly, households tolerate a higher leverage because
the bank is using more of its own capital to make loans. This serves to discipline its activities.
If the banks put more of their own resources at risk, they will be more careful in selecting the
preferred investment options. This reserve ratio has the e¤ect of forcing the bank to internalize
the e¤ect of its risk-taking behavior.
On the other hand, the increase in the reserve ratio, which decreases rest and increases

1
rest

,
has the e¤ect of decreasing

vft

, the marginal return on assets intermediated by the bank. This
has the e¤ect of decreasing the leverage ratio. Then, the choice of the optimal leverage ratio has
two opposite e¤ects. It can increase the leverage ratio by making the banks to increase the return
on their own capital, but at the same time it reduces the leverage ratio due to the reduction on
the return on the banksassets.
In the next section, I discuss the strategy to calibrate the model.
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3.6 Calibration.
I calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency. In the benchmark calibration, table 1, I set the
parameters to hit the observed leverage in the U.S. nancial sector.
In order to calibrate the parameters associated with the heterogeneous households, I present
information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF). The next step is to explain the strategy behind the calibration of the parameters
associated with the heterogeneity of households. After this, I present the calibration of the para-
meters associated with the nonnancial sector, the shocks, and the government. These parameters
can be directly obtained from the historical averages of their empirical counterparts or from esti-
mated studies of the U.S. economy (for example, Primiceri et al. (2006) and Taheri (2014)). The
nal section contains the calibration of the parameters associated with the nancial sector. These
parameters can be calibrated by targeting a set of observed ratios of macroeconomic variables.
The column (1) in table 1 shows the values of the parameters in the benchmark calibration.
The column (2) shows the piece of evidence used to calibrate the model.
3.6.1 Poor and Rich Households.
Distribution of Net Wealth.
In this subsection, I present the evidence behind the existence of wealth-rich and wealth-poor
households in the U.S. Krueger et al. (2016) analyze the e¤ects of the distribution of wealth on
consumption before and after the Great Recession. Table 2 presents information on the households
disposable income, consumption, age, and education for each quintile of wealth distribution.
The poorest households (the bottom 60 percent of the wealth distribution) hold less than 5
percent of net wealth7; they receive around 37 percent of the aggregate disposable income; they
explain 40 percent of aggregate consumption; the poorest group is also the youngest and less
educated group8. Hence, this group is relevant to capture the dynamics of the aggregate variables
in the economy.
Savings, Leverage Ratio, Income, and Consumption.
In the U.S., the saving rate (savings to disposable income) has decreased since 1960. The top
panel in gure 1 shows the saving rate between 1988 and 2015, as reported by the U.S. Bureau
7According to the information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the poorest households hold
less than 5% of net wealth for at least each surveys year in 1999-2013. Their demographic conditions do not change
considerably in that period.
8Krueger et al. (2016) show that this group is able to smooth consumption. Hence, they cannot be associated
with the Rule-of-Thumb (RoT) households (Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Galí et al. (2007)). RoT households do
not smooth consumption. Hence, I use the characteristics of the wealth-poor households to calibrate the borrowers
in the model.
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Table 3.1: Benchmark Calibration
Model Data
Parameter Value Variable Source of Data
(1) (2)
Heterogeneity of Agents
 Population ext. 0.60 Wealth-poor (60%.) Krueger et al. (2016)
ownExt Ownership ext. 0.05 Share of wealth (5%) Krueger et al. (2016)
transExt Transfers to ext. 0.1449 Share of income (9.3%) Broer et al. (2016)
Ex Dis. of labor ext. 15.7063 Working hours (1/3) Assumption
Int Dis. of labor int. 2.6649 Working hours (1/3) Assumption
hExt Habits ext. 0.6401 Credit to consumers (61.3%) FED (2016), Av. 2000-15
hInt Habits internal 0.8389 Consumption
 
borrower
Saver
=68%

Krueger et al. (2016)
Ext Disc. factor ext. 0.9911 Banks lending rate (3.62%) FED: Average 2006-15
Consumers
1

Inter. elast. of subs. 1 Conventional Assumption
 Discount factor savers 0.9951 Real rate (2.0%) FED: Average 1980-2008
Financial Sector
 Prob. of survival 0.9716 Life (35 quarters) Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 Diverting loans (rms) 0.3785 Lending spread (100 bp.) FED: Average 2005-15
 Diverting loans (consumption) 0.6043 Lending spread (162 bp.) FED: Average 2006-16
! Transfer starting banks 0.0035 Leverage (4) FED: Average 2000-07
Non-Financial Firms
 Capital share 0.33 Historical average BEA: Average 1980-2010
' Inv. Frisch elasticity 0.27 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
i Elasticity inv. adj. costs 1.72 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
 Elasticity of marginal dep. 7.2 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
 Depreciation rate 0.025 Historical average BEA: Average 1980-2010
 Firms no adjusting price 0.77 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
p Price indexation 0.241 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
" Elasticity of substitution 6.0 Conventional Assumption
Shocks
a Persistence technology 0.96 Estimated Taheri (2014)
 Persistence quality 0.89 Estimated Taheri (2014)
 Persistence cost-push 0.854 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
a St. dev. productivity 0.0068 Estimated Taheri (2014)
 St. dev. quality 0.0037 Estimated Taheri (2014)
 St. dev. cost-push 0.00103 Estimated Primiceri et al. (2006)
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Table 3.2: Socioeconomic Characteristics of U.S. Population
Table 2.
Net Wealth Disp. Income Consumption Heads (Years)
Quintile % held Age Education
Q1 -0.9 8.7 11.3 39.2 12
Q2 0.8 11.2 12.4 40.3 12
Q3 4.4 16.7 16.8 42.3 12.4
Q4 13.0 22.1 22.4 46.2 12.7
Q5 82.7 41.2 37.2 48.8 13.9
Bottom 60% 4.3 36.6 40.5
Top 40% 95.7 63.3 59.6
Relative Poor/Rich 0.578 0.679
Source: Elaborated with Table 1 and 2 in Krueger et al. (2016)
of Economic Analysis (BEA). The richest group has had a higher saving rate than the national
average, and much higher than the poorest, since 1988 (middle panel).
The contribution to this ratio has been di¤erent across poor and rich households9. In particular,
between 1988 and 2012, the U.S. saving rate decreased 0.2 percentage points (top panel, gure 1);
the richest contributed with 0.8 percentage points to the change in this rate (bottom panel), while
the poorest explained a negative contribution of 1 percentage point to that change.
Before the Great Recession, between 2000 and 2006, the richest increased their saving ratio by
2.2 percentage points (middle panel), from 7.3 to 9.5 percent, while the poorest decreased it in 1.1
percentage point.
9I take information from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) in order to calculate the contribution to this
rate by the bottom 60, and the top 40 percent of the net wealth distribution.
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Figure 3.1: Savings to Disposable Income
Year
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Figure 1. Savings to Disposable Income. Top Panel: National (Red Circles). Middle Panel: Savings to Disposable
Income per Group. Bottom 60 (Black Stars) and Top 40 (Dash). Bottom Panel: Contribution to The Saving Rate.
The National Measures Takes Information From BEA, NIPA Tables. The Remaining Information is From the SCF.
At the beginning of 2000, the debt of the poor households represented 110 percent of their
income (gure 2, middle panel), before the start of the Great Recession in 2003-2006, this ratio
had increased by 17 percentage points. This group was decreasing its saving ratio, and, at the
same time, increasing its debt before the crisis. In contrast, the richest decreased their leverage
ratios in 2003-2006, and contributed to the increase in the saving ratio.
If the leverage ratio is measured respect to the value of the assets, the poorest increased this
ratio between 2000 and 2006 in 70 percentage points10. This may suggest that these households
10The S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index in 2006 was 92.6 percent above the 2000 level, and
the Dow Jones Industrial Average index had increased 15.5 percent over the same period. Hence, the increase in
the leverage ratio respect to assets cannot be related to the decrease in the value of these assets.
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were not taking on debt in order to expand their assets; potentially, they may have increased debt
in order to nance consumption.
Figure 3.2: Leverage Ratio
Year
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Figure 2. Leverage Ratio. Ratio of Total Debt to Total Income and Ratio of Total Debt to Total Assets. Bottom 60
(Black Stars) and Top 40 (Dash). The National Measures Take Information From the Federal Reserve Z.1 Financial
Accounts and BEA, NIPA Tables. The Remaining Information is From the SCF.
Indeed, Mian and Su (2010, 2011), using information on homeowners credit les, show that
between 2002 and 2007, the household sector doubled its debt. They nd no evidence that home
equity-based borrowing is used to pay down credit car balances. They nd little evidence that
borrowing in response to increased house prices is used to purchase new homes or investment
properties. This is suggestive that households were increasing their leverage ratio mainly to increase
consumption, and not to increase their assets. These characteristics were stronger for younger
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homeowners. In the evidence presented in table 2, the youngest population are the poorest. Mian
and Su (2011), suggest that the characteristics of the homeowners who borrowed aggressively
against the rising values of their houses, may proxy for individuals with self-control problems, as
in the work of Laibson (1997).
Figure 3.3: Aggregate Consumption vs. Aggregate Disposable Income
Year
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
/ D
is
po
sa
bl
e 
In
co
m
e
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
Bottom  60
T op 40
Figure 3. Contribution to Aggregate Consumption Relative to The Contribution to Disposable Income. With
information From Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
Figure 3 shows the relative contribution of the poorest group to consumption as a ratio of their
relative contribution to disposable income. Before the Great Recession, the wealth-poor households
were contributing more to consumption than to disposable income, and this ratio peaked in 2006;
this coincides with the peak of the leverage ratio of these households (both respect to income
and to assets). This may put these households in a vulnerable position at the onset of the crisis.
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They were consuming too much and hiring too much debt, but their income and assets were not
increasing at the same speed.
In conclusion, the poorest households have decreased their contribution to national savings
over the last 25 years (gure 2). This reduction was more pronounced in the years leading to the
crisis. They are a group that contributes more to aggregate consumption than to aggregate income
(gure 3) and they have increasing levels of debt (gure 2). Their leverage ratios have increased
considerably since 2000, showing the largest increases in 2003-2006. The leverage ratio of this
group has increased even more if measured in terms of their assets rather than their income, which
suggests that they did not hire debt to increase assets, rather they increased consumption.
This evidence may suggest that the poorest group took advantage of the of shift in monetary
policy from 2003 to 2005 when the Federal Reserve held the interest rate lower than the two
previous decades (Taylor (2014)). Potentially, this relaxation of policy could have exacerbated the
consumption externality of this group, which is then reected in their increasing leverage ratios
and lowering saving rates. These households were highly vulnerable at the onset of the crisis.
Macro-prudential policy could have remedied this.
In this paper, the overconsumption of the wealth-poor households is captured by allowing them
to show external habits in consumption. This externality makes these households to show a pattern
of consumption, relative to the other consumers, who hold internal habits, similar to that observed
in the data. And macro-prudential policy may play a role in xing this overconsumption and
overborrowing pattern.
3.6.2 Households Heterogeneity.
There are eight parameters associated with householdsheterogeneity: the population of borrow-
ers11 (); the borrowersownership of the businesses in the economy

ownershipExt

; the share of
government transfers received by the borrowers

transfersExt

; the disutility of labor of the borrow-
ers
 
Ex

and savers
 
Int

; the external
 
hExt

and internal
 
hInt

habits; and the subjective
discount factor of the impatient households
 
Ext

. Next, I present the evidence used to calibrate
these parameters.
Column (1) in table 1 shows the values of the parameters in the benchmark calibration. Column
(2) shows the piece of evidence used in the calibration.
The models population of borrowers () is 60 percent. This is the share of wealth-poor agents
in the U.S. economy. In the model, the wealth-poor households are the borrowers.
The wealth-poor households hold around 5% of the total net wealth (Krueger et al. (2016)). I
capture this fact by assuming that the share of assets held by the borrowers

ownershipExt

in the
model is 5%. The savers own the remaining 95% of the net wealth.
In order to calibrate the transfers received by the households

transfersExt

, I take data on the
11I use indistincly the terms borrowers, externals, or wealth-poor agents to refer to the same group.
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Table 3.3: Wealth Percentile and Labor Income (SCF, 2004)
Percentile 0-5 5-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-95 95-100
Labor Income 92 83 91 89 89 81 55
Financial Income 1 1 2 5 6 14 41
Transfers 7 16 8 6 5 6 3
Source: Taken from Broer et al. (2016)
Table 3.4: Credit to Firms and Households
Financial sector (% of total loans) Source
1. Loans to rms % of total loans 38.7 FED (2016), Average: 00-15
2. Loans to consumption % of total loans 61.3 FED (2016), Average: 00-15
Banking sector
3. Loans to rms % of total loans 57.7 FED, Average: 00-15
4. Loans to consumption % of total loans 42.3 FED, Average: 00-15
relevance of such income respect to the total income of the poor households. Using the Survey
of Consumer Finances (2004), Broer et al. (2016) shows the components of household income for
di¤erent percentiles of the wealth distribution. This information is copied in Table 3. I calibrate
the share of transfer so that the wealth-poor households derive on average 9.3% of their income
from these transfers, as in the empirical evidence. The calibration indicates that poor households
receive 14.49% of the total government transfers. Hence, transExt = 0:1449.
The disutility of labor of borrowers
 
Ext

is 15.7063. And for the internal households
 
Int

is 2.6649. These values were calibrated after assuming a steady-state value of working hours of
0.33, as usual in the literature.
The external habits
 
hExt

takes a value of 0.6401. This value was calibrated to match the
observed share of loans granted by the nancial sector to households. On average, between 2000
and 2015, the ratio of loans granted by the nancial sector to households was 61.3% (table 4,
second row)12. The benchmark calibration matches this evidence.
In order to calibrate the internal habits
 
hInt

, I match the relative consumption between poor
12The information on loans received by households from the nancial sector is taken from the Z.1 Financial
Accounts of the US, 2016. In the data download program of the FED, the identier L.214 (A) Loans, n.s.a.
Given that in the model the nancial sector does not intermediate the governments assets, I use private sectors
data. The total value of loans is the sum of loans to households, and corporate and noncorporate business in the
data.
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and rich households. This ratio was 68 percent in 2006 (last row in Table 1). The benchmark
calibration matches this evidence and the value for the internal habits is 0.8389. This value is in
line with the estimated by Primiceri et al. (2006).
The last parameter associated with the heterogeneity of households is the borrowers discount
factor
 
Ext

. I present the results in the nancial section.
Next, I present the calibration of the non-nancial parameter, which can be obtained from
historical averages of their empirical counterparts.
3.6.3 Non-Financial Sector.
Based on Historical Averages.
The share of capital on national income, the subjective discount factor of the savers, the deprecia-
tion rate, and the relevance of the government spending

; ; ; G
Y

match the historical averages
of their empirical counterparts. As in Yun (1996), I assume that the rms can, without cost, index
their prices to the steady-state rate of ination.
The steady-state share of capital on national income () is set to 0:33. The compensation of
employees as a share of national income (1  ) averaged 65.1 percent in 1980-2010. This value
for  approximates that evidence (BEA, NIPA table 1.12).
During 1990-2008, the average real rate of interest was 2 percent (FRED). The subjective
discount factor of the savers ( = 0:995062) implies an annual real interest of 2 percent, matching
the evidence.
The depreciation rate () takes the value 0.025 given the quarterly frequency of this calibra-
tion, implying a 10 percent annual depreciation. This value matches the historical average of
consumption of xed capital observed in the U.S. (BEA NIPA table 1.11).
And the steady state government spending to GDP ratio G
Y
= 0:2, this is a conventional value
for this variable and between 1980-2010 the average was 19.8 percent (BEA NIPA table 1.1.10).
The remaining parameters for the non-nancial sector are taken from estimated studies. Next,
I present the values for those parameters.
From Estimated Models.
Following Primiceri et al. (2006), I assume the next values for the parameters in the models non-
nancial sector. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (') is 0.276. The elasticity of marginal
depreciation to the utilization rate () is 7.2. The inverse of the elasticity of net investment to the
price of capital (i) is 1.728.
The probability that a rm does not adjust its price this period ( = 0:779) implies that a rm
keeps its price for around 4 quarters. The size of the indexation of the price to the previous period
ination (p) is 0.241.
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The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods (") ; is 6. In the estimated results
by Taheri (2014) this elasticity takes a value close to 4.1, similar to that utilized by Gertler and
Karadi (2011). In Villa (2014) it is assumed that the elasticity would imply a markup of 1.25 in
steady state. In Primiceri et al. (2006) this elasticity is close to 5. And in the most of the literature
using calibrated New Keynesian models this elasticity is between 8 and 11. When taking a value
of (" = 6), I am in the middle of the range of values used for this parameter in models with and
without nancial frictions. Next, I proceed to explain the calibration of the shocks.
Shocks.
Following Taheri (2014), the persistence of the shock to productivity, and the shock to the quality
of capital, take the values A = 0:96; and  = 0:89, respectively. The persistence of the cost-push
shock is  = 0:85; as in Primiceri et al. (2006).
The standard deviation of the shock to productivity, and the shock to the quality of capital
take the values a = 0:0068; and  = 0:003, respectively. Which are the values estimated by
Taheri (2014). And I take the estimates of Primiceri et al. (2006) for cost-push shock,  = 0:00103.
The next step is to present the calibration of the parameters associated with the heterogeneity
of households.
3.6.4 Financial Sector.
In this section, I explain the calibration of the nancial parameters. Five parameters are particular
of the nancial sector. The survival probability in the banking industry (), the share of diverting
funds associated with the loans to rms (), the share of diverting funds associated with the loans
to consumptions (), the startup transfer to banks (w), and the discount factor of the impatient
households
 
Ext

.
Survival Probability.
The survival probability of banks () exists in the model to avoid that the banks increase their size
up to the point where they do not need borrowing from households. In that case, the incentive
constraint would not bind.
The value of the survival probability in the banking industry is set to imply an average life
expectancy of banks equal to 35 quarters. Hence,  = 0:9716. This value is in line with the
assumptions in related studies, for example Gertler and Karadi (2011).
In their estimation exercises Taheri (2014) and Villa (2014) assume that this parameter is xed
at that value before the estimation exercise.
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Table 3.5: Leverage Ratio in the U.S.
Sector Leverage Source Period
Financial sector.
Financial sector. Benchmark. 4 FRED data 00-07
Financial sector. 3.75 OECD 00-13
Banking sector
Commercial banks 10.4 FRED 00-07
Core Banking system. 8-13 Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012) 2007
Big-5 Investment banks 25-35 Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012) 2007
Corporate and non-corporate sector
Non-nancial corporate sector 2 FRED 00-07
Corporate and noncorporate sector 2 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Leverage Ratio.
The funds transferred to banks (w) take the value 0:0035, which implies a leverage ratio of 4. This
value for the leverage ratio can be considered as low, but this is the leverage observed in a wide
denition of the U.S. nancial sector 13. Next, I present the di¤erent sources that register the
possible values of the leverage ratio for the U.S. economy.
Table 5 shows di¤erent sources and di¤erent leverage ratios in the U.S. During the past crisis
the leverage ratio was not equal for all the institutions in the nancial system. Institutions at
the center of the crisis were highly leveraged. For example, during 2007, for the Big-5 investment
banks that ratio was between 25 and 35 Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012). For the core banking system
the ratio was between 8 and 13 Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012). For the corporate and non-corporate
business the ratio was close to 2 Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Banking Sector and Corporate Sector. In the previous crisis the leverage ratio of the banks
in troubles were considerably higher than the average for the banking sector or for the corporate
business sector. For example, during 2007, for the Big-5 investment banks that ratio was between
25 and 35 (Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012)). However, for commercial banks the leverage ratio (total
assets to equity in the banks) had an average of 10.4 between 2000-2007, before the crisis (FRED).
And the non-nancial corporate sector showed a ratio of assets to equity of 2 (FRED).
To capture the overall leverage ratio in the economy, given that QE1 was designed to support the
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) and banks, I take the weighted average of the leverage
ratio of these institutions. This weighted average showed a ratio of 4.05 on average between 2000
13Financial corporations include both public and private rms in the nancial business. This includes monetary
institutions, depository corporations, nancial auxiliaries and insurance companies and pension funds. This is a
broader indicator than just commercial banks.
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and 2007.
Financial Sector. As a robustness check I utilize data from OECD and FED. I utilize informa-
tion on the U.S. nancial corporations14. I construct the leverage indicator as the ratio of nancial
assets to shares and other equity. The average of this indicator between 2000 and 2013 was 3.75.
And during 2007-2008, this average was 4.07.
Thus, the leverage ratio measured as a weighted average of commercial banks and non-nancial
corporations or measured for the overall nancial corporations has observed a value of about 4.
This is the value used in the benchmark calibration.
Spreads and Share of Diverting Funds.
The spreads in steady state serve to pin down the moral-hazard problem associated with each
type of loan. The share of diverting funds associated with loans to rms () is 0:3785, which
is consistent with a spread of 100 basis points in equilibrium. This spread reects the historical
spread between AAA-BAA corporate bonds in the U.S. in 1954-2015 (FRED). Alternatively, the
spread between the AAA bond and the 10 years Treasury bills is also in this neighborhood of 100
basis points.
In order to determine the moral-hazard parameter associated with loans to consumption, I
need to determined the spread between the lending rate to consumption and the deposit rate in
the bank. In the rst step, I take the average lending rates for di¤erent categories of spending.
In the next step, I take information from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to obtain the
composition of debt. Finally, I construct a weighted interest rate which delivers the value for the
discount factor of the impatient households
 
Ext

. This discount factor is equal to 0.9911 and
implies an annual interest rate of 3.63 percent.
Table 6 shows the results. The rst row shows the components of householdsdebt. I take the 4
main components and leave the other categories aside. The main component is the mortgage debt
(87%). Then, I look at the lending rates for each of these concepts. The spread is calculated respect
to government bonds with comparable maturity: the 30-years government bond for mortgages, the
1-year government bond for credit card, the 10-year government bonds for education, and the
5-year government bond for vehicles. Finally, I weight the spread according to its relevance on
households debt15. The rst column shows weighted spread. This spread is 163 basis points and
it serves to pin down the moral hazard problem of the loans associated with consumption. This
moral hazard problem () is equal to 0.6043.
14Financial corporations include both public and private rms in the nancial business. This includes monetary
institutions, depository corporations, nancial auxiliaries and insurance companies and pension funds. This is a
broader indicator than just commercial banks.
15The weighted spread is robust to use the swap rates rather than the government bonds.
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Table 3.6: HouseholdsDebt Composition
Total= Mortgage Credit Card Education Vehicles
% of Debt (2004-2013) 100 87 3 5 5
Lending Rate
Average 2006-16 (%) 4.4 12.6 8.33 5.81
Spread (bps.)* 98 1,092 547 362
Weighted Spread 163 85 33 27 18
= I do not consider the concept Others Debts.
*Respect to term comparable U.S. Treasury Bond.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and Federal Reserve.
3.7 Optimal Policy.
In the next section, I present the optimal policy for two cases. In the rst case, I assume that the
monetary and the prudential policy cooperate in order to maximize the social welfare, given by
the weighted sum of the households utility function. In the second case, I assume that the policy
authorities do not cooperate. In this case, the objective function of the policy authorities di¤er. In
particular, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate in such a way that social welfare
is maximized, whereas the prudential authority sets the reserve requirement in such a way that
the ine¢ cient borrowing is minimized.
3.7.1 Optimal Level of Reserves.
In this section, I present the e¤ects of the reserve requirements on the steady state of this economy.
Table 7 shows the value of selected variables in the monetary and prudential regime.
Mechanism.
In this section I explain how the macro-prudential instrument a¤ects the economy. The reserve
requirement serves as a tax on the part of borrowing associated with the ine¢ cient consumption.
By requiring a fraction of the deposits in the form of reserves, mandatory reserves can act as an
implicit tax on nancial intermediation; and by altering the cost of funding, they may be useful
to reduce the volatility of credit.
The macro-prudential instrument a¤ects the economy because the cost of higher reserve re-
quirement is passed on in full to creditors in the form of higher lending rates
 
Rkt ; R
b
t

. Hence,
a¤ecting the rate at which the agents are willing to postpone consumption, reducing borrowing.
An increase in the reserve ratio drives to a drop in demand for credit and deposits. Because credit
is funded via deposits, in addition to the accumulated net wealth. An increase in reserves turns
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Table 3.7: Variables in Steady State. Benchmark Calibration
Variable. Financial sector. Monetary Macro-prudential %
1. Reserve ratio (%, Quarterly) 0 0.71
2. Leverage ratio 4 3.93 -1.85
3. % Loans to rms 38.7 49.1 10.4
4. % Loans to consumption 61.3 50.9 -10.4
5. Consumption. External 0.233 0.218 -6.4
6. Consumption. Internal 0.338 0.316 -6.5
7. Aggregate labor supply 0.33 0.32 -3.0
8. Labor supply. External. 0.33 0.32 -3.0
9. Labor supply. Internal. 0.33 0.32 -3.0
10. Wage 1.621 1.501 -7.4
11. Output 0.968 0.862 -11.0
12. Capital 8.430 6.411 -23.9
deposits into a more expensive source of funding. And the cost is transmitted to the borrowers,
increasing the rate they have to pay. This depresses credit growth. Then, the central bank can
directly inuence the consumption decision by changing the reserve requirement and reducing the
consumption associated with the habits externality.
Consumption of the borrowers is linked to the real lending rate through the Euler Equation.
An increase in the rate on lending makes consumption more expensive. Given the Euler equation,
this induces households to reduce today consumption
UExct = 
ExtEtU
Ex
ct+1R
b
t+1;
hence, the channel of transmission is through the Euler equation of the borrowers. Increasing
the reserve requirement implies an increase in the lending rate
 
Rbt

. In order to equilibrate this
relationship, the marginal utility of consumption increases, this is possible due to a reduction in
todays consumption. Hence, the reserve requirement a¤ects the equation governing the consump-
tion pattern. And this equation reects the distortion associated with the the externality. Hence,
the reserve requirement is acting on the same margin as the externality.
The reserve requirement increases the cost of credit. In particular, the spread on loans to rms
and on loans to consumption increases in 50 basis points. This implies a reduction in the demand
for credit.
The reserve requirement changes the portfolio composition of the banks in steady state. In
particular, under the optimal reserve requirements, the commercial banks lend more to rms than
in the absence of this requirement.
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Table 3.8: Welfare Gains of Cooperative Monetary and Macro-
Prudential Policy
Relative to = Monetary Policy
(1)
1. Steady State 1.6421
2. Cyclical 0.4356
*/ In % of Consumption Equivalent (C.E.) of the cooperative economy.
The participation of loans to rms in the total amount of banks loans increase in 10.4 percent-
age points in equilibrium. In contrast, the participation of the loans to consumption decrease by
10.4 percentage points. The level of consumer credit decrease 50.2 percent, while credit to rms
falls only 24 percent.
The composition of the banks portfolio in the non-stochastic steady state is determined by the
demand for loans. There is a larger reduction in the loans to consumption than in the loans to
rms because the demand for loans to consumption is more sensitive to changes in the interest rate
than the demand for production. I associate this with the fact that impatient households depend
heavily on loans in order to consume, and an increase in the cost of credit rapidly decreases their
demand for loans.
However, the loans granted to rms are a function of the cost of credit and of the overall level
of demand in the economy. Savers do not borrow to consume. Then, the increase in the cost of
credit a¤ects mainly the consumption of the borrowers. Firms, still have to produce in order to
meet the demand for the savers. Hence, they still have to demand capital and this explains the
fact that the loans to consumption fall faster than the loans to production.
The reduction in the level of credit has the e¤ect of reducing the consumption of the borrowers
in 6.4%. And it shrinks the level of output in 11%. E¤ectively, the macro-prudential policy in
steady state works through the reduction of the socially ine¢ cient levels of consumption, borrowing,
output, and labor.
Table 8 shows the welfare gains, in terms of the stream of consumption of the cooperative
Ramsey allocation, of setting the prudential instrument at its optimal level.
As observed in table 8, the prudential policy is welfare increasing in the steady state of the
economy because it reduces the excessive working hours, consumption, and overborrowing. In the
rst row in table 8, the two steady states of the economy are compared: with and without the
optimal level of reserve requirements. In steady state, the optimal level of reserves increases the
welfare in the society in 1.6421 percent, respect to a case in which only the monetary policy is
implemented.
The macro-prudential policy also has benets out of steady state. I present the results in the
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second row of table 8. In this case, the economies start at the same steady state, in which the
optimal level of reserves is 0.71 percent, and it compares the welfare benets when the shocks hit
and monetary and prudential policy are implemented. In this case, there is a welfare gain of 0.44
percent respect to the case in which only the monetary policy is implemented.
In the next section, I present the optimal prudential and monetary policy in the cooperative
and non-cooperative equilibrium.
3.7.2 Cooperative Policy.
The monetary and prudential authorities set their policy instruments in a cooperative way. I
assume that in this case, the Ramsey planner seeks to maximize the welfare of the society subject
to the competitive equilibrium conditions. I assume that the central bank is committed to follow
the announced plan from a timeless perspective. As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), and
Woodford (2003), I assume that at time (t) the Ramsey planner has been operating for an innite
number of periods.
The period (t) objective function of the Ramsey planner is the weighted utility function
of the consumers. I follow the work of Monacelli (2008), Mendicino and Pescatori (2008), and
Rubio and Carrasco (2014) and assume that the Ramsey planner weights the utility of each group
by their population size and one minus their discount factor [
 
1  Ext and (1  ), respectively].
The welfare function is then:
WR0 = ()
 
1  ExtV R;B0 + (1 ) (1  )V R;S0 ; (3.80)
where
V R;B0 =
(
E0
1X
t=0
 
Ext
t
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CR;Bt ; L
R;B
t
i)
; (3.81)
and
V R;S0 =
(
E0
1X
t=0
()t U
h
CR;St ; L
R;S
t
i)
; (3.82)
represent the utility function of the borrowers and the savers, respectively. () is the population
size and
 
Ext, 

the subjective discount factor of the borrowers and savers, respectively.
The Ramsey planner selects optimally the nominal interest rate, and the reserve requirement
in order to maximize
 
WR0

, subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions. See appendix
D for the derivation of the measure of the welfare cost utilized to evaluate the di¤erent policy
alternatives.
In the next section, I present the impulse-response function of the optimal policy.
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3.7.3 Impulse-Response Functions.
Financial Shock.
This a 1 standard deviation increase in the quality of capital. Figure 4 shows the impulse-response
functions associated with this shock. The solid lines shows the optimal monetary policy, while the
blue circles show the optimal mix of monetary and macro-prudential policy.
The positive shock to the quality of capital induces a relaxation of the banksbalance sheet
constraint. As a consequence of this relaxation, the banks can issue more loans. In turn, the
relaxation of the banks nancial constraint reduces the cost of credit, and the rms and the
consumers demand more loans. As a consequence of its cheaper cost, the credit to consumption
and to rms increases. The increase in the demand for credit revalues the bank assets, which
additionally relaxes their balance sheet constraint and allows them to lend more and at lower
rates. There is a positive feedback loop between the real and the nancial variables.
This nancial accelerator amplies and propagates the nancial shocks. The improvement in
the credit conditions lead to an increase in borrowing by the consumers with external habits.
Neither consumers, nor banks internalize the e¤ects of the externalities on the other agents in the
economy. Given the existence of the positive spread, the commercial banks would like to issue
as much loans as possible in order to accumulate as much wealth as possible. On the other side,
households with external habits and higher impatience overborrow and overconsume.
Banks are content with this situation because they are increasing their prots, enriching their
owners. However, this situation makes the economy more vulnerable to shocks. The presence of
the endogenous nancial constraint contributes to the amplication and propagation of shocks, and
the presence of the external habits produce ine¢ cient consumption and borrowing. The central
bank would like to stop this situation. In particular, if the central bank can impose a cost on the
behavior of banks or on the behavior of consumers, the overconsumption can be smoothed. For
example, the increase in the nominal interest rate increases the cost for funding new loans.
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Macro-Prudential Policy. Shock to Quality of Cap-
ital
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0 .5
0
0 .5
Output (%)
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
Fr
om
 S
S
.
Years
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0 .5
0
0 .5
Consumption (Borrowers)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0 .5
0
0 .5
Agg reg ate Consumption (%)
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
Fr
om
 S
S
.
Years
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-1 5
-1 0
-5
0
(Rb-R), Bps.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Inflation, Bps.
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
Fr
om
 S
S
.
Years
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-1 0
-5
0
(Rk-R), Bps.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0 .5
0
0 .5
Nominal Interest Rate (%)
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
Fr
om
 S
S
.
Years
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
1 0
Reserve Ratio, Bps.
M o n e ta ry
P ru d e n tia l
Figure 4. Optimal Policy. 1 sd. Increase in the Quality of Capital. Monetary Policy (Solid Lines), Macro-prudential
Policy (Circles).
Hence, when the shock hits, the central bank increases the nominal interest rate, in order to
increase the cost of funding for commercial banks. The monetary authority would like to curb
an excessive increase in consumer credit in order to prevent exacerbating the externality associ-
ated with the borrowersconsumption and to stop the propagation associated with the nancial
accelerator.
The increase in the real interest rate makes the cost of funding new loans more expensive,
banks fund the issuing of loans by paying the real interest rate on the deposits. The contractionary
monetary policy reduces the banks prots and their balance sheet constraint tightens. Because the
availability of credit is limited by the value of the bank franchise, the reduction in the protability
of the banks serves to reduce the overborrowing associated with the excessive consumption of the
borrowers. The initial increase in the nominal interest rate is large because the central bank would
like to smooth the excessive credit growth. However, this creates a deation, which is partially
compensated in the second period. Given that the central bank has access to only one policy
instrument, it is exploiting the expectational benets of its commitment technology. The central
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banks commits itself to a contractionary policy in the rst period in order to reduce the demand
for credit, and in the second period it commits to an expansionary policy in order to compensate
the agents for the initial contraction. In this way the central bank is maximizing its intertemporal
trade-o¤s.
The monetary policy, in the absence of the macro-prudential instrument is more contractionary
(solid lines). However, it is not enough to stop the change in ination. The central bank increases
the nominal interest rate in order to stop the credit growth. However, not all the increase in the
credit is associated with the ine¢ cient level of borrowing. The rms increase their borrowing in or-
der to produce more and to satisfy the increase in the consumption of the savers and the borrowers.
The increase in the consumption of the savers is not associated with the habits externality, but the
tightening in the monetary policy a¤ects the cost of credit for the rms, which are producing to
satisfy also the consumption of the savers. Hence, the central bank accepts an increase in ination
in order to not damaging the level of production associated with the consumption of the savers.
If the central bank has access to the monetary, and the macro-prudential instrument (the
reserve requirement), then the trade-o¤s for the central bank can be improved (circles in gure
1). On impact, there is an increase in the reserve requirement. This increase is equal to 10 basis
points (the optimal level of the reserves in steady state is 0.71 percent).
If the central bank has access to the reserve ratio, the increase in this requirement induces a less
contractionary monetary policy. The increase in the reserve requirement imposes and additional
cost to the banks. Because these reserves are non-remunerated, if the commercial banks seek to
increase the credit, they have to bear the additional cost associated with the issue of the new
deposits. This has the e¤ect of reducing their prots and makes their nancial constraint more
astringent.
The tightening of the banks balance sheet, respect to the case in which the macro-prudential
policy is absent, has the e¤ect of reducing the banks ability to issue new loans. The increase in
the reserve ratio reduces the credit growth: if only the monetary policy is implemented, on impact,
the credit increases 2.5 percent, while in the presence of the reserve requirement the initial increase
in credit is only 1.7 percent.
The central bank utilizes its two instruments to curb the ination changes and the credit
growth. In this way, the central bank can reduce the welfare damage associated with the price
dispersion in this economy with sticky prices, and the overborrowing associated with the habits
externality.
The initial reaction of the monetary and prudential policy serves to reduce the expansion of
credit and to keep ination under control. This mix of policy also serves to stop the nancial
accelerator mechanism. Once the central bank has smoothed the e¤ects of this mechanism, it
would like to return the economy to equilibrium. The monetary policy is contractionary and then
turns expansionary in the second period. The initial contraction is explained by the desire to avoid
exacerbating the habits externality. But, the expansion in the second period is explained by the
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technology commitment and the Phillips curve. In particular, the central bank can promise to
deliver ination in this period and deation in the next period. In this way, the central bank is
exploiting the benets of the commitment technology. The monetary instrument continues being
expansionary for almost one year in order to achieve ination and price level control in the long-run,
which is the typical result of the commitment technology.
In summary, in the model, overconsumption is a source of ine¢ ciency. The macro-prudential
policy would like to reduce the overborrowing associated with the excessive consumption. Hence,
macro-prudential makes the cost of credit more expensive for these borrowers. This depresses their
consumption motives and the economy is better-o¤ because it is less exposed to the multiplier
e¤ects of shocks, and ination and the real variables reduce their volatility respect to the case
in which only the monetary policy is present. When the prudential instrument is in place, both
policies are contractionary, but the monetary policy is less contractionary than in the absence of
the prudential instrument. The reserves ratio increases in order to make more expensive the cost
of credit for consumers. The trade-o¤s for the central bank have improved.
Technology Shock.
This a 1 standard deviation increase in the productivity. Figure 5 shows the impulse-response
functions associated with this shock. The solid lines shows the optimal monetary policy, while the
blue circles show the optimal mix of monetary and macro-prudential policy.
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Macro-Prudential Policy. Shock to Technology
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Figure 5. Optimal Policy. 1 sd Increase in Productivity. Monetary Policy (Solid Lines), and Macro-prudential
Policy (Circles).
A positive shock to technology increases the return per unit of capital. The increase in the
return on capital has the e¤ect of increasing the cost of credit. The policy is expansionary and
the central bank increases the nominal interest rate in order to prevent excessive increase in
consumption. This policy creates an initial deation.
The increase in the cost of credit, given that the return per unit of capital has increased, and
reinforced by the contractionary monetary policy, reduces the demand for credit and the banks
balance sheet is damaged. As a consequence of the increase in the cost of credit, the issuing of
credit falls. If the central bank has access to the reserve requirement, then the prudential policy
turns expansionary in order to stop the reduction in credit associated with the contractionary
monetary stance. The expansionary prudential policy contributes to reduce the ination volatility
and to increase the growth of consumption by reducing the cost of credit.
In this case, the monetary and the prudential policy act in opposite directions. However, their
actions contribute to deliver less volatility in ination and credit. The combination of the contrac-
tionary monetary policy and the expansionary prudential policy deliver a larger in consumption.
In the next section, I present the results of the implementation of the optimal policy. The
implementation is via simple rules. In particular, I present two policy rules: one for the monetary
policy and one for the prudential instrument. These rules have the characteristic of maximizing
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the social welfare.
3.7.4 Non-Cooperative Policy.
In order to analyze the e¤ects of implementing monetary and prudential policy in a non-cooperative
way, I extend the model to consider strategic games between these policy makers. The non-
cooperative solution assumes that the monetary authority maximizes the social welfare, which is
equal to the social welfare of the cooperative solution, by choosing the contingent path of the
nominal interest rate, whereas the prudential authority deals with the overborrowing problem; in
particular, it minimizes the loans granted to consumption by choosing a level of reserve requirement
which makes the consumption e¢ cient.
The objective of the prudential regulator is to minimize every period the deviations of the
consumption of the borrowers
 
CExt

respect to the case in which the habits externality is zero
(Ct ),
min 1
2

CExt   Ct
2
: (3.83)
Table 9 shows the welfare cost of non-cooperative policies. The cost is measured respect to the
cooperative case. When the shock hit, the non-cooperative policy implies a welfare cost of 0.34%
of the stream of consumption of the cooperative allocation.
Shock to Productivity.
Figure 6 shows the combination of monetary and macro-prudential policy after a shock to pro-
ductivity when the policy makers do not cooperate. The blue circles show the cooperative policy,
whereas the dashed lines show the non-cooperative policy.
When the two policy makers cooperate, the monetary policy is contractionary, while the pru-
dential policy is expansionary. If they do not cooperate, the prudential policy becomes more
expansionary. When the policy makers are cooperating, the nominal interest rate increases almost
one percent on impact and the prudential instrument move slightly. But if they do not cooperate,
the central bank nds it optimal a smooth contractionary monetary policy, and the prudential
authority implements an expansionary policy. The prudential policy in the non-cooperative case
is considerably more expansionary than in the cooperative case, but the monetary policy is less
contractionary.
The combination of monetary and prudential policy reduce ination in almost 10 basis points
on impact and the deationary process last for two years. After the second period, the monetary
policy is more contractionary than in the cooperative case, this explains the prolonged deationary
period. Initially, output and consumption grow more than in the cooperative case. However, after
one year, the consumption and output show a smaller growth rate than in the cooperative case. In
the non-cooperative case, ination and the spread are more volatile than in the cooperative case.
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Table 3.9: Welfare Cost of Non-Cooperative Policy
Relative to Cost % of C.E.
(1)
1. Cooperative Policy 0.3420
Figure 3.6: Non-Cooperative Policy. Shock to Quality of Capital
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Figure 6. Non-Cooperative Policy. 1 sd Increase in Productivity. Cooperative Macro-prudential Policy (Circles),
Non-Cooperative(Dashed).
Cost-Push Shock.
Figure 7 shows the monetary and prudential response after an increase of one standard deviation
in the cost-push variable.
This shock is more contractionary and more inationary when the authorities are not cooper-
ating. Under the non-cooperative framework, the nominal interest rate is more expansionary than
under cooperation. Given that the prudential regulator anticipates the more contractionary mon-
etary setting, the prudential policy is considerably more expansionary. This provides incentives to
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the banks to lend more and consumption increases more than in the cooperative case.
The reduction in the reserve requirement increases the banks protability and they are able
to issue more loans. The combination of monetary and prudential policy are not as e¤ective in
stabilizing ination and output as they are when the policy makers are cooperating.
Figure 3.7: Non-Cooperative Policy. Cost-Push Shock
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Figure 7. Non-Cooperative Policy. 1 sd Cost-Push Shock. Cooperative Macro-prudential Policy (Circles), Non-
Cooperative(Dashed).
3.8 Conclusion.
Reserve requirements can work as a Pigouvian tax in an economy with an overborrowing problem.
A positive level of this requirement increases the cost of credit. Under this regime agents internalize
the e¤ects of their consumption externality and reduce their demand for credit. Setting a positive
level of this requirement is welfare increasing; the economy reduces its overall size and agents
works less and reduce their borrowing. The optimal level of reserve requirement is 0.7% and
this instrument can be used out of the steady state. When shocks hit the economy, the mix of
prudential and monetary policy can stabilize ination and reduce the excessive level of borrowing,
contributing to increase welfare.
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In contrast to some of the current literature, in this paper we set up a model in which some
agents have an overborrowing problem, while other have an underborrowing problem. The pru-
dential instrument is able to increase welfare by reducing overborrowing and making agents to
internalize their consumption decisions.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
Along this disseration, I analyzed the optimal policy in the presence of nancial frictions. This
analysis was divided in three chapters. In the rst chapter I analyze the optimal monetary policy
recommendation in the presence of nancial frictions and its implementation via simple rules. In
the second chapter, I allow the central bank to have an additional policy instrument. The nominal
interest rate is complemented with the possiblity of implementing nancial intermediation. This
new instrument seeks to mimic the policy implemente by the Federal Reserve of the United States
in the past recession. Finally, the third chapter analyzed the interaction between macroprudential
and monetary policy when there is an overborrowing problem.
In the chaper one, I utilize a standard New Keynesian model with a banking sector that faces
balance sheet constraints, the optimal policy seeks to stabilize the nancial markets by reducing
the volatility of the cost of credit; a healthy nancial sector is desirable. In this framework, there
is a trade-o¤ between ination stabilization and nancial stabilization. This holds if the economy
is subject only to a productivity shock or if the economy becomes more e¢ cient by reducing the
monopolistic competition.
The implementation of optimal policy suggests stabilizing the spread between the return on
capital and the risk-free rate. When a shock hits the economy, this policy suggests an aggressive
reaction in the initial periods.
The simple rule that mimics optimal policy suggests a zero coe¢ cient on changes in output, and
a non-zero coe¢ cient to changes in the premium on capital with respect to its long-run average.
Stabilizing the nancial sector enhances social welfare. In contrast, a strong anti-inationary stance
may be welfare decreasing. Additionally, inertial rules serve to anchor ination expectations in the
long-run, while stabilizing nancial markets in the short-run, mimicking the optimal policy under
commitment.
In the second chapter, the central bank can participate in the nancial markets. As a conse-
quence of the Great Recession, the understanding of the interactions between banking and mon-
etary policy has become a central issue in policy design. The severity of the nancial crisis has
exposed the limitations of the conventional tools utilized by the central bank to stabilize the econ-
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omy. In this chapter, I analyzed whether, there are welfare gains of equipping the central bank
with an additional policy instrument.
In an economy with nancial frictions , the central bank now has access to two policy instru-
ments: the nominal interest rate and credit easing through asset purchases. If a negative shock
hits the economy there are stabilization and welfare gains from allowing the central bank to par-
ticipate in direct lending activities. The trade o¤s for the central bank improve in the presence
of monopolistic competition, nancial frictions, and two policy instruments, respet to the case in
which there is only monetary policy available.
The optimal policy can be implemented via simple rules. One rule sets optimally the nominal
interest rate, while the other set the central bank policy nancial intermediation. This arrange-
mente is welfare improving and the central bank improves its policy trade o¤s.
The third chapter considers the optimal interaction between two aspects of policy: monetary
and macroprudential policy in an economy in which there are incentives to overborrowing. In this
economy, a consumption externality creates an ine¢ ciently high level of credit. This can put the
economy at a vulnerable position in case of a nancial shock.
Reserve requirements can work as a Pigouvian tax in an economy with an overborrowing
problem. A positive level of this requirement increases the cost of credit. Under this regime agents
internalize the e¤ects of their consumption externality and reduce their demand for credit. Setting
a positive level of this requirement is welfare increasing; the economy reduces its overall size and
agents works less and reduce their borrowing. The optimal level of reserve requirement is 0.7%
and this instrument can be used out of the steady state. When shocks hit the economy, the mix of
prudential and monetary policy can stabilize ination and reduce the excessive level of borrowing,
contributing to increase welfare.
In contrast to some of the current literature, in this paper we set up a model in which some
agents have an overborrowing problem, while other have an underborrowing problem. The pru-
dential instrument is able to increase welfare by reducing overborrowing and making agents to
internalize their consumption decisions.
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Appendix A
Appendix Chapter 1.
A.1 Derivation of Equations.
A.1.1 Households.
The maximization problem of the household can be expressed using the Lagrangian:
L = Et
8<:
1P
i=0
i
h
ln (Ct+i   hCt+i 1)  1+'L1+'t+i
i
+t+i

Wt+iLt+i + t+i + Tt+i +Rt+i

Dt+i +B
g
t+i
  Dt+i+1 +Bgt+i+1  Ct+i
9=;
The rst order conditions are:
Respect to Consumption:
Ett+i = Et

1
(Ct+i   hCt+i 1)   h
1
(Ct+i+1   hCt+i)

(A.1)
Respect to labor:
EtL
'
t+i = Ett+iWt+i (A.2)
Respect to Savings:
Ett+i = Ett+i+1Rt+i+1 (A.3)
And the Budget constraints:
Wt+iLt+i + t+i +Rt+i

Dt+i +B
g
t+i
  Dt+i+1 +Bgt+i+1+ Tt+i = Ct+i (A.4)
The marginal utility of consumption at period (i = 0) can be expressed as:
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Uct = Et

1
(Ct   hCt 1)   h
1
(Ct+1   hCt)

(A.5)
Then, optimal labor supply is
L't
Uct
= Wt (A.6)
And the consumption-saving decision
1 = Et
Uct+1
Uct
Rt+1
It is dened
t;t+i =
Uct+i
Uct
(A.7)
A.1.2 Financial Intermediaries.
incentive constraint and Maximization of Banks Final Wealth.
The bank is interested in maximizing its terminal net wealth (Njt+i). It has a nite horizon and
the probability of surviving from today to tomorrow is (t). At the end of period t, the surviving
bank maximizes its terminal wealth for the end of period (t+ 1) on.
The banks net wealth evolves as the di¤erence between the return on its assets and the cost
of funding them, eq.(1:9) in the main text
Njt+1 =

Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtSjt +Rt+1Njt
and because the bank is not interested in funding projects with an expected discounted cost larger
than its expected discounted return, the next condition should apply for the bank to operate
Et
1+it;t+1+i

Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i
  0 (A.8)
in any period (i  0).
At the end of period (t), a surviving bank has a probability of dying tomorrow equal to
(1  t+1). If a bank survives that period with probability (t+1), it will have a probability of
leaving the industry in (t+ 2) equal to (1  t+2) t+1. Banks surviving that period, with proba-
bility (t+2), have a probability of leaving the industry in (t+ 3) equal to (1  t+3) t+2t+1. So,
the probability of dying in the period (t+ i) is (1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

for (i  0). Then, at the
end of period t, the bank maximizes its expected discounted terminal wealth according to
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) (A.9)
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which takes into account the evolution of terminal wealth (1:9), the discount factor
 
i+1t;t+1+i

and the survival pattern. Substituting the evolution of wealth eq.(1:9)
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i
  
Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSjt+i
+Rt+1+iNjt+i
!
(A.10)
I can split the right-hand side of eq. (A:10) in one term associated with total assets and other
associated with the equity part. Then, the problem of the bank can be expressed as
Vjt = V
v
jt + V

jt (A.11)
with
V vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i
 
Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSjt+i (A.12)
and
V jt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+iRt+1+iNjt+i (A.13)
Assets.
Now, working with the assets part eq.(A:12)
V vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i
 
Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSjt+i (A.14)
the update one period-ahead of the previous equation is
V vjt+1 = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+2+i)

t+1+ik=t+2k

i+1t+1+i;t+2+i
 
Rkt+2+i  Rt+2+i

Qt+1+iSjt+1+i
(A.15)
Eq. (A:14) can be expressed as
V vjt = Et (1  t+1) 1t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtSjt +
Et
1X
i=1
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i
 
Rkt+1+i  Rt+1+i

Qt+iSjt+i
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and the second part of the right-hand side can be expressed as
V vjt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtSjt +
Et (t+1) t;t+1
1X
i=0
(1  t+2+i)

t+1+ik=t+2k

i+1t+1+i;t+2+i
"  
Rkt+2+i  Rt+2+i

Qt+i+1Sjt+i+1
#
and using A.15
V vjt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

QtSjt +
Et (t+1) t;t+1V
v
jt+1
Multiplying by

1
QtSjt

1
QtSjt
V vjt = (1  t+1)Ett;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1
1
QtSjt
V vjt+1 (A.16)
I can use the denitions

vt =
V vjt
QtSjt

which implies

vt+1 =
V vjt+1
Qt+1Sjt+1

. Substituting this in the
previous equation
vt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1
1
QtSjt
vt+1Qt+1Sjt+1
dening the gross growth of asset between period (t) and (t+ i) as
xt;t+i =
Qt+iSjt+i
QtSjt
I arrive to
vt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1 (A.17)
Equity.
Working with the net wealth part eq. (A:13)
V jt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+iRt+1+iNjt+i
updating one period-ahead the previous equation
V jt+1 = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  t+2+i)

t+1+ik=t+2k

i+1t+1+i;t+2+iRt+1+iNjt+i
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I can separate
 
V jt

as
V jt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1Njt +
Et
1X
i=1
(1  t+1+i)

t+ik=t+1k

i+1t;t+1+i (Rt+1+i)Njt+i
starting the summation from zero
V jt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1Njt +
Et (t+1) t;t+1
1X
i=0
(1  t+2+i)

t+1+ik=t+2k

i+1t+1+i;t+2+i (Rt+2+i)Njt+i+1
the term in the summation is the one period-ahead update of
 
V jt

. Then
V vjt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1Njt +
Et (t+1) t;t+1V
v
jt+1
I dene now

t =
V jt
Njt

and

t+1 =
V jt+1
Njt+1

. Multiplying the previous equation by

1
Njt

V jt
1
Njt
= Et (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett+1t;t+1Njt+1
Njt
t+1
the gross rate of net wealth between period (t) and (t+ i) can be dened as
zt;t+i =
Njt+i
Njt
Then, the previous equation can be written as
t = E (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett+1t;t+1zt;t+1t+1 (A.18)
Equation (A:11) is equal to
Vjt = tQtSjt + tNjt (A.19)
Which is the conjectured solution to the banks problem.
A.1.3 Non-nancial Intermediate Producers Firms.
The rm production function is
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Ymt = At (UtKt)
 L1 t (A.20)
The income for the rms is the value of its product (PmtYmt) plus the income coming from the
reselling the undepreciated capital (1  t) tKt.
The costs are: the wage bill (WtLt), the return on the capital acquired in the previous period
and paid in this
 
Rkt

Qt 1Kt and assuming that cost of replacement of worn out capital is unit,
the prots problem for the rm in this period is to choose (Ut) and (Lt) to maximize
PmtYmt + [Qt   t] tKt  RktQt 1Kt  WtLt (A.21)
subject to eq.(A:20). The rst order condition respect to labor is
(1  )PmtYmt
Lt
= Wt (A.22)
Respect to Utilization rate.
Pmt
Ymt
Ut
= bU t tKt (A.23)
I am assuming the depreciation function:
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t (A.24)

0
(Ut) = bU

t
Return to Capital.
The return to capital is the remaining of the prots after paying the wage bill and the other costs of
production. Substituting the optimal condition (A:22) in the prots equation (A:21) total prots
should be zero as long as the rms pays all the return to capital to the banks
PmtYmt + [Qt   t] tKt  RktQt 1Kt   (1  )PmtYmt = 0
simplifying and solving for the return to capital
Rkt =

Pmt
Ymt
Kt
+ [Qt   t] t

1
Qt 1
(A.25)
where the value of the marginal productivity of capital is
Pmt
Ymt
Kt
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A.1.4 Capital Producers.
Each period the rms chooses the level of net investment to solve
maxEt
1X
=t
 tt;

(Qt   1) Int   f

In + Iss
In 1 + Iss

(In + Iss)

with
f

In + Iss
In 1 + Iss

=
_i
2

In + Iss
In 1 + Iss
  1
2
(A.26)
The rst order condition respect to net investment is
Qt = 1 +
_i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
+ _i

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss

 Ett;t+1_i

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
  1

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
A.1.5 Retailers.
Demand for Final Product.
Each of the consumers of the nal good must minimize the cost of buying one unit of the composite
good. This good is aggregated according to:
Yt =
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
ft df
 "
" 1
(A.27)
where (") is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Then, the minimization problem is
Lt =
Z 1
0
PftYftdf + t
(
Yt  
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
ft df
 "
" 1
)
The rst order condition respect to (Yft) is
Pft = t
Z 1
0
Y
" 1
"
ft df
 1
" 1
Y
  1
"
ft (A.28)
Using the denition of the composite good
Pft = tY
1
"
t Y
  1
"
ft
Solving for the demand of individual good (Yft)
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Yft =

Pft
t
 "
Yt (A.29)
Substituting eq.(A:29) in (A:27)
t =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
(A.30)
The Lagrange multiplier can be though as the correct price index. Then,
t = Pt (A.31)
where the price index is dened as
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
Substituting eq.(A:31) in (A:29)
Yft =

Pft
Pt
 "
Yt (A.32)
Which is the optimal demand for the nal good (f) : And substituting this in the denition of
spending Z 1
0
PftYftdf = St (A.33)
I can write the aggregate spending of the consumer of the nal good as
YtPt =
Z 1
0
PftYftdf (A.34)
Evolution of the price index.
From the previous section we know that the price index is equal to:
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
Given that the fraction (1  ) of the rms reoptimize price in period (t) and that a fraction ()
is not able to reoptimize in this period, and that those rms not reoptimizing this period partially
index (p) their price to the past period ination



t 1

and allowing for the optimal price to be
(P t ), equation (1:39) can be written as:
Pt =
Z 1 
0
 
P ft
1 "
df +
Z 
1 



t 1Pft 1
1 "
df
 1
1 "
(A.35)
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then,
P 1 "t = (1  ) (P t )1 " + 



t 1Pt 1
1 "
(A.36)
Dividing (A:36) by
 
P 1 "t

1 = (1  )

P t
Pt
1 "
+ 



t 1
 1
t
1 "
(A.37)
solving for the relative price
P t
Pt
=
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
(1  )
375
1
1 "
(A.38)
Equation (A:37) is the evolution of the optimal price.
A.1.6 Price setting.
Following Christiano et al. (2005), Ascari and Sbordone (2014) and Hornstein (2007), In each
period there is a xed probability (1  ) that a rm can reoptimize its price P t . For those rms
not reoptimizing this period they index their price to previous period ination. This happens with
a probability (). In this case
P it = 

t 1Pit 1
with the parameter  2 [0; 1] indicating the degree of indexation to previous period ination. The
problem is then
max
P it
Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j
"
(1   t+j)
P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
Yit+j   Pmt+jYit+j
#
(A.39)
subject to the demand function
Yit+j =
 
P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
! "
Yt+j (A.40)
The cumulative ination between period (t) and (t+ j) is
t;t+j =
1
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
Pt+3
Pt+2
::: Pt+k
Pt+k 1
for j = 0
for j  1
t 1;t+j 1 =
1
Pt
Pt 1
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
:::Pt+k 1
Pt+k 2
for j = 0
for j  1
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Substituting demand eq.(A:40) in eq.(A:39)
max
P it
Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j
2664 (1   t+j)
P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
 Pmt+j

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
3775 (A.41)
which is equal to
max
P it
Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j
2664 (1   t+j)

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
1 "
Yt+j
 Pmt+j

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
3775 (A.42)
the rst order condition
Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j
2664 (1  ") (1   t+j)

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
Yt+j
  ( ")Pmt+j

P it

t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 " 1


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j

Yt+j
3775 = 0 (A.43)
simplifying
Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j
2664 P
 "
it (1   t+j)



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
1 "
Yt+j
  "
" 1Pmt+jP
 " 1
it



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
3775 = 0 (A.44)
solving for the optimal price
P itEt
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j (1   t+j)
 


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
!1 "
Yt+j (A.45)
=
"
"  1Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
jPmt+j
 


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
! "
Yt+j
dividing by

Pt
Pt

P it
Pt
PtEt
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
j (1   t+j)
 


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
!1 "
Yt+j
=
"
"  1Et
1X
j=0
jt;t+j
jPmt+j
 


t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
! "
Yt+j (A.46)
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using
Pt = P
1 "+"
t
and solving for the optimal price
P it
Pt
=
"
"  1
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+j
jPmt+j



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
 "
Yt+j
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+jj (1   t+j)



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
1 "
Yt+j
P
 (1 ") "
t (A.47)
introducing the price inside the parenthesis in the numerator and denominator
P it
Pt
=
"
"  1
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+j
jPmt+j



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
Pt
 "
Yt+j
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+jj (1   t+j)



t 1;t+j 1
Pt+j
Pt
1 "
Yt+j
(A.48)
using the denition of cumulative ination
P it
Pt
=
"
"  1
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+j
jPmt+j



t 1;t+j 1
t;t+j
 "
Yt+j
Et
P1
j=0 
jt;t+jj (1   t+j)



t 1;t+j 1
t;t+j
1 "
Yt+j
(A.49)
Which is the optimal relative price for the rm.
Evolution of Ination.
The price index is eq.(A:31)
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pft)
1 " df
 1
1 "
Distributing between the (1  ) setting price optimally this period and this () indexing their
price to the previous period ination
Pt =
Z 1 
0
 
P ft
1 "
df +
Z 1
1 



t 1Pft 1
1 "
df
 1
1 "
integrating across each group
P 1 "t =

(1  ) (P t )1 " + 



t 1Pt 1
1 "
dividing by
 
P 1 "t

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P 1 "t
P 1 "t
=
"
(1  )

P t
Pt
1 "
+ 



t 1
Pt 1
Pt
1 "#
using ination denition
1 =
"
(1  )

P t
Pt
1 "
+ 



t 1
 1
t
1 "#
(A.50)
A.1.7 Price Dispersion.
At the rm level demand must be equal to the supply, then
Ymft =

Pft
Pt
 "
Yt (A.51)
From the intermediate good production
Ymft = At (UttKft)
 L1 ft (A.52)
Aggregate labor is
Lt =
Z 1
0
Lftdf (A.53)
Aggregate e¤ective capital is
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kftdf (A.54)
And aggregating eq.(A:51)over all the rms and taking into account the denitions of aggregate
variables
At (UttKt)
 L1 t = Yt
Z 1
0

Pft
Pt
 "
df (A.55)
Dening price dispersion as
t =
Z 1
0

Pft
Pt
 "
df (A.56)
Then, the aggregate resource constraint can be written as
Ymt = Ytt (A.57)
A.1.8 Evolution of Price Dispersion.
Price dispersion was dened as
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t =
Z 1
0

Pft
Pt
 "
df (A.58)
Each period there is a fraction (1  ) choosing price optimally and () indexing the price to
the previous period ination
t =
Z 1 
0

P ft
Pt
 "
df +
Z 1
1 


p
t 1
Pft 1
Pt
 "
df
multiplying inside the second integral by

Pt 1
Pt 1

t =
Z 1 
0

P ft
Pt
 "
df +
Z 1
1 


p
t 1
Pt 1
Pt
Pft 1
Pt 1
 "
df
integrating over the rms
t = (1  )

P t
Pt
 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1 (A.59)
from the price index, eq.(A:38) I know

1  



t 1
 1
t
1 " 1
1  
 1
1 "
=

P t
Pt

substituting in (A:59)
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1 (A.60)
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A.2 Set of Equilibrium Conditions. Conventional Mone-
tary Policy
List of variables (36).
Uct; Ct; Rt;t;t+1; Lt; Pmt; Yt
vt; R
k
t+1; xt;t+1; t; zt; t;
Qt; Kt; Nt; Net; Nnt;
Ymt; Ut;
Int; t; It; Gt;  t;
t; gt; At; t;
t; t; Ft; Zt; 

t ;
it; Spt
Households.
1. Marginal Utility of Consumption (Uct)
Uct = Et

(Ct   hCt 1) 1   h (Ct+1   hCt) 1

2. Euler Equation. Consumption Saving (Ct)
Ett;t+1Rt+1 = 1
3. Stochastic Discount Factor (t;t+1)
Ett;t+1 = Et
Uct+1
Uct
4. labor Market Equilibrium (Lt)

(1  )
L'+1t
Uct
= PmtYmt
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Banks.
5. Marginal Return on Banks Assets (vt)
vt = Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1
6. Gross Growth of Bank Assets (xt;t+1)
xt;t+1 = Et
t+1
t
zt;t+1
7. Marginal Return on Banks Wealth (t)
t = E (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett+1t;t+1zt;t+1t+1
8. Gross Growth of Bank Wealth (zt;t+1)
zt;t+1 = Et
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1

9. Leverage Ratio (t)
t =
t
  vt
10. Aggregate Capital (Kt)
QtKt+1 = tNt
11. Net worth in the banking sector (Nt)
Nt = Net +Nnt
12. Existing wealth (Net)
Net = t 1
 
Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt

Nt 1
13. Wealth of new banks (Nnt)
Nnt = wQttKt
Intermediate Producers.
14. Return to capital (Rkt)
Rkt =
t
Qt 1


PmtYmt
tKt
+Qt   t

15. Production of Intermediate goods (Ymt)
Ymt = At (UttKt)
 L1 t
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Capital Goods Producers.
16. Investment (Qt)
Qt = 1 +
i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
+ i

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
 Ett;t+1i

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
  1

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
17. Depreciation function (Ut)
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t
18. Optimal Capacity Utilization (Pmt)
Pmt
Ymt
Ut
= bU t tKt
19. Net Investment (t)
Int = It   ttKt
20. Law of movement of capital (Int)
Kt+1 = tKt + Int
21. Exogenous government consumption (Gt)
Gt = Ggt
22. Aggregate resources (It)
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
(Int + Iss)
Retailers
23. Final Production (Yt)
Ymt = Ytt
24. Price Dispersion (t)
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1
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25. Optimal Price Choice (Ft)
Ft = PmtYt + Ett;t+1
 "
t 
"
t+1Ft+1
26. (Zt)
Zt = (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Zt+1
27. Optimal choice of price (t )
t =
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t
28. Evolution of ination (t)
1 "t =

(1  ) (t )1 " + 



t 1
1 "
Policy and Exogenous Variables.
29. Fisher Equation (Rt)
it = EtRtt+1
30. Monetary policy (it)
it
i
= Et

it 1
i
R ht

i Yt
Y
Y
"it
31. Technology Shock
lnAt = a lnAt 1   "at
32. Capital Quality Shock (t)
ln t = " ln t 1   "t
33. Government Shock (gt)
ln gt = g ln gt 1   "gt
34. Shock to the Probability of dying (t)
ln t =  ln t 1   "t
35. Markup shock ( t)
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ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t
36. Premium (Spt)
Spt = Rkt  Rt
Summary of Variables (36) and Equations (36) :
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A.3 Social Planners Problem.
The Social Planners Problem.
Introducing eq.(1:62) in eq.(1:63)
Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
i
2

Kt+1  Kt [1 + t] + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) : (A.61)
Combining eq.(1:62) with eq.(1:61) and introducing in eq.(A:61)
Yt = Ct +Gt +Kt+1   (1  t) tKt (A.62)
+
i
2

Kt+1  Kt [1 + t] + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) :
Now, substituting eq.(1:60) in eq.(A:62)
Yt = Ct +Gt +Kt+1  

1  c   b
1 + 
U1+t

tKt (A.63)
+
i
2

Kt+1  Kt [1 + t] + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) :
Finally, substituting eq.(1:59) in the previous equation
At (UttKt)
 L1 t = Ct +Gt +Kt+1  

1  c   b
1 + 
U1+t

tKt (A.64)
+
i
2

Kt+1   (1 + t)Kt + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) :
Then, the social planner chooses [Ct; Lt; Ut and Kt+1] to maximize the utility of the consumer
eq.(1:58) subject to the restriction eq.(A:64). The Lagrangian for the problem is
L =
1
Et
X
t=0
t

ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 + '
L1+'t

(A.65)
+Et
1X
t=0
tt
26664
At (UttKt)
 L1 t
 Ct  Gt  Kt+1 +
h
1  c   b1+U1+t
i
tKt
 i
2

Kt+1 Kt(1+t)+t 1Kt 1
Kt t 1Kt 1+Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) :
37775
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The rst order conditions are:
Ct :
1
(Ct   hCt 1)   t   Et

h
Ct+1   hCt

= 0 (A.66)
Lt :  L't + t (1  )At (UttKt) L t = 0 (A.67)
Ut : tAt
(UttKt)
 L1 t
Ut
  bttKtU t = 0 (A.68)
Kt+1 : 0 =  t   tiEt

Kt+1  Kt (1 + t) + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss


(Kt+1   tKt + Iss)

1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss

(A.69)
 ti
2
Et

Kt+1  Kt (1 + t) + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
+Ett+1
At+1
 
Ut+1t+1Kt+1

L1 t+1
Kt+1
+ Ett+1

1  c   b
1 + 
U1+t+1

t+1
 Ett+1i
266664

Kt+2 Kt+1(1+t+1)+tKt
Kt+1 tKt+Iss

 
Kt+2   t+1Kt+1 + Iss

 (1+t+1)(Kt+1 tKt+Iss) (Kt+2 Kt+1(1+t+1)+tKt)
(Kt+1 tKt+Iss)2

377775
+Ett+1
i
2
 
Kt+2  Kt+1
 
1 + t+1

+ tKt
Kt+1   tKt + Iss
!2  
t+1

(A.70)
and the resource constraint
At (UttKt)
 L1 t = Ct +Gt + EtKt+1  

1  c   b
1 + 
U1+t

tKt (A.71)
+
i
2
Et

Kt+1   (1 + t)Kt + t 1Kt 1
Kt   t 1Kt 1 + Iss
2
(Kt+1   tKt + Iss) :
The Social Planners Steady State.
In this section I present the steady state that faces the Social Planners Allocation. This steady
state is calculated when [Yt+1 = Yt = Yt 1 = Y ] for each variable. Eq.(A:66  A:71) can, respec-
tively, be written in steady state as
 =
[1  h]
C (1  h) (A.72)
L =


(1  )

(UK)
 1
'+
(A.73)
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U =
"

b

K
L
 1# 11+ 
(A.74)
K
L
=

1   [1  ]

 1
 1 1
U
(A.75)
and the resource constraint
C = (UK) L1   G  K (A.76)
where the value of shock to the quality of capital and to productivity in steady state [ = A = 1]
and the depreciation in steady state
 = c +
bU1+
1 + 
were used.
Inserting eq.(A:74) into (A:75) and solving for the capital labor ratio
K
L
=

1   [1  ]

 1
 1
: (A.77)
The government spending was assumed as a fraction of the total output. That fraction is

G

then

G = GY

with
Y  = (K) L1  (A.78)
solving the resource constraint for
 
C
L

and using the e¢ cient rate

K
L

eq.(A:76) becomes
C
L
=

K
L
 
1 G  K
L
(A.79)
with
U =

1   [1  ]
b
 1

= 1 (A.80)
after substituting

K
L

in eq.(A:74).
Substituting eq.(A:72) in eq.(A:73) and using the e¢ cient values of the variables
L =
(
1  h
1  h
1  


K
L
 
C
L
 1) 11+'
: (A.81)
Finally, using the e¢ cient values of

K
L

and [U]
U
K
L
=

1   [1  ]

[ 1 1 ]
: (A.82)
After using the optimal value for utilization (U = 1) the equations for consumption, labor and
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capital can be written as
Y  =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
264
h
1 [1 ]

i (1+')
 1 
1 G
  []
h
1 [1 ]

i 1 2 '
 1
375
  1
1+'
(A.83)
K =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
264 1 G
h
1 [1 ]

i 1+'
1 
  []
h
1 [1 ]

i+'
1 
375
  1
1+'
(A.84)
L =

1  h
1  h
1  

 1
1+'
" 
1 G
  []
h

1 [1 ]
i #  11+' (A.85)
which are equations in terms of the deep parameters.
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A.4 Derivation of the Welfare Cost.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) I compare the welfare cost of each alternative policy
relative to the time invariant equilibrium of the Ramsey policy. The welfare associated with the
optimal Ramsey policy conditional on a particular state of the economy in period zero is
V R0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU

CRt ; L
R
t

(A.86)
and the welfare associated with an alternative implementable regime is
V I0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU

CIt ; L
I
t

: (A.87)
If the consumption cost of following an alternative policy regime instead of the Ramsey policy
on a particular state in period zero is represented by

WC

the cost of the alternative policy is
implicitly dened by
V I0 = E0
1X
t=0
tU
 
1 WCCRt ; LRt  : (A.88)
where

WC

is the fraction of consumption of the Ramsey regime that a household is able
to renounce in order to be indi¤erent between that regime and the alternative policy. As in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I assume that at time zero the variables of the economy equal
their respective Ramsey steady state value.
Substituting the particular form of the utility function in (A:88)
V I0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

ln
 
1 WCCRt   h  1 WCCRt 1  1 +  LR1+ t

: (A.89)
Equation [A:89] can be written
V I0 =
ln
 
1 WC
1   + E0
1X
t=0
t

ln

CRt   hCRt 1
  
1 +  
LR1+ t

: (A.90)
Solving this equation for the welfare cost
1
(1  ) ln
 
1 WC = V I0   V R0 (A.91)
which makes use of [A:86]. Noting that
ln (1 + x)  x;
the welfare cost [A:91] can be written as
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WC = [1  ] V R0   V I0  ; (A.92)
which is the welfare cost function that is necessary to approximate up to second order in order to
have accurate welfare comparisons across regimes.
Approximating the welfare cost up to second order.
Equation (A:92) can be approximated up to second order around the deterministic Ramsey steady
state (x0; ") with [x0 = x] and " = 0. Because in equilibrium V R0 and V
I
0 are functions of the
initial state vector (x0) and the parameter scaling the standard deviations of the shocks ("), the
conditional welfare cost can be written as
WC (x0; ") = [1  ]

V R0 (x0; ")  V I0 (x0; ")

(A.93)
Because I want to compare the welfare results using the same deterministic Ramsey steady
state, only the rst and second order derivatives of the cost respect to (") have to be considered
(see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)). Following this, the second order approximation of the
previous equation can be written in general terms as
WC  WC (x0; ) +WC (x0; ) +
1
2
WC (x0; )
2
 : (A.94)
Now, because all the regimes are approximated across the same deterministic Ramsey steady
state, the constant term

WC (x0; )

in eq. (A:94) disappears in the comparison. This means
that
WC (x0; ) = 0:
The terms containing the rst order approximation of the policy function

WC (x0; )

are
zero. This is shown in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Up to a rst order of approximation, the
derivative of the policy function respect to the parameters scaling the variance of the shocks is
zero. For this particular case
WC (x; 0) = [1  ]

V R0" (x; 0)  V I0" (x; 0)

 = 0
The term containing the second order approximation is
WC"" (x; 0) =
1
2
[1  ] V R0"" (x; 0)  V I0"" (x; 0)2" (A.95)
which is the welfare measure used in the main text.
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A.5 Optimal Policy. Timeless Perspective.
The optimal policy problem is solved from a timeless perspective. The Ramsey planner maxi-
mizes the discounted utility function subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions. Following
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), the portion of the Lagrangian that is relevant for optimal policy
from a timeless perspective is
LR = E0
" 1X
=0
U [C ; L ] +
1X
=0
Lm0C ()
#
(A.96)
where the period t utility function is
Ut = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 + '
L1+'t
() is the Ramsey planners discount factor, which I assume to be identical to that of the compet-
itive equilibrium. The vector

Lm
0
t

contains the 29 Lagrange multiplier associated with the 29
equilibrium conditions in period t Ct (). Those equilibrium conditions in period t are:
1. Marginal Utility of Consumption (Uct)
Uct   Et

(Ct   hCt 1) 1   h (Ct+1   hCt) 1

= 0:
2. Euler Equation. Consumption-Saving (Ct)
Ett;t+1Rt+1   1 = 0:
3. Stochastic Discount Factor (t;t+1)
Ett;t+1   EtUct+1
Uct
= 0:
4. Labor Market Equilibrium (Lt)

(1  )
L'+1t
Uct
  PmtYmt = 0:
5. Marginal Return on Banks Assets (vt)
 vt + Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1 = 0:
6. Gross Growth of Bank Assets (xt)
xt;t+1   Ett+1
t
zt;t+1 = 0:
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7. Marginal Return on Banks Wealth (t)
 t + E (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett+1t;t+1zt;t+1t+1 = 0:
8. Gross Growth of Bank Wealth (zt)
zt;t+1   Et
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1

= 0:
9. Leverage Ratio (t)
t  
t
  vt = 0:
10. Aggregate Capital. Loans (Kt)
QtKt+1   tNt = 0:
11. Net worth in the banking sector (Nt)
 Nt +Net +Nnt = 0:
12. Existing wealth (Net)
Net   t 1
 
Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt

Nt 1 = 0:
13. Wealth of new banks (Nnt)
Nnt   wQttKt = 0
14. Return to capital (Rkt)
Rkt  
t
Qt   1


PmtYmt
tKt
+Qt   t

= 0:
15. Production of Intermediate goods (Ymt)
Ymt   At (UttKt) L1 t = 0:
16. Investment (Qt)
 Qt + 1 + i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
+ i

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
 Ett;t+1i

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
  1

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
= 0:
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17. Depreciation function (Ut)
 t + c + b
1 + 
U1+t = 0:
18. Optimal Capacity Utilization (Pmt)
PmtYmt   bU1+t tKt = 0:
19. Net Investment (t)
 Int + It   ttKt = 0:
20. Law of movement of capital (Int)
 Kt+1 + tKt + Int = 0:
21. Exogenous government consumption(Gt)
 Gt +Ggt = 0:
22. Aggregate resources (It)
 Yt + Ct +Gt + It + i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
(Int + Iss) = 0:
23. Final Production (Yt)
Ymt   Ytt = 0:
24. Price Dispersion (t)
 t + (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1 = 0:
25. Optimal Price Choice (Ft)
 Ft + PmtYt + Ett;t+1 "t "t+1Ft+1 = 0:
26. (Zt)
 Zt + (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Zt+1 = 0:
27. Optimal choice of price (t )
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t  
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t = 0:
28. Evolution of ination (t)
 1 "t +

(1  ) (t )1 " + 



t 1
1 "
= 0:
29. Fisher Equation (Rt)
it   EtRtt+1 = 0:
Then the Ramsey planner solves the above problem choosing at period t processes for the 30
endogenous variables Uct, Ct, t, Lt, vt, xt, t, zt, t, Kt+1, Nt, Net, Nnt, Rkt, Ymt, Qt, t, Ut,
Int, Pmt, Gt, It, Yt, t, Ft, Zt, t , t, Rt, it and the 29 Lagrange multipliers associated with the
competitive equilibrium relationships. The 5 exogenous processes for the shocks are given by
30. Technology Shock (At)
lnAt = a lnAt 1   "at:
31. Capital Quality Shock (t)
ln t = " ln t 1   "t:
32. Government Shock (gt)
ln gt = g ln gt 1   "gt:
33. Shock to the Probability of dying (t)
ln t =  ln t 1   "t:
34. Markup shock ( t)
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t :
The values for the variables listed above are given dated t<0, and also the values of the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the competitive equilibrium constraints are given at t<0.
Then, as explained in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) the structure of the optimality conditions
associated with the Ramsey equilibrium are time invariant.
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Appendix B
Appendix Chapter 2
B.1 Set of Equilibrium Conditions. Unconventional Mon-
etary Policy
List of variables (36).
Uct; Ct; Rt;t;t+1; Lt; Pmt; Yt
vt; R
k
t+1; xt;t+1; t; zt; t;
Qt; Kt; Nt; Net; Nnt;
Ymt; Ut;
Int; t; It; Gt;  t;
t; gt; At; t;
t; t; Ft; Zt; 

t ;
it; 
QE
t
Households.
1. Marginal Utility of Consumption (Uct)
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Uct = Et

(Ct   hCt 1) 1   h (Ct+1   hCt) 1

:
2. Euler Equation. Consumption Saving (Ct)
Ett;t+1Rt+1 = 1:
3. Stochastic Discount Factor (t;t+1)
Ett;t+1 = Et
Uct+1
Uct
:
4. Labor Market Equilibrium (Lt)

(1  )
L1+'t
Uct
= PmtYmt:
Banks.
5. Marginal Return on Banks Assets (vt)
vt = Et (1  ) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett;t+1xt;t+1vt+1:
6. Gross Growth of Bank Assets (xt;t+1)
xt;t+1 = Et
"
1  QEt+1
1  QEt
#"
Tt+1
Tt
#
zt;t+1:
7. Marginal Return on Banks Wealth (t)
t = E (1  ) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett;t+1zt;t+1t+1:
8. Gross Growth of Bank Wealth (zt;t+1)
zt;t+1 = Et
h 
Rkt+1  Rt+1
 
1  QEt

Tt +Rt+1
i
:
9. Leverage Ratio (t)
Tt =
1
1  QEt
t
t   vt :
10. Aggregate Capital (Kt)
QtKt+1 = 
T
t Nt:
11. Net worth in the banking sector (Nt)
Nt = Net +Nnt:
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12. Existing wealth (Net)
Net = Et
h 
Rkt  Rt
 
1  QEt 1

Tt 1 +Rt
i
Nt 1:
13. Wealth of new banks (Nnt)
Nnt = w

1  QEt 1

QttKt:
Intermediate Producers.
14. Return to capital (Rkt)
EtR
k
t+1 = Et
t+1
Qt


Pmt+1Ymt+1
t+1Kt+1
+Qt+1   t+1

:
15. Production of Intermediate goods (Ymt)
Ymt = At (UttKt)
 L1 t :
Capital Goods Producers.
16. Investment (Qt)
Qt = 1 +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + K
2
+ i

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + K

Int + K
Int 1 + K
 Ett;t+1i

Int+1   Int
Int + K

Int+1 + K
Int + K
2
:
17. Depreciation function (Ut)
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t :
18. Optimal Capacity Utilization (Pmt)
PmtYmt = bU
1+
t tKt:
19. Net Investment (t)
Int = It   ttKt:
20. Law of movement of capital (Int)
Kt+1 = tKt + Int:
21. Aggregate resources (It)
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Yt = Ct +Gt + It +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + K
2
(Int + K) + & t:
Costs of government participation
& t = 
QE
t QtKt+1
241 + 1
2
"
QEt QtKt+1
QEt 1Qt 1Kt
  1
#235
with
QtS
G
t = 
QE
t QtKt+1
Retailers
22. Final Production (Yt)
Ymt = Ytt:
23. Price Dispersion (t)
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1:
24. Optimal Price Choice (Ft)
Ft = PmtYt + Ett;t+1
 "
t 
"
t+1Ft+1:
25. (Zt)
Zt = (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Zt+1:
26. Optimal choice of price (t )
t =
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t:
27. Evolution of ination (t)
1 "t =

(1  ) (t )1 " + 



t 1
1 "
:
Policy and Exogenous Variables.
28. Fisher Equation (Rt)
it = EtRtt+1:
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29. Monetary policy (it)
ln

it
i

= R ln

it 1
i

+ (1  R)


h
ln
t

i
+ Y

Yt
Y

+ "it:
30. Credit Policy

QEt

QEt = QEEt

log

Rkt
Rt

  log

Rk
R

:
31. Government Spending (Gt)
Gt = Ggt
32. Technology Shock (At)
lnAt = a lnAt 1   "at:
33. Capital Quality Shock (t)
ln t = " ln t 1   "t:
34. Government Shock (gt)
ln gt = g ln gt 1   "gt:
35. Shock to the diverting funds (t)
lnt =  lnt 1   "t:
36. Markup shock ( t)
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t :
Summary of Variables (36) and Equations (36) :
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B.2 Optimal Unconventional Policy. Timeless Perspec-
tive.
The optimal policy problem is solved from a timeless perspective. The Ramsey planner maxi-
mizes the discounted utility function subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions. Following
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), the portion of the Lagrangian that is relevant for optimal policy
from a timeless perspective is
LR = E0
" 1X
=0
U [C ; L ] +
1X
=0
Lm0C ()
#
(B.1)
where the period t utility function is
Ut = ln (Ct   hCt 1)  
1 + '
L1+'t
() is the Ramsey planners discount factor, which I assume to be identical to that of the compet-
itive equilibrium. The vector

Lm
0
t

contains the 29 Lagrange multiplier associated with the 29
equilibrium conditions in period t Ct (). Those equilibrium conditions in period t are:
1. Marginal Utility of Consumption (Uct)
Uct   Et

(Ct   hCt 1) 1   h (Ct+1   hCt) 1

= 0:
2. Euler Equation. Consumption-Saving (Ct)
Ett;t+1Rt+1   1 = 0:
3. Stochastic Discount Factor (t;t+1)
Ett;t+1   EtUct+1
Uct
= 0:
4. Labor Market Equilibrium (Lt)

(1  )
L'+1t
Uct
  PmtYmt = 0:
5. Marginal Return on Banks Assets (vt)
 vt + Et (1  t+1) t;t+1
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

+ Ett+1t;t+1xt;t+1vt+1 = 0:
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6. Gross Growth of Bank Assets (xt)
xt;t+1   Ett+1
t
zt;t+1 = 0:
7. Marginal Return on Banks Wealth (t)
 t + E (1  t+1) t;t+1Rt+1 + Ett+1t;t+1zt;t+1t+1 = 0:
8. Gross Growth of Bank Wealth (zt)
zt;t+1   Et
 
Rkt+1  Rt+1

t +Rt+1

= 0:
9. Leverage Ratio (t)
t  
t
  vt = 0:
10. Aggregate Capital. Loans (Kt)
QtKt+1   tNt = 0:
11. Net worth in the banking sector (Nt)
 Nt +Net +Nnt = 0:
12. Existing wealth (Net)
Net   t 1
 
Rkt  Rt

t 1 +Rt

Nt 1 = 0:
13. Wealth of new banks (Nnt)
Nnt   wQttKt = 0
14. Return to capital (Rkt)
Rkt  
t
Qt   1


PmtYmt
tKt
+Qt   t

= 0:
15. Production of Intermediate goods (Ymt)
Ymt   At (UttKt) L1 t = 0:
16. Investment (Qt)
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 Qt + 1 + i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
+ i

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
 Ett;t+1i

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
  1

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
= 0:
17. Depreciation function (Ut)
 t + c + b
1 + 
U1+t = 0:
18. Optimal Capacity Utilization (Pmt)
PmtYmt   bU1+t tKt = 0:
19. Net Investment (t)
 Int + It   ttKt = 0:
20. Law of movement of capital (Int)
 Kt+1 + tKt + Int = 0:
21. Exogenous government consumption(Gt)
 Gt +Ggt = 0:
22. Aggregate resources (It)
 Yt +Ct +Gt + It + i
2

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  1
2
(Int + Iss) + 
QE
t QtKt+1
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2
"
QEt QtKt+1
QEt 1Qt 1Kt
  1
#235 = 0:
23. Final Production (Yt)
Ymt   Ytt = 0:
24. Price Dispersion (t)
 t + (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1 = 0:
25. Optimal Price Choice (Ft)
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 Ft + PmtYt + Ett;t+1 "t "t+1Ft+1 = 0:
26. (Zt)
 Zt + (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Zt+1 = 0:
27. Optimal choice of price (t )
t  
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t = 0:
28. Evolution of ination (t)
 1 "t +

(1  ) (t )1 " + 



t 1
1 "
= 0:
29. Fisher Equation (Rt)
it   EtRtt+1 = 0:
Then the Ramsey planner solves the above problem choosing at period t processes for the 31
endogenous variables Uct, Ct, t, Lt, vt, xt, t, zt, t, Kt+1, Nt, Net, Nnt, Rkt, Ymt, Qt, t, Ut, Int,
Pmt, Gt, It, Yt, t, Ft, Zt, t , t, Rt, it, 
QE
t and the 29 Lagrange multipliers associated with the
competitive equilibrium relationships. The exogenous processes for the shocks are given by
30. Technology Shock (At)
lnAt = a lnAt 1   "at:
31. Capital Quality Shock (t)
ln t = " ln t 1   "t:
32. Government Shock (gt)
ln gt = g ln gt 1   "gt:
33. Shock to the diverting funds (t)
lnt =  lnt 1   "t:
34. Markup shock ( t)
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t :
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The values for the variables listed above are given dated t<0, and also the values of the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the competitive equilibrium constraints are given at t<0. Then, as
explained in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005) the structure of the optimality conditions
associated with the Ramsey equilibrium are time invariant.
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B.3 Calibration of The Asset Purchases Rule.
The asset purchases rule is:
QEt = 0 + QEEt

log

Rkt
Rt

  log

Rk
R

; (B.2)
given the lack of studies calibrating such a rule, I follow the next strategy in order to calibrate this
rule. Once the rule is calibrated, I use it to nd the e¢ ciency costs associated with the central
banks intermediation.
The policy rule in (B.2) has two parameters 0 and QE. I take evidence on the size of the
FEDs QE1 program and the change in the spread

SPt =
Rkt
Rt
  Rk
R

associated with it. The
evidence is taken for two di¤erent observations.
The rst point is when the shock hits, and after the FED had implemented QE1 the spread
was (SP 1t ). The share of assets held by the FED at that time was 
1
t . Then the rule (B.2) can be
written
1t = 0 + QESP
1
t : (B.3)
The empirical evidence (Gagnon et al. (2011)) suggest that the FED increased to 22% its
participation in the private assets markets. Hence, 1t takes that value.
The second points is before the implementation of QE1 but after the shock hit, hence, the
policy rule in (B.2) can be written as:
0t = 0 + QESP
0
t ; (B.4)
at that time the FED held zero percent of private securities. Hence, 0t = 0. The system (B.3,
B.4) can be solved for the policy coe¢ cients [0; QE] using evidence on (SP 0t and SP
1
t ). I rely
on empirical studies that estimated the impact of the QE1 on reducing the spread. In particular,
these studies provide information for calculating (SP = SP 0   SP 1). With that information, I
can solve the system (B.3, B.4) and obtain the policy coe¢ cients. Table 2 presents the information
Table B.1. Reduction in the Spread and Calibration of 0 and QE
 SP (bp:) QE
1. BAA-Mortgages (Nov08-March10) 182 12:1
2. Gagnon et al. (2011) 82 26:8
3. DAmico and King (2010) 50 44:0
4. Hancock and Passmore (2011) 125 17:6
5. Neely (2010) 94 23:4
6. Average 107 24:8
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The rst column in table B.1 shows the reduction in the spread once the FED implemented
QE1, (SP 0 SP 1). The second column shows the feedback coe¢ cient (QE) associated with each
piece of evidence. For example, take the row 1 in the table, if the FED reduced the spread in 182
basis points after having implemented QE1, the policy coe¢ cients in the rule would be 0 = 3:6
and QE = 12:1: Across the studies presented in table B.1, the average reduction in the spread
after implementing QE1 was 107 basis points. After the implementation of QE1, the FED had
purchased about 22 percent of long-term, agency debt, MBS and Treasury securities outstanding
at the beginning of the asset purchases program (Gagnon et al. (2011)). This implies that average
value for the feedback coe¢ cients implied by the calculations in Table B.1, is: QE is 24.8 and
QE = 30:5.
This value QE = 24:8 means that for each basis point that the spread increased over its long-
run level the FED increased its participation in the nancial markets on 24.8 basis points. I utilize
that value of QE to calibrate the rule in the benchmark case.
B.3.1 E¢ ciency Costs.
In order to calibrate the e¢ ciency costs, I assume that the FED followed a simple rule to implement
asset purchases during the past crisis. Additionally, I assume that the FEDs reaction was optimal.
I utilize the average of the parameters calculated in table 2 (QE = 24.8 and QE = 30:5) in order
to calibrate the linear rule:
QEt = 0 + QEEt

log

Rkt
Rt

  log

Rk
R

: (B.5)
Then, I search for the value of e¢ ciency costs () which make that rule optimal. I assume that
if the FED did not increased the QE1 above 22% of assets, was because the e¢ ciency costs impede
it.
For example, if the e¢ ciency costs are close to zero ( = 0:0001) the feedback coe¢ cient (QE)
reaches a value of 2500, which is quite far from the evidence suggested by the calibrated rule
(QE = 24:8). However, if implementing this unconventional policy is costlier, then the magnitude
of this feedback coe¢ cient decreases.
Table B.2 presents the e¢ ciency costs which make the rule with feedback coe¢ cients QE =
24.8 and QE = 30:5, optimal:
Table B.2. E¢ ciency Costs and Linear Rule.
QE 
1. 24:8 0:0025
this is the e¢ ciency cost used as benchmark.
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Appendix C
Appendix Chapter 3
C.1 Summary of Equilibrium Conditions.
Households.
1. Marginal Utility of Consumption. External
 
UExct

UExct = Et
"
1 
CExt   hExtCExt 1

#
:
2. Marginal Utility of Consumption. Internal
 
U Ict

U Ict = Et
"
1 
CIt   hIntCIt 1
   hInt 
CIt+1   hIntCIt

#
:
3. Euler Equation. Consumption Saving. External
 
CExt

1 = ExtEt
UExct+1
UExct
Rbt+1:
4. Euler Equation. Consumption Saving. Internal
 
CIt

1 = Et
U Ict+1
U Ict
Rt:
5. Stochastic Discount Factor (t;t+1)
t;t+1 = Et

ownershipExt 
ExtU
Ex
ct+1
UExct
+

1 ownershipExt


U Ict+1
U Ict

6. Aggregate Labour (Lt)
Lt =
("
()

UExct
Ex
 1
'
+ (1 )

U Ict

 1
'
#
[(1  )PmtAt (UttKt)]
1
'
) '
'+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Lt = L
Ex
t + (1 )LIt
7. Labour. External
 
LExt

LExt =

(1  ) U
Ex
ct
Ex
PmtYmt
Lt
 1
'
:
8. Labour. Internal
 
LIt

LIt =

(1  ) U
I
ct
Int
PmtYmt
Lt
 1
'
:
Banks.
9. Marginal Return on Banks Loans to Firms

vft

ft = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

:
10.Arbitrage Between banks assets. Marginal Return on Banks Loans to Households
 
Rbt

Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  
Rt
rest

= Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

11. Marginal Return on Banks Wealth (t)
t = Ett;t+1
t+1
Rt
rest
:
12. Banks Discount Factor (
t+1)

t+1 = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

:
13. Leverage Ratio (t)
t =
t
  vft
:
14. Loans to rms

Sft

QtS
f
t = tNt  qtSExtt :
15. Aggregate Capital (Kt+1)
QttKt+1 = QtS
f
t
16. Loans to Households
 
SExtt

qtS
Ext
t = B
Ext
t
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17. Households Borrowing
 
BExtt

WtL
Ex
t + 
Ex
t   TExt  Rbt

qt 1BExt 1

+

qtB
Ex
t

= CExt
18. Household Prots
 
Ext

Ext
OwnershipExt
= (1  )

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1

  w
h
Qt 1S
f
t 1 + qt 1S
Ext
t 1
i
+ (Qt   1) Int   i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) +
[(1   t) t   Pmt]Yt
19. Transfers
 
TExtt

TExtt = 
transfers
Ext [G   tYt] :
20. Net worth in the banking sector (Nt)
Nt = 

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1

+ w

Qt 1S
f
t 1 + qt 1S
Ext
t 1

21. Aggregate deposits (Dt 1)
Dt 1 = Qt 1Kt + qt 1BExtt 1  Nt 1
Intermediate Producers.
22. Return to capital (Rkt)
EtR
k
t+1 = Et
t+1
Qt


Pmt+1Ymt+1
t+1Kt+1
+ (Qt+1   t+1)

:
23. Return to loans to Consumption
 
qbt

EtR
b
t+1 = Et
t+1
qt


Pmt+1Ymt+1
t+1Kt+1
+ (qt+1   t+1)

:
24. Production of Intermediate goods (Ymt)
Ymt = At (UttKt)
 L1 t :
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Capital Goods Producers.
25. Investment (Qt)
Qt = 1 +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
+ i

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss

Int + Iss
Int 1 + Iss
  Ett;t+1i

Int+1   Int
Int + Iss

Int+1 + Iss
Int + Iss
2
:
26. Depreciation function (t)
t = c +
b
1 + 
U1+t :
27. Optimal Capacity Utilization (Pmt)
PmtYmt = bU
1+
t tKt:
28. Net Investment (Int)
Int = It   ttKt:
29. Law of movement of capital (Ut)
Kt+1 = tKt + Int:
30. Aggregate resources (It)
Yt = C
Ex
t + [1 ]CIt +G+ It +
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) :
Retailers
31. Final Production (Yt)
Ymt = Ytt:
32. Price Dispersion (t)
t = (1  )
2641  



t 1
 1
t
1 "
1  
375
 "
1 "
+ 
h

p
t 1
 1
t
i "
t 1:
33. Optimal Price Choice (Ft)
Ft = PmtYt + Ett;t+1
 "
t 
"
t+1Ft+1:
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34. (Zt)
Zt = (1   t)Yt + Ett;t+1
(1 ")
t 
 (1 ")
t+1 Zt+1:
35. Evolution of ination (t)
1 "t =
"
(1  )

"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t
1 "
+ 



t 1
1 "#
:
36. Fisher Equation (Rt)
it = EtRtt+1:
37. Wage (Wt)
Wt = (1  )PmtYmt
Lt
38. Optimal Price (t )
t =
"
"  1
Ft
Zt
t
39. Technology Shock (At)
lnAt = a lnAt 1   "at:
40. Capital Quality Shock (t)
ln t = " ln t 1   "t:
41. Markup shock ( t)
ln (1   t) =  ln (1   t 1) +
 
1  

ln (1  )  "t :
Summary of Variables (42) and Equations (41) :Nominal interest rate and any other policy
instrument are determined optimally or via a Taylor Rule.
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C.2 Prots and Deposits In Steady State.
C.2.1 Prots of the Firms.
To determine the household deposits in steady state, I need to determine the prots that enter the
budget constraint. In the economy three groups of rms produce prots.
Banks. The banks return every period to the households the amount of resources intermediated
by the (1  ) exiting banks
(1  )

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1

;
where Qt 1S
f
t 1 + qt 1S
Ext
t 1 = Qt 1Kt + qt 1B
Ext
t 1 . At the same time, the household transfer (w)
as startup funds. Hence, banks prots are:
Bankt = (1  )

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1

(C.1)
  w Qt 1Kt + qt 1BExtt 1  : (C.2)
Capital Goods Producers. Capital goods producers have prots equal to
Capitalt = (Qt   1) Int  
i
2

Int   Int 1
Int 1 + Iss
2
(Int + Iss) ; (C.3)
which is the function they maximize every period. In steady state those prots are zero.
Retailers. The retailers maximize every period the function
Rett =

(1   t) P

t
Pt
  Pmt

Y ft ; (C.4)
where  t is assumed to be zero in steady state and it serves only as a cost-push shock. And the
aggregate demand is
Y ft =
"
CExt + [1 ]CIt +G+ It +
i
2

It
It 1
  1
2
(It)
#
(C.5)
C.2.2 Prots in Steady State.
In steady state the prots of the capital produces are zero. Banks prots are:
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Bank = (1  )

Rk   R
res

QSf +

Rb   R
res

qSExt +
R
res
N

(C.6)
  w Qt 1Kt + qt 1BExtt 1  : (C.7)
And for the retailers
Ret = [1     Pm]

CEx + [1 ]CI +G+ I : (C.8)
C.2.3 Deposits In Steady State.
Total deposits in the economy are
D = QK + BExt  N: (C.9)
The households with external habits have steady-state borrowing of
BEx =
Ext
Ext   1

CEx + TEx   Ex  WLEx : (C.10)
After substituting the prots in steady state, aggregate borrowing of this group is
BEx

1 +

1
1 Rb

Ownership

q (1  )

Rb   R
res
+
R
res
  w
1  

=

1
1 Rb



CExt +
TEx

 WLEx

 

1
1 Rb

Ownership

(1  )

Rk   R
res
+
R
res
  w
(1  )

K

 

1
1 Rb

Ownership [(1     Pm)Y ] ;
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C.3 Banks Maximization Problem.
C.3.1 Banks Maximization.
The banks optimally choose the assets

Sfjt , S
Ext
jt

to maximize
Nt =

Rkt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

Qt 1S
f
t 1 +

Rbt 1  
Rt 1
rest 1

qt 1SExtjt 1 +
Rt 1
rest 1
Nt 1
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i
0@ hRkt   Rt 1rest 1RtiQtSfjt + hRbt   Rt 1rest 1Rti qtSExtjt
+
Rt 1+st 1
rest 1
Njt
1A ; (C.11)
subject to the incentive constraint (eq. 3.18). The conjectured solution is
Vjt = 
f
tQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (C.12)
Using the incentive constraint (eq. 3.18), the Lagrangian for this problem is
L = Vjt + t
h
Vjt   

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt
i
;
where (t) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive constraint. Substituting the
proposed solution (eq. 3.23)
L = [1 + t]
h
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt
i
  t

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

;
each period the bank chooses

Sfjt and S
Ext
jt

. The rst order conditions are:
Sfjt : [1 + t]Qt
f
t   tQt = 0; (C.13)
SExtjt : [1 + t] 
Ext
t qt   tqt = 0 (C.14)
and respect to the Lagrange multiplier
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt = 

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

(C.15)
This means that
ft =

t
1 + t

; (C.16)
and that
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Extt = 

t
1 + t

: (C.17)
The bank would like to equate the marginal return of its assets, hence from C.16 and C.17
Extt = 
f
t : (C.18)
Substituting the last equation in C.15
ft

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

+ tNjt = 

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

: (C.19)
Solving C.19 for (t)
t
  ft
=
QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt
Njt
; (C.20)
which is the banks maximum leverage ratio (t). And it can be written as
t =
t
  ft
(C.21)
Now, use the Bellman equation
Vjt = maxEt
1X
i=0
(1  ) it;t+1+i (Njt+1+i) ;
and express it as
Vjt = Ett;t+1

(1  ) + 

Vjt+1
Njt+1

Njt+1: (C.22)
Use the proposed solution (eq. 3.23) in the previous equation
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (C.23)
= Ett;t+1
"
(1  ) + 
 
ft+1Qt+1S
f
jt+1 + 
Ext
t+1qt+1S
Ext
jt+1 + t+1Njt+1
Njt+1
!#
Njt+1; (C.24)
insert the maximization condition C.18 in C.23 and simplify
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt
= Ett;t+1
"
(1  ) + 
 
ft+1Qt+1S
f
jt+1 + 
f
t qt+1S
Ext
jt+1 + t+1Njt+1
Njt+1
!#
Njt+1; (C.25)
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ft

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

+ tNjt
= Ett;t+1
24(1  ) + 
0@ft+1

Qt+1S
f
jt+1 + qt+1S
Ext
jt+1

+ t+1Njt+1
Njt+1
1A35Njt+1; (C.26)
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt
= Ett;t+1
"
(1  ) + 
 
ft+1
Qt+1S
f
jt+1 + qt+1S
Ext
jt+1
Njt+1
+ t+1
!#
Njt+1: (C.27)
Use the banks maximum leverage ratio to substitute in the previous equation
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (C.28)
= Ett;t+1
h
(1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1
i
Njt+1:
Dene the banks adjusted stochastic discount factor as:

t+1 = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

: (C.29)
Substitute C.29 in C.28
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt = Ett;t+1
t+1Njt+1: (C.30)
Now, insert the evolution of wealth (eq. 3.17) in the previous condition
ftQtS
f
jt + 
Ext
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (C.31)
= Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

QtS
f
jt +

Rbt  
Rt
rest

qtS
Ext
jt +
Rt
rest
Njt

;
which holds when
ft = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

; (C.32)
Extt = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  
Rt
rest

; (C.33)
and
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t = Ett;t+1
t+1
Rt
rest
: (C.34)
Use the banks condition C.18
Extt = 
f
t : (C.35)
Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  
Rt
rest
   bt

= Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

(C.36)
Substitute in C.31
ftQtS
f
jt + 
f
t qtS
Ext
jt + tNjt (C.37)
= Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

QtS
f
jt +

Rkt  
Rt
rest

qtS
Ext
jt +
Rt
rest
Njt

;
simplifying
ft
h
QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt
i
+ tNjt (C.38)
= Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

QtS
f
jt + qtS
Ext
jt

+
Rt
rest
Njt

which implies
ft = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rkt  
Rt
rest

;
t = Ett;t+1
t+1
Rt
rest
;
t =
t
  ft
;
with

t+1 = (1  ) + 

ft+1t+1 + t+1

;
and
Extt = 
f
t
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Extt = Ett;t+1
t+1

Rbt  
Rt
rest

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C.4 Welfare Cost.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), I compare the welfare cost of each alternative policy
relative to the time invariant equilibrium of the Ramsey policy. The welfare associated with the
optimal Ramsey policy conditional on a particular state of the economy in period zero
 
WR0

, is
WR0 = ()
 
1  ExtV R;B0 + (1 ) (1  )V R;S0 ; (C.39)
where () is the borrowers population. The superscript (R), represents the allocations in the
Ramsey regime, while the superscripts B and S, represent the borrowers, and savers allocations,
respectively. And,
V R;B0 =
(
E0
1X
t=0
 
Ext
t
U
h
CR;Bt ; L
R;B
t
i)
; (C.40)
is the welfare function of the borrowers, while
V R;S0 =
(
E0
1X
t=0
()t U
h
CR;St ; L
R;S
t
i)
; (C.41)
is the saverswelfare.
If the central bank implements an alternative policy, the social welfare in that regime
 
WM0

;
is :
WM0 = ()
 
1  ExtV M;B0 + (1 ) (1  )V M;S0 (C.42)
where the superscript (M) represents the allocations in the alternative regime. I follow the work
of Monacelli (2008), Mendicino and Pescatori (2008), and Rubio and Carrasco (2014) and assume
that the Ramsey planner weight the utility of group by their population size and their discount
factor, such that, given a constant consumption stream, the two agents achieve the same level of
utility.
If the consumption cost, of following the alternative regime instead of the Ramsey policy on
a particular state in period zero is represented by the cost of the alternative policy is implicitly
dened by
WM0 = ()
 
1  Ext(E0 1X
t=0
 
Ext
t
U
h
(1  {)CR;Bt ; LR;Bt
i)
(C.43)
+ (1 ) (1  )
(
E0
1X
t=0
()t U
h
(1  {)CR;St ; LR;St
i)
;
where [{] is the fraction of consumption of the Ramsey regime that a household is willing to
renounce in order to be indi¤erent between the alternative regime and the Ramsey regime.
The particular utility function of the borrowers is
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U
h
CR;Bt ; L
R;B
t
i
=

ln

CR;Ext   hExCR;Ext 1

  
Ex
1 + '

LR;Ext
1+'
; (C.44)
and that of the savers is:
U
h
CR;St ; L
R;S
t
i
=

ln

CR;It   hIntCR;It 1

  
Int
1 + '

LR;It
1+'
: (C.45)
Substituting C.44, and C.45 in C.43
WM0 = ()
8>><>>:E0
1X
t=0
 
Ext
t
2664 ln
 
(1  {)CR;Ext
  (1  {)hExCR;Ext 1
!
 Ex
1+'

LR;Ext
1+'
3775
9>>=>>; (C.46)
+ (1 )
8>><>>:E0
1X
t=0
()t
2664 ln
 
(1  {)CR;It
  (1  {)hIntCR;It 1
!
 Int
1+'

LR;It
1+'
3775
9>>=>>; ;
this can be written as
WM0 =  [ln (1  {)] (C.47)
+ ()
 
1  Ext
8<:E0
1X
t=0
 
Ext
t 24 ln

CR;Ext   hExCR;Ext 1

 Ex
1+'

LR;Ext
1+'
359=; (C.48)
+ (1 ) [ln (1  {)]
+ (1 ) (1  )
8<:E0
1X
t=0
()t
24 ln

(1  {)CR;It   (1  {)hIntCR;It 1

 Int
1+'

LR;It
1+'
359=; ; (C.49)
using C.40, and C.41 in C.47
WM0 =  [ln (1  {)] + ()
 
1  ExtV R;B0 (C.50)
+ (1 ) [ln (1  {)] + (1 ) (1  )V R;S0 ; (C.51)
which is equal to
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 [ln (1  {)] + (1 ) [ln (1  {)] (C.52)
= ()
 
1  Ext hV M;B0   V R;B0 i+ (1 ) (1  ) hV M;S0   V R;S0 i ;
Suppose that the economy is populated only by households with external habits ( = 1). Then,
the welfare cost for those households would be
{ =
 
1  Ext hV R;B0   V M;B0 i ; (C.53)
after noting that:
ln (1 + {)  {;
which is the welfare cost function that is necessary to approximate up to second order in order to
conduct accurate welfare comparisons, across regimes, if there are only households with external
habits.
C.4.1 Approximating the Welfare Cost up to Second Order.
Equation C.53 can be approximated up to second order around the deterministic Ramsey steady
state (x0; ") with [x0 = x] and " = 0. Because in equilibrium V
R;B
0 and V
M;B
0 are functions of
the initial state vector (x0) and the parameter scaling the standard deviations of the shocks ("),
the conditional welfare cost can be written as
{ (x0; ") =
 
1  Ext hV R;B0 (x0; ")  V M;B0 (x0; ")i : (C.54)
In order to ensure that the di¤erent regimes start on the same point, I compare them assuming
that their initial point is the same deterministic Ramsey steady state. Hence, only the rst and
second order derivatives of the cost respect to (") have to be considered (see Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2007)). Following this, the second order approximation of the previous equation can be
written in general terms as
{  { (x0; ) + { (x0; ) +
1
2
{ (x0; )2 : (C.55)
Now, because all the regimes are approximated across the same deterministic Ramsey steady
state, the constant term [{ (x0; )] in eq. C.55 disappears in the comparison. This means that
{ (x0; ) = 0:
The terms containing the rst order approximation of the policy function [{ (x0; )] are
zero. This is shown in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). Up to a rst order of approximation, the
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derivative of the policy function respect to the parameters scaling the variance of the shocks is
zero. For this particular case
{ (x; 0) =
 
1  Ext hV R;B0" (x; 0)  V M;B0" (x; 0)i = 0:
The term containing the second order approximation is
{"" (x; 0) =
1
2
 
1  Ext hV R;B0"" (x; 0)  V M;B0"" (x; 0)i2": (C.56)
Similarly, if there are only households with internal habits, the welfare cost up to second order
is
{"" (x; 0) =
1
2
(1  )
h
V R;S0"" (x; 0)  V M;S0"" (x; 0)
i
2": (C.57)
Given that there are () borrowers and (1 ) savers, the total welfare cost (x) is:
{Social = 

1  Ext
2
h
V R;B0"" (x; 0)  V M;B0"" (x; 0)
i
2" (C.58)
+ (1 )

1  
2
h
V R;S0"" (x; 0)  V M;S0"" (x; 0)
i
2";
which is the cost function utilized to calculate the convenience of the di¤erent policy in terms of
the foregone consumption.
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